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ABSTRACT 
Aviation researchers have only recently started to study factors not individually, but 
rather by combining their effects. A gap has been identified following a comprehensive 
review of the literature on trust and the combined traits of communication and trust in 
aviation maintenance. This research examines two preconditions of human error in 
aviation maintenance, communication and trust, and explores the way these are linked. 
Trust within different aspects of maintenance practice (interpersonal trust, trust 
towards technology, initial levels of trust) is presented and analysed, as well as 
examined as a prerequisite of effective communication. The aim of this study is to 
address the identified gap by investigating the existence of communication and trust 
in real life aviation maintenance occurrences. A Communication and Trust Question 
Set, comprising of questionnaires used in other industries, was devised to measure the 
relationship of communication and trust among aviation maintenance employees 
belonging to various groups. A thorough content analysis was performed in 
representative accident and incident investigation reports to identify the co-existence 
of communication and trust as preconditions in aviation maintenance occurrences. The 
results indicated that both communication and trust had a contribution to all 
maintenance occurrences and were prevalent issues in the reports examined. In 
addition, the content analysis method was applied to the aviation maintenance human 
factors training curriculum and material (coursebooks) used within the European 
Aviation Safety Agency regulatory framework. This analysis revealed the indirect 
existence of trust in the curriculum and the coursebooks, without direct mention to 
these factors. Based on indications that, in concert with trust, communication can also 
influence the detection of failures during aviation maintenance practice, an industry 
survey was conducted. This survey was conducted on 271 aviation maintenance 
professionals with the use of the Communication and Trust Question Set, intending to 
explore the association between three factors, communication satisfaction, 
interpersonal trust and trust towards maintenance software used in aviation 
maintenance companies. Overall, communication satisfaction was found to have a 
stronger association with interpersonal trust than with software trust. Thorough 
explanation and discussion on the significant differences among the different 
participants' groups is provided. An interesting finding is that aviation maintenance 
professionals have relatively high levels of trust and communication satisfaction at the 
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start of their current employment. This finding is consistent with the initial trust levels 
theory, examined in the past for other industries. A novel Conceptual Investigation 
Process has been developed on the basis of the study's methodology, with the objective 
to predict possible maintenance practice deviations in a causal relationship with 
communication and trust. The blending of the Conceptual Investigation Process with 
the multifunctional Communication and Trust Question Set tool has led to the 
conception of the Diagnosis of Communication and Trust in Aviation Maintenance 
(DiCTAM) model. The DiCTAM model is implemented through a hypothetical case 
study of possible aviation maintenance deviations. These results indicate the capability 
of the model to predict hypothetical maintenance deviations by using data collected 
from the target group's perceptions. Moreover, as examined, DiCTAM can be 
embedded within three out of four components of Safety Management Systems (SMS), 
safety risk management, safety assurance and safety promotion. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
To err is within human nature.  However, it is primarily over the last 50 years that 
human error has become a field of scientific research, as errors have started to have a 
greater global impact on economies, health, environment and communities. In the US 
alone, from over $300 billion spent on maintenance and operations every year, 80% 
was spent repairing damage caused by human error in equipment, systems and dealing 
with harm caused to people (Dhillon & Liu, 2006; Reason, 1997). In 2014, there were 
648 fatalities in 14 accidents caused by human error. This number was 1.5% higher 
than the previous 10-year average. This increase was the result of larger aeroplanes 
with higher passenger capacity (European Aviation Safety Agency, 2015), therefore 
since human error has led to greater human loss, there is a necessity within the aviation 
community to address this issue.         
A better understanding of human factors has become imperative within aviation, and 
several models and systems have been introduced and implemented in the continuous 
attempt to predict and reduce human error. In aviation maintenance, there are twelve 
factors identified as the principal preconditions or conditions, that contribute to human 
error, widely known as the Dupont’s Dirty Dozen (Blaise, Levrat, & Iung, 2014; Chang 
& Wang, 2010; Dupont & G, 1997; Flin, O’Connor, & Mearns, 2002; Marquardt, 
Gades, & Robelski, 2012; Wise, Hopkin, & Garland, 2010).  
These elements (illustrated in Figure 1.1) are dissimilar in nature and appear either on 
personal, group or organizational performance levels (Reiman, 2011). Communication 
is among these 12 most frequent causes of human error. 
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Figure 1.1 Dupont’s Dirty Dozen. 
 
 
These twelve factors are described briefly below: 
1. Lack of communication: Lack of communication (due to ineffective 
communication between aircraft maintenance professionals) can result in 
maintenance error which can be potentially responsible for an aviation incident 
or accident. 
2. Complacency: The calm feeling of being very familiar and possibly false self-
confidence with a task, and not needing to double check, question or try one’s 
best over it. An aviation professional might experience complacency during 
repetitive tasks while having established an overreliance on his/her relative 
abilities.  
3. Lack of knowledge: The lack of the required set of information/data for the 
successful completion of an aviation maintenance task. Updates in technology 
and procedures require aircraft professionals to keep their knowledge up to 
date. 
4. Distractions: Any mental or physical disruptions in the work of an aircraft 
maintenance professional. These distractions might prevent maintenance 
professionals from attending accurately to their work, possibly resulting in a 
maintenance task process error.  
5. Lack of teamwork: Many maintenance tasks require professionals to work in 
teams. In the instances that these teams fail to establish mutual understanding 
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6. Fatigue: Fatigue can affect the performance of aviation maintenance 
professionals. Relevant training is necessary to promptly recognise symptoms 
of physical tiredness, mental or emotional fatigue in oneself or colleagues. 
7. Lack of resources: Resources can be accounted as anything required by 
aircraft maintenance professionals to perform their duties successfully (time, 
personnel, equipment). Any deviation from the optimal amount might lead to 
an error-prone situation. 
8. Pressure: This precondition refers to the management-imposed expectations 
or self-induced pressure for prompt and flawless employee performance. 
9. Lack of assertiveness: Assertiveness is the ability to express one’s opinion 
and feelings confidently in a constructive and collaborative way. A lack of this 
quality may lead to maintenance errors as it can leave maintenance deviations 
undetected. 
10. Stress: This precondition has physical and psychological causal conditions and 
can affect work performance.  
11. Lack of awareness: The failure to be able to foresee all possible consequences 
by one’s actions. 
12. Norms: The unwritten rules set and followed by the employees of an 
organisation. These rules can be either in accordance or not with the 
organisation’s policies and can lead to unsafe practices and procedures.  
The Dirty Dozen is one of the most used human factors typologies in aviation 
maintenance, as it is still used in training and accident and human error analysis in 
aviation worldwide (Blaise et al., 2014; Chang & Wang, 2010; Federal Aviation 
Administration, U. S. Department of Transportation, & Flight Standards Service 2011; 
Flin et al., 2002; Marquardt et al., 2012). These 12 factors are of different nature and 
quantifiability; nevertheless, each one of them represents a causal failure in the user’s 
judgement, and as such, they are treated either individually or in homogeneous groups 
(Marquardt et al., 2012).  
Researchers still investigate the same elements under a new perspective. As a most 
recent example, the European Union (EU) joint research program ‘Future Sky Safety’ 
aims to study the concept of the Human Performance Envelope (HPE) in aviation. This 
research is investigating the interactions between nine human factors (stress, attention, 
situation awareness, vigilance, teamwork, workload, communication, trust, fatigue) 
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and the pilot’s performance, including how they work individually or in combination, 
and how they affect or degrade human performance (Silvagni, Napoletano, Graziani, 
Le Blaye, & Rognin, 2015). 
Communication has been indicated by past research to have a strong association with 
trust (Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, & Werner, 1998). Trust is a very important element 
in human social life and, therefore, has been researched extensively in the past by many 
different scientific disciplines (Hernandez & Santos, 2010). Numerous researchers 
agree that trust is a very important element in the employees’ relations and it is 
associated with the quality of their communication (Bachmann, 2003; Carrière & 
Bourque, 2009; Cascio, 2000; Cho & Park, 2011; Flin, 2007; Muchinsky, 1977; 
Shapiro, Sheppard, & Cheraskin, 1992; Yeager, 1978). However, trust is an under-
investigated trait in aviation (Flin, 2007), as discussed in detail in this study. Moreover, 
the association of trust with communication is an unexplored area, especially in the 
aviation maintenance research and practice field. 
 
1.2 Aim of the Study 
The aim of this study is to identify the existence of a relationship between 
communication and trust in the aviation maintenance environment. There are two types 
of trust to evaluate: trust towards colleagues (interpersonal trust) and trust towards 
technology (Jian et al., 1998; Li, Hess, & Valacich, 2008; Ockerman & Pritchett, 
2000). To that end, this research explores if and to what extent the aircraft maintenance 
personnel’s interpersonal trust and trust towards their company’s software is 
associated with the quality of their communication in the performance of maintenance 
tasks. One other aspect, which is very interesting to investigate for the first time, is 
whether the theory of high initial trust levels is also detectable in the aviation sector. 
Identifying the unknowns around communication and trust in aviation maintenance 
practice can be useful in addressing known safety shortfalls attributed directly or 
indirectly to these factors. This puts into the picture basic aviation maintenance 
training on communication and trust. Thus, the examination of the regulated 
curriculum and approved training material has also been targeted by this research. 
Overall, the concise examination and analysis of all these components is expected to 
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offer findings, conclusions and a systematic approach useful to the human factors 
scientific community and the aviation industry. 
1.3 Research Questions and Hypotheses and the Study’s Scope 
Two research questions and four research hypotheses have been formed to address the 
aims set for this study: 
Research questions: 
• Research Question 1: Are trust and communication detectable in aviation 
maintenance? 
• Research Question 2: Are communication and trust covered in aviation 
maintenance human factors basic training? 
Research hypotheses: 
• Research Hypothesis 1: (a) Aviation maintenance employees’ levels of 
interpersonal trust towards their colleagues have a positive association with 
their communication satisfaction and (b) supervisors/managers’ levels of 
interpersonal trust towards their subordinates have a positive association with 
their communication satisfaction. 
• Research Hypothesis 2: (a) Employees’ trust towards the company’s software 
has a positive association with their communication satisfaction and (b) 
supervisors/managers’ trust towards the company’s software has a positive 
association with their communication satisfaction. 
• Research Hypothesis 3: (a) Subordinates’ levels of interpersonal trust has a 
positive association with their communication satisfaction and (b) 
subordinates’ trust towards the company’s software has a positive association 
with their communication satisfaction. 
• Research Hypothesis 4: High initial trust levels are detectable in (a) 
interpersonal trust and (b) company’s software trust to newly recruited 
maintenance employees.  
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1.4 Thesis Structure 
Chapter 1 introduces the background, the subject of this research study, including the 
research questions and hypotheses, and provides an overview of the Thesis. 
Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive review of the relevant literature in the aviation 
maintenance industry. Both communication and trust have been critically and 
thoroughly investigated in the extended literature that covers both traits.  The most 
critical aspects of both theories have been covered in chapter one, while the focus has 
been on the review of the research (regarding communication and trust) that has been 
conducted in the aviation maintenance sector. This critical literature review process 
has identified the gaps to address next in this study.  
In Chapter 3 the study methodology is presented. It presents in depth the worldview 
that governs this whole research project along with the different methods and 
techniques used. The method chosen as the most appropriate in this study is a mixed-
methods analysis. Both qualitative and quantitative designs have been used to analyse 
the project’s data. Content analysis of accident and incident investigation reports 
(using tabulation and descriptive statistics from fifteen reports), content analysis of 
aviation human factors training curriculum and material (using manual word count 
technique and descriptive statistics) and a survey method (using correlational research 
design to treat data out of 271 participants) have been conducted. 
In Chapter 4, all results from the content analyses (from the accident and incident 
investigation reports and the aviation maintenance human factors training curriculum 
and material) and the survey method analysis (of the hypotheses testing and additional 
observations from the data) are presented in a thorough and comprehensive way. Each 
subchapter includes discussion on the results found.  
In Chapter 5, the link among communication, trust and aviation safety is discussed. 
The recognised importance of the contribution of communication and trust in aviation 
safety has led to the formation of a novel Conceptual Investigation Process. The 
Conceptual Investigation Process incorporating the multifunctional tool 
Communication and Trust Question Set, forms the new Diagnosis of Communication 
and Trust in Aviation Maintenance (DiCTAM) model. The DiCTAM model is able 
not only to predict possible maintenance practice deviations in a causal relationship 
with communication and trust, but also with any other human factors traits under 
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examination. In this view, further qualitative investigation is performed (case study 
using tabulation, Airbus A320 family Fan Cowl Doors Incidents) of possible aviation 
maintenance deviations. The methodology of the case study is provided in full detail 
while a full discussion and conclusion is provided as well. Moreover, the embodiment 
of the DiCTAM model is examined within Safety Management Systems, towards 
enhancing safe practice within the aviation maintenance environment. 
In Chapter 6, a full discussion is provided on the results of the methods and all 
research questions and hypotheses are answered based on the results.  
In Chapter 7, the conclusions of the study are presented, with further research 
suggestions to be addressed by other human factors researchers. Also, the limitations 
of this study are discussed here. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Basic Communication Theory 
Communication is a field of study that is of interest across many disciplines, including 
marketing and computer science. Communication is a process that involves everyone 
in their everyday life. However, defining communication has been challenging. There 
have been many definitions of communication in textbooks and different approaches 
through the years, beginning with Shannon and Weaver (1949) as they studied the 
transmission of messages in communication (Fiske, 1990). 
Communication has been frequently defined with different phrases depending on the 
different approaches and discipline of each researcher. In some definitions there is 
emphasis on the significance of symbols, as in “the transmission of information, ideas, 
emotions and skills…by the use of symbols” (Berelson & Steiner, 1964, p.527), while 
others examine communication as a product e.g. “We use the word ‘communication’ 
sometimes to refer to what is transferred, sometimes to the means by which it is 
transferred, sometimes to the whole process” (Ayer, 1955, p.13).  
In the study of communication there are two main streams. One stream considers 
communication as the transmission of messages and the other as the production and 
exchange of meaning (Fiske, 1990). In the transmission of the message stream, the 
member that sends the message is the sender, and the one who accepts it is the receiver. 
Communication, to be effective, must be an active process where both the sender and 
the receiver/s assure that the intended objectives are met. To achieve that, both the 
coding and the decoding process of the message along with the channel and/or medium 
of communication, are very important to its success. If the result is not the anticipated 
one, then the communication process is characterised as failed, and then the 
communication steps are investigated to identify the cause of this failure (Fiske, 1990). 
The second stream, the production and exchange of meanings deals with the 
interaction between any messages and people and the meaning that comes out of this 
interaction. In this stream, connotation is a term that is usually met. Also, 
misunderstandings, besides being a result of a failure in communication, may be due 
to cultural differences between the sender and the receiver (Fiske, 1990). 
According to Schramm (1954) very important elements that should be added to the 
communication process are the sender’s and receiver’s experiences. The mode of 
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communication chosen should be the appropriate one to meet the circumstances of 
both the sender and the receiver. The sender proceeds with the message coding based 
on his/her experience while the receiver understands the message by connecting it to 
his/her prior knowledge / cognitive level. Then the sender needs to assure that the 
message has been transmitted correctly by evaluating the receiver’s feedback 
(Schramm, 1954) as shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1 Schramm’s Communication Model with feedback. 
 






To understand the communication theories fully, the definitions of the terms: channel, 
code and medium are necessary. Channel is the means through which information 
flows (Duncan & Moriarty, 1998). Examples of channels are light waves, sound waves 
and radio waves. Medium is the material or mechanical way of transforming the 
message into a signal capable of being passed on along the channel. Coding is the 
sharing of mutual meaning between members of the same culture (Fiske, 1990).  
The basic features of the chosen channel determine the nature of the medium that will 
be selected. Next, this medium will determine the characteristics and the range of the 
codes that will be used to transmit the message. Fiske (1990) further suggests that 
media can be divided into three categories, as seen in Figure 2.2: 
• The presentational media. The body language, oral speech, the facial 
expressions are providing communication. This requires the physical presence 
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• The representational media. Any medium that represents the above by the 
production of a text, picture, painting, piece of art. These media do not require 
the presence of the communicator as they can act independently. 
• The mechanical media. These media utilize technologically developed 
channels; therefore, they are transmitters of the presentation and representation 
media. Examples are radio, television, computers, telephones. 
 
Figure 2.2 Concept map of communication media. 
 
 
Given that communication is effective and complete it can a) be beneficial to staff’s 
interpersonal and group relationships; b) guarantee that attitudes and expectations will 
be clear with no hidden agendas; c) retain focus on the task and situational awareness; 
and d) act as a managing tool (Kanki, Helmreich, & Anca, 2010).  
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2.1.1 Miscommunication 
To understand and define communication, researchers needed to clarify 
miscommunication as well. It is difficult to investigate communication and 
miscommunication separately as they are strongly interrelated. Miscommunication is 
treated as a kind of communication with its own distinct patterns and characteristics 
(Anolli, Ciceri, & Riva, 2002). In this context, miscommunication can be defined as 
‘the dark side of interpersonal communication (Parret, 1994) not being too far from its 
standard meaning of missing, flaw and disruption of the rules of communication 
(Mortensen, 1997).  
Furthermore, miscommunication includes ‘mismatching interpretation’ and distortion 
of the message (Anolli et al., 2002). This definition also includes the potential cultural 
differences between the sender and the receiver which are responsible for possible 
alternative interpretative models. Miscommunication, in the condition that it is noticed 
and attempted to be repaired, has a positive outcome on the communication process as 
well, as it provides a chance for further interaction between the communicators. 
Miscommunication has been included in several communication theories, e.g. 
Shannon & Weaver (1949) through the years as a deviation or a disruption, either 
important or less important, at any stage of the communication process (Anolli et al., 
2002).         
In the aircraft maintenance environment, a model of communication fault was 
developed by Shukri, Millar, Gratton and Garner (2016) that was inspired by 
Cushing’s (1994) detailed communication between a pilot and an air traffic controller 
failure overview. In this model there are six message characterisations:  “a) A message 
that is unavailable; b) A message that is available but incomplete; c) A message that 
is available, complete but incorrect; d) A message that is available, complete, correct 
but not clear; e) A message that is available, complete, correct, clear but not 
understood; f) A message that is available, complete, correct, clear, understood but 
mistakes still happen due to human factors” (Shukri et al., 2016).               
From this model, it is evident that even if the message is free from all the failure-prone 
factors, there is still the possibility of mistakes. Subsequently, all the specialists' efforts 
lead to the direction of the elimination of the known or predictable factors that can lead 
to a fault and the constant attempt to identify and eliminate the uncharted ones. 
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Therefore, in the case that communication for one or more reasons does not result in 
the correct exchange of the message, the beneficial effects are not fully realised.  
The contribution of communication to the occurrence of human errors stems from 
various reports. Human error can be tagged as “the human causal factor associated 
with aviation accidents” (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003) or “the failure of planned 
actions to achieve their desired ends—without the intervention of some unforeseeable 
events” (Reason, 1997). A study commissioned by the Dutch Aerospace Research 
Centre (NLR), identified various contributory factors to aircraft accidents, incidents 
and errors. In seven ground service providers in the Netherlands, both management 
and operational personnel named the ten most frequent factors that are involved in the 
cause of mistakes on the ramp (see Figure 2.3). Poor communication is the second 
most prevalent factor on that list (Balk & Bossenbroek, 2010).   
Ineffective communication is an important precondition for human error in all highly 
complex and regulated industries worldwide (Cushing, 1994). Extended research in 
aviation has shown that human factors cause 70-80% of aviation incidents at the front 
end, and 15-20% of them occur in maintenance procedures (Drury, 2000; McFadden 
& Towell, 1999). The aviation sector was the first to identify that the implementation 
of standardised procedures has contributed to safety and teamwork efficiency (70% of 
commercial flight accidents were caused due to communication errors between crew 
members) (Leonard, Graham, & Bonacum, 2004).  
Another large study in the aviation industry found that 70% of all accidents were 
caused due to crew coordination and communication issues (Lautman & Gallimore, 
1987). These findings are supported by Wiegmann & Shappell (1999) and Yacavone, 
(1993) as they have recognised crew coordination to be a major contributing factor in 
military aviation (as cited by Wiegmann & Shappell, 2012).  Failed communication 
has also been reported to be the second most frequent local factor in airworthiness 
events (Rail Safety Standards Board, 2003).  As a comparison, in railway maintenance, 
it has been shown that 92% of incidents occurred due to communication failures 
(Murphy, 2001; Rail Safety Standards Board, 2003). In the healthcare industry 
communication is among other common elements prone to mistakes as well (Leonard 
et al., 2004). Subsequently, healthcare had as well the need for standardisation of the 
communication tools due to its complexity, the limitations of human performance and 
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the different training amongst the medical professionals. For that purpose, tools like 
SBAR (Situation, Background, Assessment and Recommendation) were introduced 
for all medical personnel as a means to establish common terminology and 
methodology to avoid any communication failures (Leonard et al., 2004). 
The European Commercial Aviation Safety Team (ECAST) has acknowledged the 
awareness of the potential risk of ineffective communication as a human factor and 
that further research is necessary towards that direction (Balk & Bossenbroek, 2010). 
Of note are the results of a survey conducted by Balk & Bossenbroek (2010) on 
aviation staff working on the ramp, as illustrated in Figure 2.3. In particular, it was 
found that management's awareness is at higher levels than the line personnel's, 
suggesting that the administration has recognised these factors to be the causal 
preconditions of human errors. 
 
Figure 2.3 Contributing factors for errors, as perceived by aviation staff working on 
the ramp. 
 
(Balk & Bossenbroek, 2010) 
  14 
Moreover, various researchers have highlighted the problem of ineffective 
communication between maintenance staff, cabin crew and flight crew, proposing 
different ways to mitigate this issue (Caldwell, 2005; Mattson, Petrin, & Young, 2001). 
It is evident from the above that communication is a very important element within 
complex industries like aviation. 
An example in which maintenance communication was involved in an aircraft 
accident, is the Atlantic Southeast Airlines flight 529 in August 1995. The accident 
occurred in Georgia, United States of America (USA), during an emergency landing, 
after the loss of a propeller blade, resulting in 9 casualties and 20 injuries. The National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that "the probable cause of this 
accident was the in-flight fatigue fracture and separation of a propeller blade resulting 
in distortion of the left engine nacelle, causing excessive drag, loss of wing lift, and 
reduced directional control of the aeroplane. The fracture was caused by a fatigue crack 
from multiple corrosion pits that were not discovered by Hamilton Standard because 
of inadequate and ineffective corporate inspection and repair techniques, training, 
documentation, and communications." (National Transportation Safety Bureau, 1996). 
The NTSB in this report highlighted as a contributing factor the internal inadequate 
communication and documentation systems of the aeroplane’s manufacturer 
(Hamilton Standard) that led maintenance personnel to confusion and faulty 
procedures. 
Even though aviation was the first industry to regulate and implement human factors 
policies and guidelines, the need for new research and procedural improvement is 
continuous and arduous. In the occurrence of any new procedure introduced, new 
research over the possible reasons for a failure of the new system or its human element 
towards its failure must be applied. Moreover, the continuous effort to make 
communication in aviation effective has led to the observation and understanding of 
all aspects of human expressions. Different modes of expression, such as politeness 
(Bonnefon, Feeney, & De Neys, 2011), are under review by human factors specialists, 
in their attempt to promote clarity and minimise miscommunication at all levels.  
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2.1.2 Aviation Maintenance Areas prone to Communication Failure 
In aviation maintenance, one critical aspect is documentation. The most common 
reason for accidents in aviation is insufficient documentation and procedures (Taylor 
& Thomas, 2003b; Von Thaden, Wiegmann, & Shappell, 2006; Ward, McDonald, 
Morrison, Gaynor, & Nugent, 2010). More recent studies indicate that written 
communication can be more prone to mistakes than oral communication in critical 
maintenance communication. The reason is that in oral communication, clarification 
is easier to obtain, so fewer human errors which affect aircraft safety, are detected 
(Shukri et al., 2016). 
The improvement of maintenance documentation can establish communication as an 
important factor that could have a positive contribution to the execution of 
maintenance tasks safely (Sogg, 2002; Taylor & Thomas, 2003b). Written procedures 
govern every action in aircraft maintenance. These are manufacturers' Instructions for 
Continued Airworthiness (ICA's) and Fault Isolation Manuals and all supporting 
documentation that are continually updated. Also, as the aircraft design is evolving 
fast and becoming more sophisticated, they expand in volume. All this immense 
amount of documentation amendments and novelty must be adopted simultaneously 
by maintenance personnel around the world, even if their first language is not the one 
the documentation was produced in (Drury, 2010, 2013), typically English.  
Moreover, there is extensive research in the development and improvement of online 
platforms, that aim to replace workcards, targeting lower cost along with positive 
impact on the engineers' situational awareness, error probability, job satisfaction, 
adaptability (Kraus & Gramopadhye, 2001; Liang, Lin, Hwang, Wang, & Patterson, 
2010). Another example is that of an FAA 3-phase sponsored study that dealt with an 
improved design of the manufacturer's maintenance documentation enabling the 
transfer of information to the maintenance personnel at a satisfactory level (Chaparro 
& Groff, 2002).   
Many researchers have produced instructions and guidelines, following human factors 
principles, to help maintenance staff avoid mistakes. Their research has been 
successful in reducing human errors (Chervak, Drury, & Ouellette, 1996; Drury, 
2013).  However, the people in charge do not always acknowledge this work by 
implementing it in the field (Karanikas, Soltani, de Boer, & Roelen, 2016). They 
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usually persist in following their own former good experience and the employees’ 
perspective rather than adopt guidelines and instructions that stem from research 
(Chaparro & Groff, 2002).  
Shift turnover is of great significance in highly complex and regulated business 
environments such as aviation maintenance, the oil industry and medicine. According 
to Parke and Kanki, from the 8% of aircraft maintenance failures that were due to 
communication factor, 51% were related to shift turnover while 41% had no relation 
to it (Parke & Kanki, 2008). The turnover related maintenance occurrences were 
classified, by the reporting system used for this research, to have more severe and 
dangerous consequences (Parke & Kanki, 2008). These results indicate that debriefs 
conducted according to human factors principles, can enhance productivity by 20 – 
25% (Tannenbaum & Cerasoli, 2013). While debriefs may appear to be cost-effective 
and produce quick results in the organisations’ improvement of performance, the study 
of such processes over the years is scattered across different disciplines with no 
conclusive results (Tannenbaum & Cerasoli, 2013).  
The literature above highlights that communication in the aircraft maintenance 
environment provides several considerations. An element that underlies every phase 
of the aircraft maintenance process, a primary element of the maintenance process, as 
it is the framework upon which information transmission takes place, the research 
community and the industry need to proceed with further investigation on the structure 
of documentation and shift turnover procedures.  
 
2.1.3 Communication in Aviation Training 
The training framework in aviation is designed to enhance communication skills and 
techniques, promote teamwork, accommodate human performance tools and develop 
and evolve situational awareness among maintenance personnel. This is an indicator 
of the way that the aviation industry values communication, acknowledges it as an 
important contributing factor of human error and takes actions towards its successful 
application within the various aviation activities. This training is either called Crew 
Resource Management (CRM) or Maintenance Resource Management (MRM) 
(Patankar & Taylor, 2008; Salas, Burke, Bowers, & Wilson, 2001; Taylor & Patankar, 
2001).  
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As the literature indicates: a) training is essential in enhancing elements such as 
successful communication and indeed has good results; b) the design of training, the 
delivery and its implementation is of great importance in achieving the required results 
in areas such as communication (Lappas & Kourousis, 2016; Salas, Tannenbaum, 
Kraiger, & Smith-Jentsch, 2012; Taylor & Thomas, 2003b). To define the success of 
training in promoting factors such as communication, more ‘on the job’ observation of 
the participants is needed, given that most of the research has been conducted in 
simulation (Karanikas, 2013; Kirkpatrick, 1998; Salas et al., 2001). 
In the European Union (EU), there is a 30 million Euro program (Future Sky Safety 
2015-2019) that explores all new tools and approaches to aviation safety. This 
research, among other issues, indicates that a significant gap has been recognised 
between the quality of the students’ oral and written communication skills gained 
during their studies (especially in the aeronautical area) and the skills required by the 
aeronautical industry to perform the tasks safely (Ribeiro & Filipe, 2016). Industry and 
academia do not work together as the communication between them is ineffective and 
discontinued (Karanikas, 2015; Malagas, Fragoudaki, Kourousis, & Nikitakos, 2017). 
This indicates that since there is no widespread human factors training within the 
tertiary education curricula, there is a great need for that for newly recruited personnel. 
 
2.2 Trust 
First, trust is the belief of somebody else’s benignant intentions. Second, no person 
can impose these beliefs to come true; in other words trust means to be prepared for 
the possibility that the anticipated benignant outcome will not happen. Third, the 
meaning of trust includes a degree of interdependency as somebody’s situation is 
linked to somebody else’s actions (Whitener et al., 1998). Based on these three 
elements, trust is the attitude someone or a party adopts (trustor) towards somebody 
else or another party (trustee) (Robinson, 1996). This attitude, or even both parties’ 
relationship, is influenced by the trustee’s behaviour and it will form the trustor’s 
understanding and receptiveness towards the trustee (Whitener et al., 1998). It is noted 
in the literature that the competence, benevolence and integrity of the trustee are the 
characteristics that trustor takes into consideration for the formation of his/her trust 
(Butler, 1991; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). 
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Trust, while it has been extensively researched by organisational researchers and more 
specifically by certain industries (e.g. web commerce), is understudied in high-
reliability organisations, such as the aviation industry (Cox, Jones, & Collinson, 2006). 
Trust usually stands in combination with other human characteristics and is difficult 
to be isolated and quantified. However, there is growing research indicating that trust 
and professionalism are fundamental factors in maintaining safety in the aviation 
industry. On the one hand, professionalism is the basis to exercise all the necessary 
steps towards safety, but on the other hand, personal trust is essential in the 
communication that is required (Flin, 2007; Muchinsky, 1977; O'Reilly, 1977; 
O'Reilly & Roberts, 1977; Yeager, 1978).  
Also, personal trust is associated with performance and cooperation (Axelrod, 1984; 
Ben-Ner & Putterman, 2009; Deutsch, 1962; Earley, 1986), citizenship behaviour 
(McAllister, 1995), problem-solving (Zand, 1972) and towards the skills and 
capabilities of aviation experts (trust in competence), to achieve the desired level of 
safety (Harvey & Stanton, 2014). Maintenance personnel need to trust that their 
colleagues will act as safely as themselves. This is a process that needs to be inspired 
and enhanced rather taken for granted (Taylor & Thomas, 2003a).  
Trust towards people, and especially towards individuals in the case of a risky 
situation, where an individual will do anything within his/her power to overcome the 
risk, aspires to be a solid factor in ensuring safety management (Harvey & Stanton, 
2014). However, Harvey & Stanton (2014) and Reason (2016) argue that this statement 
contradicts the modern systems’ approach to risk and human error, according to human 
factors principles, as human error has been considered so far to be a systemic rather 
than an individual consequence (Dekker, 2011; Rasmussen, 1997). Adaptation is 
inevitable where models include the social system and human error while 
organisations put pressure on their systems on the benefit of their cost-effectiveness - 
productivity balance (Leveson, 2004). 
Apart from the trust between colleagues, there is the trust between maintenance 
personnel and management that is rather low and makes staff feel sceptic and 
pessimistic that positive results in safety cannot be achievable (Taylor & Patankar, 
2001). Management is responsible for building, namely establishing/taking the 
initiative towards the employees, as well as maintaining trust (Whitener et al., 1998). 
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Beyond interpersonal trust, there is the confidence towards technology and procedures, 
having in mind that trust is bipolar, lingering between the two extremes of trust and 
distrust (Jian, Bisantz, & Drury, 1998; Ockerman & Pritchett, 2000).  
Procedures are clusters of partial steps that, to be successful, need to meet different 
criteria and conditions (e.g. environment). Due to different reasons, (e.g. lack of 
knowledge, norms) maintenance employees might not take these conditions under 
consideration in the case of failure. Situations like these might lead these professionals 
to lose trust on procedures, in the case of a failure, or show overreliance in the instance 
that the procedures were effective even if the right conditions were not met (Ockerman 
& Pritchett, 2000). 
The benefits of trust have been well understood for some decades now since Zand 
(1972) suggested that employees with higher levels of trust compared to the ones with 
lower levels:  a) make information processing more cost-effective to the company; b)  
seem to have more contentment among them; and c) show certainty towards other 
counterparts. Research has also shown that trust towards familiar individuals is far 
more easily achieved, especially when positive feedback makes this person perceived 
to be trustworthy. Apparently, the level of trust tends to differ amongst various 
organisations, depending on their size. In small organisations, the interpersonal trust 
seems to be at a higher level than in larger organisations, including in the military, but 
for different reasons (Patankar, 2004).  
Technology, on the other hand, is a human construction and, as a product, it lacks 
human characteristics (McKnight & Thatcher, 2004). To focus on the technology 
itself, one should isolate it from the human element (users, developers) and examine 
the technology artefact itself. This approach enables the investigation of trust towards 
technology without being influenced by the surrounding human structures (McKnight, 
Carter, Thatcher, & Clay, 2011).   
People depend on technological artefacts and rely on their anticipated abilities and 
capabilities to perform successfully. In this concept, trust means to depend or rely on 
another (McKnight & Chervany, 1996). Therefore, if someone believes he/she can 
depend on technology’s performance in a time of need, then trust towards technology 
is the describing term for it (McKnight et al., 2011).  
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Trust in technology is divided into initial trust and knowledge-based trust (McKnight 
et al., 2011). Initial trust refers to the expectations and beliefs of the anticipated 
operations of the technological application chosen by the user. Knowledge-based trust 
is the result after interaction and familiarisation with a technological system. Trust in 
technology needs further investigation as not extended research has been conducted in 
this area (McKnight et al., 2011).  
Furthermore, in modern times, more organisations have evolved into sizeable 
impersonal enterprises,  where trust between groups is difficult to achieve (Bachmann, 
2003). To overcome this issue, organisations have to agree, adopt and utilise similar 
social rules to gain familiarity and work together efficiently (Powell & DiMaggio, 
1991). Even though these sets of rules seem to prevent distrust among enterprises, 
some researchers insist that interpersonal relations are the ones that guarantee the 
formation of trust. This means that specific people need to represent organisations to 
form the needed familiarity (Giddens, 1990).  
Within business relations, trust is a fundamental factor that takes part in the 
orchestration of their expectations and mode of collaboration (Salam, 2017). It appears 
to have an assistive role in establishing business relationships, and it is crucial to re-
establish the theory behind the organisational influences on business behaviour. This 
will be of major help in attempts at building trust in inter-organisational interactions 
(Bachmann, 2003). “The more complex and dynamic social and economic relations 
and exchange arrangements are today; the more trust is needed as a lubricant to keep 
the motor running” (Arrow, 1974, p.23).  
Overreliance or excessive trust may have negative effects on interpersonal and 
organisational relations, and there is no current research to describe it adequately 
(Zaheer & Bachmann, 2006). To unfold the role that trust plays in organisations, one 
must explore the macrolevel and microlevel of theory and analysis. In the macro level, 
trust is studied regarding its interaction with the industry structure while in the micro-
level trust is examined among people as seen in Figure 2.4 (Kramer & Tyler, 1996).  
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Figure 2.4 Schematic representation of the concept of trust. 
 
 
2.2.1 Trust Dynamics in Organisations 
When systems in organisations promote open and free communication (knowledge 
sharing, uninhibited information disclosure) their employees are more likely to 
develop their trust-building towards the organisation and each other (Butler, 1991; 
Whitener et al., 1998; Zaheer & Bachmann, 2006). Trust has been linked to safety in 
the aviation industry and there has been a significant effort through MRM training (5th 
generation) to implement and enhance safety culture and engage all personnel in that 
direction.  
In the case that an organisation proceeds with implementing all necessary actions to 
reduce human errors, then learning from their mistakes would be one of them. In this 
case, it is crucial to the people involved to have a sufficient level of trust that they will 
not be blamed, if they report the identified mistake and that they can speak openly 
about it (commonly called a just culture) (Catino, 2008; Dekker, 2009). Although there 
are mechanisms available to maintenance personnel to avoid or reduce human errors, 
they must trust their managers mutually to achieve that.  
Studies have revealed that a big proportion of engineers do not trust that their 
managers’ actions will be solely aimed at enhancing safety (Goglia, Patankar, & 
Taylor, 2002). The lack of trust, or distrust, acts as an obstacle to the formation and 
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implementation of programs such as the FAA’s Aviation Safety Action Program 
(ASAP), that provides maintenance personnel with a system to report failures and 
thereby contribute to the continuous effort to improve aviation safety.  
 
2.2.2 Characteristics of Trust 
Other extended research on trust indicates that trust is at high levels at the beginning 
of a professional relationship "high initial trust levels" (McKnight, Cummings, & 
Chervany, 1998). New employees begin their employment with an intrinsic level of 
trust towards their colleagues and their organisations. Thereafter, it is the culture of 
each organisation that will be responsible for maintaining or altering this level. Trust 
is also a multidimensional area that is highly influenced by other social features. As 
proposed in the Model of Trust, Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995) suggest 
trustworthiness is perceived by factors such as ability, benevolence and integrity.  In a 
society that is trained to believe and rely on others, it is most probable that people will 
trust their organisation initially at a high level (McKnight et al., 1998; Rotter, 1967).  
Depending on the circumstances, trust levels can appear to develop as fragile or robust. 
Fragile is when it is subject to sudden changes during a given period either to a higher 
level, when the initial level is low or vice versa. Robust, on the other hand, is the 
opposite of fragile. It is used when the level of trust remains stable over a specified 
period (McKnight et al., 1998). Since the existence of the “high initial trust levels” is 
identified, it is of primary importance in the aviation industry to maintain it at those 
levels. It will only be successful by keeping in mind that the elements that make trust 
robust are:  
• Adequate precedent support, that is former good experience which forms a 
present behaviour in a similar manner;  
• Belief-confirming cognitive mechanisms, in which people’s remarks that 
oppose their beliefs are overlooked; and  
• Social mechanisms, the in person socialisation among people enhances the 
positive attitude between them (McKnight et al., 1998).  
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Moreover, research has identified legislative procedures, conflicts of power, stress and 
liability to be factors that reduce trust within organisations (Hovden, Størseth, & 
Tinmannsvik, 2011; Naevestad, 2008).  
Furthermore, research has confirmed the relationship between ASAPs and trust since 
organisations with ASAPs in place have demonstrated higher scores in trust than other 
companies in which ASAPs were not in their structure (Patankar & Driscoll, 2005). 
To evaluate the personal perception of maintenance personnel regarding human factors 
and safety in the workplace, specific tools had to be introduced. One tool that has been 
extensively used by the FAA is the Maintenance Resource Management Technical 
Operations Questionnaire (MRM/TOQ). Among other questions that were used to 
measure different human factors, the following statements were used to measure the 
level of trust: “My supervisor can be trusted”, “My safety ideas would be acted on if 
reported to a supervisor”, “My supervisor protects confidential information.”, “I know 
proper channels to report safety issues” (Patankar & Driscoll, 2005; Taylor & Thomas, 
2003a). 
These types of questionnaires are evolving and adapting over time, and new data is 
accumulating through continuous research. The optimum result would be to obtain a 
substantial amount of data from the full range of aviation activities, which would 
enable researchers to analyse results comparatively, inferentially, and longitudinally 
(Taylor & Thomas, 2003a). 
 
2.3 The Relation between Trust and Communication 
Literature has indicated that personal trust is an essential element that is associated 
with successful communication (Bachmann, 2003; Carrière & Bourque, 2009; Cho & 
Park, 2011; Flin, 2007; Muchinsky, 1977; O'Reilly, 1977; O'Reilly & Roberts, 1977; 
Yeager, 1978) this is a non-exhaustive list of references. Experimental research has 
shown that face to face communication has been highly successful due to, among other 
reasons, the lifting of anonymity and the trust that the communicators show to each 
other. Face to face communication enhances verbal communication where trust 
elements such as commitment and promises are used along with body language, facial 
expressions and visual cues to a successful outcome (Ben-Ner & Putterman, 2009). 
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Experimental evidence, regarding the relation between trust and communication, is 
scarce and more research on that field is needed (Ben-Ner & Putterman, 2009).   
When it comes to group communication, the group should establish common ground 
for the members to agree upon some basic ideas or concepts. This process should go 
through trust among the members, towards their incentives and attitudes, in order for 
the group to create a functioning communication (Anolli et al., 2002, as adapted by 
Bachmann, 2001; Donath, 1999).   
At the organisational level, when organisational culture supports open and free 
communication among all levels of employees, it is expected that they will enhance 
their trust levels towards each other and towards their organisation (Butler, 1991; 
Whitener et al., 1998; Zaheer & Bachmann, 2006). Recent research in the aviation 
maintenance field has indicated that communication and trust are two major factors 
that both can be used as tools for maintenance failure detection (Langer & Braithwaite, 
2016). Also, according to the FAA, trust is an essential element for a successful safety 
program in the aviation industry. The different safety programs base their effectiveness 
on the successful communication among the different business partners and mutual 
trust or distrust can affect this communication. 
 
2.4 The Link of Communication and Trust with Aviation Safety 
In the aviation industry, it is well recognised that poor communication is a paramount 
human factor contributing to errors (Balk & Bossenbroek, 2010; Bureau of Air Safety 
Investigation, 1997). Some researchers have acknowledged the need for error-free 
communication within aviation (Caldwell, 2005; Mattson et al., 2001), while others 
have identified poor communication to be an accident causal factor (Dupont, 1997; 
Flin et al., 2002; Weick, 1990). Recently, researchers have developed tools to 
proactively detect maintenance failures, such as the Maintenance Operations Safety 
Survey (MOSS), in which communication and trust are major factors (Langer & 
Braithwaite, 2016). 
Communication is an important aspect of business as information gathering on 
different professional matters takes up a large proportion of the employees’ time 
(Mount & Back, 1999). Communication satisfaction is the perception of employees 
regarding the communication practices followed by their organisation (Carrière & 
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Bourque, 2009). Communication satisfaction is very important in identifying a healthy 
and functioning organisation (Downs & Adrian, 2004; Downs & Hazen, 1977). Many 
researchers believe that satisfactory and effective communication is a sign of an 
organisation’s successful operation, with regards to its productivity, efficiency and its 
sales and customers approach (Zwijze-Koning & De Menno, 2007).  
Communication satisfaction has been associated positively with job satisfaction 
(Appelbaum et al., 2012; Carrière & Bourque, 2009; Downs & Hazen, 1977; 
Muchinsky, 1977; Pincus, 1986), employment situation satisfaction (Goris, 2007), 
organisational commitment (Ng, Butts, Vandenberg, DeJoy, & Wilson, 2006; Varona, 
1996), productivity (Hargie, Tourish, & Wilson, 2002), work value, and job 
performance (Jalalkamali, Ali, Hyun, & Nikbin, 2016). Research on communication 
satisfaction has been conducted in business areas to date such as: hospitality (Mount 
& Back, 1999), manufacturing (Downs & Hazen, 1977), private and public sector 
(Brunetto & Farr-Wharton, 2004), information technology sectors  (Appelbaum et al., 
2012), nursing (Pincus, 1986), automotive (Jalalkamali et al., 2016), financial services 
(Clampitt & Downs, 1993) and the ambulance service (Carrière & Bourque, 2009).  
In the aviation sector, research to date has shown that effective communication 
techniques are part of the employees’ initial and recurrent training and are linked to 
their on-job safety-related practices (Karanikas, Melis, & Kourousis, 2017). Also, 
organisational commitment and employees’ level of organisational satisfaction is 
associated with employees’ safety-related practices (Dode, Greig, Zolfaghari, & 
Neumann, 2016; Evans, Glendon, & Creed, 2007; Glendon & Litherland, 2001; Luria 
& Yagil, 2010; O'Connor, 2011). Figure 2.5 offers a schematic representation of the 
summary of the interrelationship between communication and trust and the effect of 
communication in organisational commitment and safety. It is of note that the literature 
does not discuss any links between the other four organisational traits and safety, even 
though these are affected by communication as well. However, the literature review 
did not reveal any research which was conducted to identify the association between 
communication satisfaction and trust in aviation maintenance professionals.  
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Figure 2.5 Interrelationships between communication, trust, safety and other 
organisational traits.  
 
 
Whitener et al. (1998) have found that there are three factors in communication which 
appear to have a strong association with trust: precise information, explanations and 
justifications of decisions and openness. Trust, as a fundamental trait in human social 
life, has been the focus of many different disciplines of science, and each one has dealt 
with it and defined it according to each discipline’s scope and interest (Hernandez & 
Santos, 2010). Trust has not been investigated as a trait in the aviation sector (Flin, 
2007).  However, it is a very important element of the interrelationships of co-workers 
in all industries and warrants further research, as it is linked to the quality of 
communication (Bachmann, 2003; Carrière & Bourque, 2009; Cascio, 2000; Cho & 
Park, 2011; Flin, 2007; Muchinsky, 1977; Shapiro et al., 1992; Yeager, 1978). 
Interpersonal trust is one of the organisational variables that have an interrelationship 
with communication. While other variables are not the focus of this study, these 
include performance, citizenship behaviour, problem-solving, cooperation and 
cooperative relationships. These variables can be defined through three distinct 
dimensions (Whitener et al., 1998). The first dimension is the confidence of the 
element of benevolence in the other party’s acts. The second dimension is that there is 
no control over the other party’s actions; therefore, there is no warranty in the 
deliverable outcome, and the third dimension is that the individual’s performance has 
some reliance on the performance of another individual (Whitener et al., 1998). Also, 
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past research has indicated that the character of trust can change, depending on the 
stage of the relationship between the different parties involved (Hernandez & Santos, 
2010). Moreover, the interaction between the two parties, i.e. the knowledge and 
evaluation of previous successful collaboration, which can lead to successful 
prediction of potential future collaboration, enhances trust. This is called knowledge-
based trust (Hernandez & Santos, 2010). 
 
2.5 Summary of Findings and Research Gaps 
This review aimed to include mainly aviation maintenance literature relevant to 
communication and trust; however, this literature was found to be scarce. Thus, it 
stems that these factors, examined either independently or in combination, are 
understudied in aviation maintenance. Communication and trust were, therefore, 
explored in the broader multidisciplinary literature, subsequently filtered to obtain 
studies applicable to the aviation maintenance context. The most important findings of 
this review are presented in a synoptic/summarised form in Table 2.1, acting also as a 
guide for the identification of research gaps. 
Most researchers have concluded that aviation has recognised miscommunication as a 
paramount human factor contributing to errors (Balk & Bossenbroek, 2010; Bureau of 
Air Safety Investigation, 1997), but there is still much work to be done to eliminate 
this risk and provide the industry with an error reduced communication. A research 
gap has been identified in the issues that arise from the communication among 
different areas within aviation, and there is research underway mitigating these issues 
(Caldwell, 2005; Mattson et al., 2001). Every aspect of human nature and personality 
characteristics should be considered, to eliminate the factors that might affect the 
adequate delivery and comprehensions of a message in the communication process. 
To achieve this, it is of high importance to place the mechanisms and models of 
miscommunication in the specific frame of the aviation industry (Anolli et al., 2002) 
as there is a lot of potential in their implementation and development, especially in 
aviation maintenance (McRoy, 1998; Mortensen, 1997; Parret, 1994). 
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Table 2.1 Synopsis of findings of the literature review on communication and trust, 
including identified research gaps. 
Communication 
Most researchers have concluded aviation has recognised miscommunication as paramount 
human factor contributing to errors (Balk & Bossenbroek, 2010; Bureau of Air Safety 
Investigation, 1997); there is still much work to eliminate this risk and provide industry with 
error free communication. 
Highly important to place mechanisms and models of miscommunication in the aviation 
industry specific frame (Anolli, Ciceri, & Riva, 2002) as there is a lot of potential in 
implementation and development there, especially in aviation maintenance (McRoy, 1998). 
While debriefs may appear to be cost effective and produce quick results in the organizations’ 
improvement of performance, the study of such processes over the years is scattered across 
different disciplines with no conclusive results (Tannenbaum & Cerasoli, 2013).  
Significant gap has been recognized between the quality of students’ oral and written 
communication skills gained during their studies (especially in the aeronautical area) and the 
skills required by the aeronautical industry to perform tasks safely (Karanikas, 2015). 
Extended research is needed in using new technologies to make them more appealing and 
resolve managers’ and employees’ negative attitude to similar platforms (Chaparro & Groff 
2002).  
Trust 
Trust, while extensively researched by organisational researchers and more specifically by 
certain industries (e.g. web commerce), is understudied in high-reliability organisations, like 
the aviation industry (Cox, Jones, & Collinson, 2006).  
Optimum result would be to obtain a large amount of data from full range of aviation activities, 
which would enable researchers to analyse results comparatively, inferentially and 
longitudinally (Taylor & Thomas, 2003a). 
Literature on trust in aviation industry is scarce. More research is needed in identifying and 
associating trust with other traits in actual aviation maintenance environment (Flin, 2007). 
Initial levels of trust (individual or company indicated at beginning of collaboration levels of 
trust) are high. Research can be focused on mechanisms capable to understand and manipulate 
retention of high trust levels over prolonged time (McKnight et al., 1998). 
Trust in technology and the negative effects of excessive interpersonal or organizational trust 
can be researched further, as these are understudied fields, especially in aviation maintenance.  
More extensive research is needed to standardize trust measuring methodologies, in 
analysing the results and enabling smaller scale research to be compared safely. This will 
lead to reliable results and interventions (Taylor & Thomas, 2003a). Only over recent years 
researchers have started trying to unveil the causational factors for maintenance errors 
(Hobbs & Williamson, 2003).  
Communication and Trust 
Experimental evidence, regarding the relation between trust and communication, is scarce and 
more research on that field is needed (Ben-Ner & Putterman, 2009). 
The relationship between trust and communication (how they interact with each other) among 
colleagues, between subordinates and managers/supervisors and between maintenance staff and 
technology needs to be researched. 
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Past research indicated that standard terminology and methodology would help reduce 
human errors occurring in aircraft procedures, especially in the written forms of 
communication (e.g. documentation, manuals, workcards etc.) (Chervak et al., 1996; 
Drury, 2013). Because of such endeavours, new technology and improved software 
are being used in the place of internal communication forms and workcards, stemming 
encouraging results (Kraus & Gramopadhye, 2001; Liang et al., 2010). Extended 
research has still to be conducted in this direction to make such hardware and software 
tools more appealing and subsequently resolve both managers’ and employees’ 
negative attitude to similar platforms (Chaparro & Groff, 2002). On the other hand, 
there is a lack of systemic study of maintenance debriefings, which, in turn, does not 
assist in comprehending and improving this crucial step in maintenance processes 
(Tannenbaum & Cerasoli, 2013). 
Training is the only vehicle that will introduce and facilitate all the required 
communication skills to maintenance personnel (Patankar & Taylor, 2008; Robertson, 
2005; Salas et al., 2001; Taylor & Patankar, 2001). There has been considerable 
research during the few past decades in developing systems and generating effective 
training programs. There is, however, the potential for further research in the long-
term effectiveness of these training programs as trainees do not appear to acquire the 
desired level of knowledge and skills (Taylor & Thomas, 2003b). 
The framework within inter-organisational trust has a lot of potential for restructuring, 
enabling the enhancement of business interactions and achieving further development 
(Bachmann, 2003). This review revealed that literature dealing with trust in the 
aviation industry is scarce. This alone indicates that there is a need for additional and 
more focused research in identifying and associating trust with other traits in the actual 
working environment of aviation maintenance (Flin, 2007). One of the interesting 
elements of trust is that the Initial levels of trust (the levels of trust an individual or a 
company indicates at the beginning of collaboration) are high. Human factors 
researchers' efforts can be focused towards the direction of understanding and 
manipulating the mechanisms which are capable of contributing to maintaining these 
levels high over a prolonged period (McKnight et al., 1998). 
More extensive research is needed to standardise trust measuring methodologies, in 
analysing the results, and to enable smaller-scale research to be compared safely, 
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which in turn will lead to reliable results and interventions (Taylor & Thomas, 2003a). 
Only over recent years, researchers have started to unveil the causational factors for 
maintenance errors (Hobbs & Williamson, 2003). This, eventually, is expected to lead 
to breakthroughs in the aviation maintenance field, provided that further focused 
research is undertaken. 
Following the example of EU research program ‘Future Sky Safety’ (Silvagni, 
Napoletano, Graziani, Le Blaye, & Rognin, 2015) and trying to fill in the gap in the 
human factors research in aviation maintenance, the investigation of the interaction 
between two factors, such as communication and trust, is pioneering within the 
aviation maintenance context and it is considered to be very important. The research 
that has been conducted in aviation human factors so far is mainly single factor 
research. Therefore, the study of two or more factors and their impact on human 
performance is a direction more researchers would be expected to follow in the future, 
given that human reaction is the result of different factors and conditions interacting 
with each other. 
Under the scope of the investigation of factors in combinations, it is beneficial to see 
further combined research in communication and trust in aviation maintenance. More 
specifically, the relationship between trust and communication (how they interact with 
each other) among colleagues, between subordinates and managers/supervisors and 
between maintenance staff and technology. Furthermore, trust among aviation 
businesses (including aircraft maintenance organisations) and how they interact with 
each other would be a domain for further research, as new data and findings could 
arise. Another aspect is trust in technology, which appears to be bereft of any 
significant research in the aviation maintenance field. The negative effects of excessive 
interpersonal or organisational trust can be researched further, as again, this is an 
understudied field, especially in aviation maintenance.  
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CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODS 
3.1 Purpose Statement 
The objective of this study is to explore the relationship between trust (variable) and 
communication (variable) in aviation maintenance (illustrated schematically in Figure 
3.1). Two variables were investigated with every attempt to exclude any bias, 
following the principles of the correlational research (Fraenkel & Wallen, 2003). 
 
Figure 3.1 Schematic representation of the trust - communication influence. 
 
The review of social sciences literature has indicated that trust is associated with and 
can contribute to successful communication (Bachmann, 2003; Flin, 2007) (Figure 
3.2). Thus, a minimum level of trust should be present with effective communication 
between two or more counterparts. As discussed in Chapter 2, another interesting fact 
in the literature is that a high level of trust is identified whenever a new professional 
relationship begins. This is known as the high initial trust levels model (McKnight et 
al., 1998). The study of trust issues in aviation to date has been scarce (Flin, 2007), 
and further research is required, particularly in the field of aviation maintenance. 
Studies which examine the relationship between trust and communication, including 
initial trust levels, among technical staff, have not been adequately investigated and 
could play an important role in the maintenance and advancement of aviation safety.  
  
Figure 3.2 Schematic representation of the relation between trust and communication, 
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Furthermore, since the new trend in aviation is to study factors in combination, rather 
than individually (Silvagni et al., 2015), the undertaken research on communication 
and trust aims to be part of the state-of-the-art research trend in the aviation domain. 
Only recently scientists have started to deal with the contributing effects of human 
factors in maintenance errors (Hobbs & Williamson, 2003). More specifically, 
researchers have highlighted the gap in effective communication between maintenance 
staff, cabin crew and flight crew, proposing some ways to mitigate this issue (Caldwell, 
2005; Fisher, 2016; Mattson et al., 2001). 
 
3.2 Research Design 
This study is following the pragmatic paradigm and focuses on the appropriate 
methodologies to a systematic and in depth investigation of the the identified research 
area (Mackenzie & Knipe, 2006). Since Pragmatism focuses on a specific scientific 
problem, researchers that choose to work within this frame mostly prefer a mixed-
methods approach rather than solely qualitative or quantitative methods (Mackenzie 
& Knipe, 2006, Robinson, Emden, Croft, Vosper, Elder, Stirling & Vickers, 2011). 
Robinson et al. (2011) argue that the pragmatic approach is the dedicated frame in 
which researchers can move back and forth between quantitative and qualitative 
approach to investigate and present their arguments. Moreover, a pragmatic approach 
is characterised by its combined objectivity and subjectivity, while its data are 
characterised by their transferable nature (Robinson, et al. 2011). A pragmatic inquiry 
sets the scenery for an inquiry that seeks for results and specific answers without 
excluding the philosophical investigation of the subject. Therefore, in this research 
study, the reasoning will move from a qualitative approach (set the context of the 
study) to a quantitative approach (to seek for specific answers and measurements) and 
then back to a qualitative approach again. This will allow to cross-validate and make 
the findings meaningful to the aviation maintenance setting. 
Following the pragmatic paradigm’s reasoning, and since this justification falls into 
the objectives of this study and the examples of past research in this field, the mixed 
methods approach is chosen as the most appropriate for this study. The first step is to 
challenge whether trust and communication are detectable in aviation maintenance. A 
qualitative approach investigates the existence of communication and trust within 
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aviation maintenance (work environment and employees training) (Bachmann, 2003; 
Flin, 2007). Then, the second step is to quantitatively explore in depth the association 
between trust (interpersonal and trust towards technology) and communication in 
aviation maintenance among different groups of maintenance employees, depending 
on their length of employment, type of license, employment status etc. The data 
collection and analysis (presented in Chapter 4) indicated that the research hypotheses 
could not be rejected (Phillips & Burbules, 2000) as cited in Creswell, 2014. Finally, 
the last step is to qualitatively validate the results from the two previous steps. 
Blending the results is also part of this final step, which is performed via a proposed 
model used in diagnosing and identifying communication and trust issues in aviation 
maintenance (presented in Chapter 5).  
In this study, mixed methods were selected to gather and analyse the data. More 
specifically, the most appropriate procedure to collect the data for this study were from 
within non-experimental designs and specifically utilising surveys and conducting 
content analysis. The literature review, which has examined thoroughly the research 
in the aviation field, has noted that the methods that have been followed in past 
research were both qualitative and quantitative. It has been considered useful to follow 
best practice from other researchers on the same field, as this study aims to contribute 
to the wider research body of knowledge with its findings. Moreover, these findings 
are targeted to identify patterns to further understand human factors in the specific 
field of aviation maintenance. The pragmatic paradigm is the one that dictates the use 
of mixed methods, as the qualitative and quantitative are linked to each other, which 
offers additional reassurance on the suitability of this research approach.   
Nonetheless, there are two other research designs which are available to researchers. 
These are qualitative designs and quantitative designs. In qualitative research, 
individuals or groups of people are examined by researchers using methods that aim 
to identify several characteristics and behaviours, and they usually do not target the 
investigation of any specific trait (Creswell, 2014). The researcher normally needs to 
interpret the findings, the same way as in any research, but the final written report has 
a flexible structure with no numbered data that could be analysed through a statistical 
process (Creswell, 2014).  
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On the other hand, in quantitative methods, researchers use tools that offer assistance 
to their objective observation of the traits examined. The researchers use various 
methods to collect their data in a numerical form and then analyse their finding with 
the use of mathematics, statistics or numeracy by using computational aids. Their 
numerical findings help them in presenting them in a clear way, capable of providing 
either explanation or generalisation of the trait under examination (Babbie, 2010).  
The two traits under investigation are communication and trust. The first step was to 
recognise whether both traits, communication and trust, are observable in the aviation 
maintenance environment (within aviation maintenance occurrences and aviation 
maintenance training). Subsequently, this association needs to be explored further, also 
reverting to a deeper insight in the significance of this association. Therefore, firstly, 
the content analysis method was utilised (as a qualitative research design technique), 
followed by the survey method (as a quantitative research design technique), exploring 
further the two traits. These content analyses’ results identified the existence of the 
two traits, both in the aviation maintenance practice and the human factors basic 
training curriculum and training material. The survey investigation (a technique widely 
used in quantitative research in various disciplines) was employed to obtain and 
interpret the findings, by quantifying and statistically analysing the results. It is also 
noted that the collection and analysis of data generally precludes the use of mixed-
methods research methodologies. This is due to the nature of the mixed methods 
design, which includes both quantitative and qualitative procedures that are used 
together to understand thoroughly the research problem (Creswell, 2014).  
A synopsis of the research design process, involving a qualitative and quantitative 
methodology branch, is represented schematically in Figure 3.3. For the quantitative 
branch of this research, the data were collected through surveys which were 
administered to different groups of aviation maintenance technicians (Creswell, 2014). 
More specifically, the survey method employed in this research intends to measure the 
interaction between the amount of trust and the effectiveness in communication. The 
qualitative one used the content analysis method to examine and produce results from 
aviation maintenance accidents/incidents' reports and official training material. 
 
Figure 3.3 Schematic representation of the research design adopted in this study. 
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In addition, the overall systematic research approach, which is summarised in Table 
3.1, presents the research approaches and methods selected and employed to address 
each one of the research questions and hypotheses. This summary assisted in the course 
of the research and it is also considered as a useful guide for the reader of this study, 
as it maps the research questions and hypotheses to the various methodologies. More 
detailed analysis and discussion are provided in subchapter 3.3 ‘Research Methods’. 
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Table 3.1 Mapping of research questions and hypotheses with research approaches. 
Research Question Research Approach 
1. Are trust and communication detectable 
in aviation maintenance? 
Use of qualitative approach (content 
analysis method) to investigate the 
existence of communication and trust in 
the aviation maintenance environment 
(actual accidents and incidents’ reports 
where aviation maintenance has had a 
contribution). 
2. Are communication and trust covered in 
aviation maintenance human factors basic 
training? 
Use of qualitative approach (content 
analysis method) to investigate the content 
of the aviation maintenance human factors 
basic training curriculum and training 
material, in relation to the coverage of 
communication and trust. 
Research Hypothesis Research Approach 
1. (a) Aviation maintenance employees’ 
levels of interpersonal trust towards their 
colleagues has a positive association with 
their communication satisfaction and (b) 
supervisors/managers’ levels of 
interpersonal trust towards their 
subordinates has a positive association with 
their communication satisfaction. 
Use of quantitative approach (survey 
method) to investigate and measure the 
association between communication and 
trust in aviation maintenance. 
2. (a) Employees’ trust towards the 
company’s software has a positive 
association with their communication 
satisfaction and (b) supervisors/managers’ 
trust towards the company’s software has a 
positive association with their 
communication satisfaction. 
3. (a) Subordinates’ levels of interpersonal 
trust has a positive association with their 
communication satisfaction and (b) 
subordinates’ trust towards the company’s 
software has a positive association with 
their communication satisfaction. 
4. High initial trust levels are detectable in 
(a) interpersonal trust and (b) company’s 
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3.3 Research Methods 
The research methods selected to be used in this study are the content analysis and the 
survey method. The content analysis method has been selected to investigate the 
existence of communication and trust: 
• In actual aviation safety occurrences (accident and incidents), specifically due 
to maintenance errors; 
• Within the basic aviation maintenance human factors training curriculum and 
training material. 
The survey method intends to identify and measure the association between 
communication and trust within the aviation maintenance context (technicians around 
the world surveyed). This is accomplished by exploring the aviation maintenance 
professionals’ perceptions from their current working experience.  
Moreover, for the implementation of this methodology, a dual-use tool has been 
developed and embedded within the content analysis and survey methods. This tool is 
the Communication and Trust Question Set. The overall research methodology 
construct is graphically represented in Figure 3.4, with full details described and 
discussed in the subchapters indicated on the figure. 
 
Figure 3.4 Graphic representation of the study’s overall research methodology. 
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3.3.1 The Communication and Trust Question Set  
As discussed in the preamble of the 3.3 ‘Research Methods’ subchapter, a dual-use 
question set was developed and used in this research, consisting primarily of two parts:  
• The Communication Satisfaction Questionnaire; 
• The Trust Constructs and Measures Questionnaire. 
These two questionnaires are complemented with demographics and general 
questions’ sections and constitute the communication and trust question set. In the 
following sections, the background, rationale, description and the final form of the 
developed question set are discussed in detail. 
 
3.3.1.1 Communication Satisfaction Questionnaire 
The Communication Satisfaction Questionnaire is a tool that was developed in 1977 
and widely used since then in research projects dealing with communication 
satisfaction in many different industries such as hospitality, healthcare and automobile 
manufacturing (Appelbaum et al., 2012; Brunetto & Farr-Wharton, 2004; Carrière & 
Bourque, 2009; Chan & Lai, 2017; Clampitt & Downs, 1993; Downs & Hazen, 1977; 
Gochhayat, Giri, & Suar, 2017; Jalalkamali et al., 2016; Mount & Back, 1999; Pincus, 
1986; Zwijze-Koning & De Menno, 2007; Zwijze-Koning, 2016). The 
Communication Satisfaction Questionnaire has been an efficient tool to extract 
employees’ perceptions of communication within their organisation (Gray & Laidlaw, 
2004; Zwijze-Koning & De Menno, 2007; Zwijze-Koning, 2016). This is a 40-item 
questionnaire, with items categorised in eight communicative themes (dimensions). 
These dimensions vary from interpersonal communication (e.g. an employee’s 
evaluation of the communication with his/her supervisor), to the organisation-wide 
communication climate (Zwijze-Koning & De Menno, 2007). This construct has been 
found to have a test-retest reliability of 0.94 (Downs & Hazen, 1977).  
The Communication Satisfaction Questionnaire has the capability to expose 
employees’ beliefs on important matters affecting communication within an 
organisation. The questionnaire’s convergent validity has been compared in the past 
with other questionnaires, e.g. the Communication Incident Technique (CIT) and it 
was found to be a very reliable and up to date tool in investigating an organisation’s 
communication satisfaction (Zwijze-Koning, 2016). Moreover, several researchers 
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have evaluated the reliability, concurrent and construct validity of this questionnaire 
(DeWine & James, 1988; Lee, Strong, Kahn, & Wang, 2002; Rubin, Palmgreen, & 
Sypher, 1994; Zwijze-Koning, 2016).  
It is noted that this questionnaire has been the primary research tool for various 
research studies conducted in many different countries and institutions (Rubin et al., 
1994). It has been characterised as “arguably the best measure of communication 
satisfaction in the organisational arena” (Clampitt & Downs, 1993, p. 6) while Rubin 
et al. (1994, p. 116) agree that “The thoroughness of the construction of this 
satisfaction measure is apparent. The strategies employed in this study are exemplary”.  
The content of the Communication Satisfaction Questionnaire used are presented in 
Table 3.2, where items in sections C ‘Communication - My job’ and D 
‘Communication - My job and the people I work with’ are addressed to all aviation 
maintenance professionals and section E ‘Communication - Only for 
managers/supervisors’ items to supervisors/managers only. All items are assigned a 7-
point Likert scale when used for surveys. Sections C, D and E use the coding: 1 = 
‘Very Dissatisfied’, 2 = ‘Dissatisfied’, 3 = ‘Somewhat Dissatisfied’, 4 = ‘Neither’, 5 
= ‘Somewhat Satisfied’, 6 = ‘Satisfied’ and 7 = ‘Very Satisfied’.  
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Table 3.2 Content of the Communication Satisfaction Questionnaire. 
Section C: Communication - My job 
C1 Information about my progress in my job. 
C2 Personnel news. 
C3 Information about organisational policies and goals. 
C4 Information about how my job compares with others. 
C5 Information about how I am being judged. 
C6 Recognition of my efforts. 
C7 Information about departmental policies and goals. 
C8 Information about the requirements of my job. 
C9 Information about government action affecting my organisation. 
C10 Information about changes in our organisation. 
C11 Reports on how problems in my job are being handled. 
C12 Information about benefits and pay. 
C13 Information about our organisation’s financial standing. 
C14 Information about accomplishments and/or failures of the organisation. 
Section D: Communication - My job and the people I work with 
D1 My superiors know and understand the problems faced by subordinates. 
D2 The organisation’s communication motivates and stimulates an enthusiasm for 
meeting its goals. 
D3 My supervisor listens and pays attention to me. 
D4 My supervisor offers guidance for solving job related problems. 
D5 The organisation’s communication makes me identify with it or feel a vital part 
of it. 
D6 The organisation’s communications are interesting and helpful. 
D7 My supervisor trusts me. 
D8 I receive in time the information needed to do my job. 
D9 Conflicts are handled appropriately through proper communication channels. 
D10 The grapevine (person to person informal communication / gossip) is active in 
our organisation. 
D11 My supervisor is open to new ideas. 
D12 Communication with my colleagues within the organisation is accurate and free 
flowing. 
D13 Communication practices are adaptable to emergencies. 
D14 My work group is compatible. 
D15 Our meetings are well organised. 
D16 The amount of supervision given me is about right. 
D17 The attitudes towards communication in the organisation are basically healthy. 
D18 Informal communication is active and accurate. 
D19 The amount of communication in the organisation is about right. 
D20 Are you a supervisor / manager? 
Section E: Communication - Only for managers / supervisors 
E1 My subordinates are responsive to downward directive communication. 
E2 My subordinates anticipate my needs for information. 
E3 I do not have a communication overload. 
E4 My subordinates are receptive to evaluation, suggestions, and criticism. 
E5 My subordinates feel responsible for initiating accurate upward communication. 
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It is noted that a minor modification was deemed necessary and was applied to the 
original Communication Satisfaction Questionnaire developed by Downs & Hazen 
(1977). In particular, the following two questions were deemed ambiguous and 
redundant and, therefore removed: 
Removed Question 1: 
‘Written directives and reports are clear and concise’ 
Reason 
In aviation maintenance written communication holds a substantial 
proportion of the overall communication as this stems from 
regulatory and quality assurance requirements, such as engineering 
reports, workcards, work orders, directives, airworthiness notices, 
service bulletins, discrepancy reports, etc. This item was considered 
as being too specific, referring only to directives and reports, not 
reflecting the wide variety of written communication in aviation 
maintenance. This ambiguity could affect the reliability of the 
responses. 
Furthermore, in the questionnaire there are six other items covering 
the scope and elements of clear and concise written communication. 






C3 Information about organisational policies and goals. 
C7 Information about departmental policies and goals. 
C8 Information about the requirements of my job.  
C10 Information about changes in our organisation.  
D6 The organisation’s communications are interesting and helpful. 
D19 The amount of communication in the organisation is about right. 
 
Removed Question 2:  
‘People in my organisation have great ability as communicators’ 
Reason 
This item was not considered sufficiently clear for the purposes of 
the survey (open to subjective interpretation to what constitutes 
‘great ability’) and the content analysis. This ambiguity could affect 
the reliability of the responses. 
Furthermore, in the questionnaire there two other items covering in a 
clear way the scope and elements of effective communication ability. 




of the removed 
item 
D3 My supervisor listens and pays attention to me. 
D12 Communication with my colleagues within the organisation is 
accurate and free flowing. 
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3.3.1.2 Trust Constructs and Measures Questionnaire 
The Trust Constructs and Measures Questionnaire has been developed by Li et al. 
(2012) and it is in practice a synthesis of various questionnaires developed and used in 
the past by Gefen (2004), Lowry, Vance, Moody & Beckman (2008), McKnight et al. 
(2011), McKnight, Choudhury & Kacmar (2002), Nicolaou & McKnight (2006), 
Stewart & Malaga (2009) and Vance, Elie-dit-cosaque & Straub (2008). The studies 
performed with the constituent questionnaires have yielded valid and reliable research 
data and findings, which informed their adoption and adaption from Li et al. (2012). 
Moreover, the measurement model (reliability scores, construct validity, convergent 
and discriminant validity) was found to produce statistically significant results (Li et 
al., 2012). The measurement model results verified that the measurement scales 
adapted by Li et al., (2012) were valid and reliable in their study. Specifically, web 
capability and reliability were found to be powerfully belief constituent in assessing 
trust in the website. This outcome confirmed that the IT-specific scales, that were 
adopted by Li et al., (2012) were valid in technology trust measurement (Li et al., 
2012).  
In the present research study, the Trust Constructs and Measures Questionnaire was 
adapted to measure interpersonal trust (among colleagues and between employees-
managers) and trust towards the software package utilised for aircraft maintenance 
certification and management. In particular, the questionnaire’s basic sections 
remained unchanged (those covering competence, benevolence, integrity, software 
capability and software reliability), with modifications introduced to reflect the 
supervisors/managers' levels (covering competence, benevolence and integrity). In 
addition, items of the questionnaire were rephrased in accordance with the scope of 
the study and to match the aviation maintenance context. The modification made is 
provided in detail in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3 Mapping of the modified items from the original Trust Constructs and 
Measures Questionnaire from Li, Rong &Thatcher, 2012. 
Original Trust Constructs and Measures 
Questionnaire by Li, Rong & Thatcher (2012) 










I believe this merchant is effective in 




F1. My colleagues fulfil my expectations in our 
collaboration. 
This merchant performs its role of e-vendor 
very well. 
F2. My colleagues perform their duties very well. 
Overall, this merchant is a capable and 
proficient e-vendor. 
F3. Overall, my colleagues are capable and proficient 
technical staff. 
In general, this merchant is very 
knowledgeable about the business it 
operates. 










F5. My colleagues act in the best interest of the project. 
If I required help, this merchant would do 
its best to help me. 
F6. If I required assistance, my colleagues would do their 
best to help me. 
This merchant is interested in my well-
being, not just its own. 
F7. My colleagues are interested in my professional well-










F8. My colleagues are truthful in their contact with me by 
actively exposing the whole truth on any work-related 
matter. 
I would characterize this merchant as 
honest. 
F9. I would characterize my colleagues as honest by not 
telling lies. 
This merchant would keep its commitments. 
F10. My colleagues would keep their verbal 
commitments. 




I think this website has the functionality I 






F12. My company's software has the functionality I need. 
This website has the ability to do what I 
want it to do. 
F13 My company's software has the ability to do what I 
want it to do 
Overall, this website has the capabilities I 
need. 





I think this website is very reliable.  F15. My company's software is very reliable. 






F16. I can depend on the software when I perform/certify 
maintenance tasks. 
This website performs in a predictable way. 
 




I believe this merchant is effective in 




G1. My subordinates are effective in assisting and 
fulfilling my expectations in our collaboration. 
This merchant performs its role of e-vendor 
very well. 
G2. My subordinates perform their duties very well. 
Overall, this merchant is a capable and 
proficient e-vendor. 
G3. Overall, my subordinates are capable and proficient 
technical staff. 
 
In general, this merchant is very 
knowledgeable about the business it 
operates. 
 











G5. My subordinates act in the best interest of the project. 
 
If I required help, this merchant would do 
its best to help me. 
G6. If I required assistance, my subordinates would do 
their best to help me. 
 
This merchant is interested in my well-
being, not just its own. 
G7. My subordinates are interested in my professional 











G8. My subordinates are truthful in their contact with me 
by actively exposing the whole truth on a matter. 
 
I would characterize this merchant as 
honest. 
G9. I would characterize my subordinates as honest by 
not telling lies. 
 This merchant would keep its commitments. G10. My subordinates would keep their commitments. 
 This merchant is sincere and genuine. G11. My subordinates are sincere and genuine. 
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Following this adaptation, an experts’ evaluation process was conducted to examine 
the appropriateness of adaptations (modifications). This additional stage was 
performed to suit the context of this study, test the content validity of scores and check 
if any further improvement was necessary on the questions (Creswell, 2014). For this 
purpose, three aviation maintenance professionals were selected. Their background 
included many years of experience in maintenance practice and instruction (as 
technical trainers). Their recommendations for the improvement of the questions were 
thoroughly assessed and implemented in the questionnaire, as they were found to be 
constructive.   
The content of the Trust Constructs and Measures Questionnaire used are presented in 
Table 3.4, where items in section F ‘Trust’ are addressed to all aviation maintenance 
professionals and that of section G ‘Trust - Only for managers/supervisors’ to 
supervisors/managers only. The items were grouped, forming 8 constructs, as were 
introduced by Li et al. (2012). These constructs are: ‘trust in colleagues’ competence’, 
‘trust in colleagues’ benevolence’, ‘trust in colleagues’ integrity’, ‘trust in company's 
software capability’, ‘trust in company's software reliability’, ‘trust in managers-
subordinates’ competence’, ‘trust in managers-subordinates’ benevolence’ and ‘trust 
in managers-subordinates’ integrity’. However, since two of the three items forming 
the construct: ‘trust in company's software reliability’, were not used in the statistical 
analysis, a new single construct was formed with the four remaining questions about 
software: ‘trust in company's software capability’. All items are assigned a 7-point 
Likert scale when used for surveys. Sections F and G use the coding: 1 = ‘Strongly 
Disagree’, 2 = ‘Disagree’, 3 = ‘Somewhat Disagree’, 4 = ‘Neither’, 5 = ‘Somewhat 
Agree’, 6 = ‘Agree’ and 7 = ‘Strongly Agree’.  
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Table 3.4 Content of the Trust Constructs and Measures Questionnaire. 
Section F: Trust 
F1 My colleagues fulfil my expectations in our collaboration. 
F2 My colleagues perform their duties very well. 
F3 Overall, my colleagues are capable and proficient technical staff. 
F4 In general, my colleagues are knowledgeable about our organisation. 
F5 My colleagues act in the best interest of the project. 
F6 If I required assistance, my colleagues would do their best to help me. 
F7 My colleagues are interested in my professional well-being, not just their own. 
F8 My colleagues are truthful in their contact with me by actively exposing the 
whole truth on any work-related matter. 
F9 I would characterize my colleagues as honest by not telling lies. 
F10 My colleagues would keep their verbal commitments. 
F11 My colleagues are sincere and genuine. 
F12 My company's software has the functionality I need. 
F13 My company's software has the ability to do what I want it to do. 
F14 Overall, my company's software has the capabilities I need. 
F15 My company's software is very reliable. 
F16 I can depend on the software when I perform/certify maintenance tasks. 
F17 This software performs in a predictable way. 
F18 Are you a supervisor / manager? 
Section G: Trust - Only for managers / supervisors 
G1 My subordinates are effective in assisting and fulfilling my expectations in our 
collaboration. 
G2 My subordinates perform their duties very well. 
G3 Overall, my subordinates are capable and proficient technical staff. 
G4 In general, my subordinates are knowledgeable about our organisation. 
G5 My subordinates act in the best interest of the project. 
G6 If I required assistance, my subordinates would do their best to help me. 
G7 My subordinates are interested in my professional well-being, not just their own. 
G8 My subordinates are truthful in their contact with me by actively exposing the 
whole truth on a matter. 
G9 I would characterize my subordinates as honest by not telling lies. 
G10 My subordinates would keep their commitments. 
G11 My subordinates are sincere and genuine. 
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3.3.1.3 Complete Question Set 
The complete Communication and Trust Question Set, as discussed, is comprised of 
the following parts: 
• Section A ‘Demographic information of the participants ‘; 
• Section B ‘General Questions’; 
• Sections C, D and E: ‘Communication Satisfaction Questionnaire’; 
• Sections F and G: ‘Trust Constructs and Measures Questionnaire’. 
The Section A ‘Demographic’ and B ‘General Questions’ items are shown in Table 
3.5. 
Table 3.5 Content of the ‘Demographic’ and ‘General Questions’ sections (A and B 
correspondingly) of the Communication and Trust Question Set. 
Section A: Demographic information of the participants 
A1 My current post and duties require me to exercise my aircraft maintenance 
license privileges. 
A2 My company is approved by .......................... to perform and certify 
maintenance. 
A3 My experience with my current company is: 
less than 6 months 
6 months or more 
A4 I have a total of ............ years of experience in aviation maintenance. 
Section B: General Questions 
B1 How satisfied are you with your job? 
B2 In the past 6 months, what has happened to your level of satisfaction? 
 
These items (questions) collected information on the participants’ longevity of 
employment with current organisation, type of license and regulative authority under 
current employment, position. The available (answers) for all items were: 
• A1 = ‘Yes’ or ‘No’; 
• A2 = ‘EASA’, ‘FAA’, ‘CASA’ and ‘Other’; 
• A3 = ‘Less than 6 months’ or ‘6 months or more’ 
• A4: This was a free field; 
• B1: A 7-point Likert scale with the following coding: 1 = ‘Very Dissatisfied’, 
2 = ‘Dissatisfied’, 3 = ‘Somewhat Dissatisfied’, 4 = ‘Neither’, 5 = ‘Somewhat 
Satisfied’, 6 = ‘Satisfied’ and 7 = ‘Very Satisfied’; 
• B2: ‘Gone up’, ‘Stayed the same’ and Gone done’ 
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The longevity of employment question was expected to separate the sample in two 
groups regarding their experience: 
• The experienced group (6 months of experience and more with current 
employer); 
• The newly recruited (less than 6 months with current employer). 
The comparison of the results of the Trust Constructs and Measures Questionnaire 
items are essential in any observation of the high initial trust levels formation within 
the newly recruited group (Hernandez & Santos, 2010; McKnight et al., 1998).  
According to McKnight et al. “…initial trust, because the parties have not worked 
together long enough to develop an interaction history” therefore, for the scope of this 
research the group of employees with experience up to 6 months was selected to 
measure the initial levels of trust. A maximum period of six months’ experience 
enables a sufficient sample size to be used effectively in statistical analysis, as well as 
to set an amount of time that employees would not be yet familiar with all their 
company’s systems. 
 
3.3.2 Content Analysis of Accident and Incident Investigation Reports 
The first step in this study is to answer Research Question 1 ‘Are trust and 
communication detectable in aviation maintenance employees?’. These general and 
open-ended research questions are appropriately answered though qualitative research 
methods (Leedy & Ormrod, 2013). At this stage, the information must have been either 
directly observable or measurable from the professionals that are involved in aviation 
maintenance and must be obtained through a technique that reveals this information in 
the most reliable way. A suitable technique to use for this purpose is content analysis 
(Fraenkel & Wallen, 2003), as it is the most appropriate tool in identifying specific 
information in an area or a topic. This technique is usually employed to test research 
questions which are general and open-ended and based on “forms of human 
communication” notion (Leedy & Ormrod, 2013, p. 148), as in the case of accident 
and incident investigation reports (as discussed in the sequel). 
Since communication and trust have been associated with aviation safety, a reliable 
source to collect information on the two traits would be from accident and incident 
investigation reports. These reports reflect a systematic investigation process by a team 
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of aviation experts, who, over an extended period, investigate, analyse and present in 
a holistic way all contributing factors of an aviation safety occurrence. This phase’s 
aim is to collect descriptive information about a specific area, namely, to explore the 
association between trust and communication by identifying these traits in aviation 
safety occurrences.  
 
3.3.2.1 Data Location and Units Specification 
Aviation accident and incident investigation reports are real-life sources to obtain 
information and data about the observation of communication and trust in aviation 
maintenance. Aviation is a highly regulated global industry which follows global 
norms and trends in its operation. Every country with an aviation system in place, has 
developed a formal accident/incident investigation board, which is also required to 
make publicly available all final reports. The objective of this process is to enable 
transparency and promote safe practice in all fields of the aviation industry. Each board 
usually maintains a dedicated online database, available in the public domain, in which 
the reports are stored and can be downloaded freely. 
In order to proceed with the content analysis, the units of this analysis must be 
determined (Fraenkel & Wallen, 2003). This means that there need to be specific 
words and/or phrases acknowledged reflecting the meaning of communication and 
trust in the database of this research. This is a process that helps in the applicability 
(transferability of the observed values to other domains/industries with similar results) 
and consistency (ability by other researchers in the replication of the same research) 
of this technique. Therefore, the reports were firstly scanned to locate the words 
‘communication’ and ‘trust’. Further on, the items contained in sections C, D, E, F and 
G of the Communication and Trust Question Set were used to identify the 
corresponding issues, with  
• The Communication Satisfaction Questionnaire items identifying underlying 
communication issues and  
• The Trust Constructs and Measures Questionnaire items identifying trust 
issues. 
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3.3.2.2 Sampling Technique 
The collected reports are dealing with accidents and incidents attributed to a technical 
error due to inappropriate maintenance practice. The content analysis method was 
selected to enable a thorough investigation of the existence of both communication 
and trust in real safety occurrences within aviation maintenance practice. Content 
analysis is usually employed as a qualitative method, which can be useful when an in-
depth examination of a body of material is required to identify and analyse specific 
traits. This in-depth analysis does not necessarily demand a great volume of material 
to be assembled and review and for the purpose of this process it can be equally served 
by examining a smaller representative sample (Leedy & Ormrod, 2013). 
Since the main goal of this study is to identify the co-existence of communication and 
trust as preconditions in aviation maintenance occurrences, it was possible to work 
with a smaller but still representative body of material. Therefore, the large volume of 
data available online (accident and incident investigation reports) only necessitated the 
selection of a smaller number of different investigation boards out of the total number 
in existence around the world (Leedy & Ormrod, 2013). Several accident investigation 
boards/authorities were selected, applying the following criteria: 
• The reports should be in the English language; 
• The final body of material would include reports from around the world; 
therefore, the investigation boards selected included countries with diverse 
population size, culture and regulatory framework; 
• Reports on accidents and incidents that occurred in the last ten years. This 
criterion was chosen on the basis that the conditions of the maintenance 
operations when these safety occurrences took place reflected current or as 
close as possible working conditions (with the latest safety provisions and 
human factors training in place).  It is noted that the aviation industry has been 
introduced to new technology and modern/updated procedures in the recent 
years and human factors training has been implemented in many aviation 
authorities around the world (European Aviation Safety Agency, 2015).  
The volume of reports to be investigated was large, as there were many accidents and 
incidents investigations reports issued by these boards, providing detailed, and in 
several cases, large pieces of documentation through the years. Thus, from this ten 
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years’ time frame used as a filter, a smaller, yet representative, a sample of reports 
were selected to reflect different types of accidents and incidents and to cover various 
aspects of aviation maintenance. A thorough examination, with the use of the content 
analysis method, was performed on the reports to identify communication and trust 
elements in the selected range of aviation safety occurrences.  
 
3.3.2.3 Data Analysis 
The data analysis of the content analysis method is a crucial step in this process. All 
accident and incident investigation reports that were selected were thoroughly 
scrutinised to identify the words ‘communication’ and ‘trust’. In the cases that there 
was no direct reference to communication and trust, the reports were analysed against 
the Communication and Trust Question Set items to identify and tabulate 
communication and trust (Leedy & Ormrod, 2013). After the tabulation, descriptive 
statistics were used to show the frequencies of communication and trust in the accident 
and incident investigation reports. 
 
3.3.3 Content Analysis of Human Factors Training Curriculum and Material  
The next step in this study is to answer Research Question 2: ‘Are communication and 
trust covered in aviation maintenance human factors basic training?’. As with Research 
Question 1, this is a general and open-ended research question and on the basis of 
“forms of human communication”, which can be answered by employing qualitative 
research methods (Leedy & Ormrod, 2013). The most suitable way to do that is by 
obtaining all the information needed directly from approved aviation maintenance 
training organisations and sources. At this stage, the information must be either 
directly observable or measurable and must come through a technique that reveals this 
information in the most reliable way. An appropriate technique to be utilised is the 
content analysis (Fraenkel & Wallen, 2003), as it is a tool capable to identify specific 
information in an area or a topic. 
Since communication and trust have been associated with aviation safety, a reliable 
source of information on the two traits would be training material approved by aviation 
regulatory authorities around the world (e.g. EASA, FAA, CASA, etc). These 
authorities regulate, among others, aviation maintenance training in every aspect 
(training organisations, curriculum, examinations, etc). Therefore, the training 
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curriculum and the content of the approved training material adhere to aviation 
maintenance training regulations within the regulatory authority’s jurisdiction. 
 
3.3.3.1 Data Location and Units Specification 
The identification of suitable approved training material for the content analysis 
requires the assembling of information on human factors basic training under different 
aviation regulatory frameworks around the world. A limitation to the assembly of the 
relevant information (rules, documentation, authorities’ website, training material, etc) 
is the language they are written in, which needs to be English. This examination was 
conducted to identify the existence of communication and trust in aviation 
maintenance basic training. The following four major aviation regulatory authorities 
were selected for this examination: 
 
• European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), European Union, 6,252,643 
(16.9% of world) registered carrier departures worldwide (The World Bank, 
2018): Human factors training is a mandatory requirement in aviation 
maintenance basic training (European Union Aviation Safety Agency, 2014).  
• Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), USA, 9,879,630 (26.7% of world) 
registered carrier departures worldwide (The World Bank, 2018): Human 
factors training is not a mandatory requirement in aviation maintenance basic 
training (Federal Aviation Administration, 2015). 
• Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA), India, 1,200,111 (3.2% of 
world) registered carrier departures worldwide (The World Bank, 2018): 
Human factors training is a mandatory requirement in aviation maintenance 
basic training (DGCA has mirrored the curriculum of EASA) (Directorate 
General Of Civil Aviation, 2019). 
• Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), Australia, 665,384 (1.8% of world) 
registered carrier departures worldwide (The World Bank, 2018): Human 
factors training is a mandatory requirement in aviation maintenance basic 
training (CASA has mirrored the curriculum of EASA) (Civil Aviation Safety 
Authority, 2018). 
It is noted that FAA does not stipulate mandatory human factors training in basic 
training. Therefore, this limits the analysis to approved training material obtained from 
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the other three regulatory regimes (EASA, DGCA and CASA), for the purposes of 
testing Research Question 2. After closer examination, all authorities use the EASA 
curriculum for their maintenance human factors training. This is contained in the 
EASA Part-66 regulation for Module 9 ‘Human Factors’ (European Aviation Safety 
Agency, 2014) and it has been used in the content analysis method.       
In order to proceed with the content analysis, the units of this analysis must be 
determined (Fraenkel & Wallen, 2003). This means that there need to be specific 
words and/or phrases acknowledged reflecting the meaning of communication and 
trust in the database of this research. This is a process that assists in the applicability 
(transferability of the observed values to other domains/industries with similar results) 
and consistency (ability by other researchers in the replication of the same research) 
of this technique. Therefore, the training curriculum and the training material were 
scanned to locate the words ‘communication’ and ‘trust’. Further on, the items 
contained in sections C, D, E, F and G of the Communication and Trust Question Set 
were used to identify the corresponding issues, with: 
• The Communication Satisfaction Questionnaire items identifying underlying 
communication issues and 
• The Trust Constructs and Measures Questionnaire items identifying trust 
issues. 
 
3.3.3.2 Sampling Technique 
Since the curriculum of EASA, DGCA and CASA is the same (that of EASA) the 
training material that is selected, are two EASA Part-66 Module 9 ‘Human Factors’ 
approved coursebooks. These coursebooks are used for the basic training of Category 
A ‘Aircraft Maintenance Mechanic’ and Category B ‘Aircraft Maintenance 
Technician’ aviation maintenance staff. It is noted that both coursebooks are used by 
different EASA Part-147 maintenance training organisations. Usually, the EASA 
maintenance training organisations that provide basic maintenance training, develop 
their own internal course material which is then approved by an EASA competent 
aviation authority. Therefore, very few published and publicly available EASA Part-
66 Module 9 ‘Human Factors’ course material exist. This, in turn, has limited the 
selection to only two coursebooks. However, as discussed in Chapter 4 ‘Results’, these 
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two coursebooks were the adequate required body of material to answer Research 
Question 2 by employing the content analysis method. 
 
3.3.3.3 Data Analysis  
All material that was selected, was thoroughly scrutinised to identify communication 
and trust traits (Leedy & Ormrod, 2013). The whole process was divided into a manual 
word count technique (for the words ‘communication’ and ‘trust’) and then descriptive 
statistics were used. These descriptive statistics techniques showed the frequencies of 
communication and trust into the EASA Part-66 Module 9 ‘Human Factors’ 
curriculum and the approved training material (coursebooks) that were analysed for 
the purposes of this phase of the study.  
The second phase of the data analysis proceeded into the in-depth examination of the 
EASA human factors training curriculum and the approved coursebook (training) 
material. This examination aimed towards the identification of the underlying 
communication and trust issues. Firstly, the curriculum was examined again to identify 
chapters/content that potentially cover communication and trust which, could be 
analysed further with the use of the items of the Communication and Trust Question 
Set. For this purpose, one of the most established and widely used tools in aviation 
maintenance was used, which is also included in the EASA approved material, the 
Dirty Dozen (Dupont, 1997), briefly discussed in Chapter 1 ‘Introduction’. The Dirty 
Dozen was utilising in a mapping exercise between the areas that could contain 
communication and trust elements and the items of the Communication and Trust 
Question Set. 
The third phase was to proceed with the examination of both Module 9 ‘Human 
Factors’ coursebooks to identify which of the twelve factors of the Dirty Dozen were 
included in the course material. Using the previously developed mapping, of each of 
the twelve factors of the Dirty Dozen against the items of the Communication and 
Trust Question Set, this process has driven the indirect identification of the 
communication and trust factors in the course material, even when no direct reference 
existed to these. This three-step (phased) analysis technique identified all the direct, 
and concealed elements of communication and trust in the EASA approved basic 
human factors training material.  
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3.3.4 Survey 
In quantitative designs, there are two major approaches that researchers select, the 
experimental and non-experimental. In experimental research, the researcher 
manipulates the conditions of a simulated environment that affects one group and then 
compares their scores with another group that had no interference with their 
environment by the researcher (Creswell, 2014).  
Trust is a value that has already been observed in people, and more specifically in a 
certain group of employees, according to the high initial trust levels model by 
McKnight et al. (1998). The element that is missing is the measurement of these levels. 
Thus, the new element that can contribute to the body of knowledge would be the 
measurement of the levels of initial trust and not the experimental proof of the 
existence of initial trust (McKnight et al., 1998). Therefore, experimental techniques 
were not considered suitable for the investigation of the research hypotheses of this 
study. The same thinking is used with the measurement of effective communication as 
it is a factor already observed and indicated as to be fundamental in the maintenance 
domain (Balk & Bossenbroek, 2010; Bureau of Air Safety Investigation, 1997; 
Caldwell, 2005; Mattson et al., 2001). Consequently, experimental methods were not 
chosen for the examination of communication as well in this study. 
An appropriate approach to research the hypotheses is to investigate these with the 
assistance of correlational design. Correlational design examines the relationship 
between two or more variables (Creswell, 2014). Usually, the tools utilised in such 
surveys are questionnaires, structured interviews or the combination of both, which 
enable the collection of data and the extract of results that can be applicable to the 
general population as well.  
 
3.3.4.1 Data Collection Method 
The data collection method used in this research is the survey method. Surveys are 
designed to examine a smaller part of the general population and project the results to 
the general population (Creswell, 2014). This helps the researcher to extract 
information on their behaviour, characteristics or attitudes. In this study, the survey 
used was the Communication and Trust Question Set, which helped to identify and 
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measure trust and communication satisfaction among maintenance staff. This was part 
of the process of testing the study’s hypotheses.  
Personnel with various lengths of work experience were targeted at one point of time, 
so the survey was applied at this point of time, collecting all the required data needed 
to confirm or disprove the research hypotheses (Creswell, 2014). This process ensured 
the validity of the results for the selected point of time, that is representative of each 
employee’s length of experience in the specific company. It is noted that the 
questionnaire (Communication and Trust Question Set) was provided in English, and 
no respondent required its translation into a different language.   
In order to augment the response rate to the questionnaire, there are some important 
factors that were taken into account when designing and planning the distribution of 
the survey. Firstly, aesthetically, the material should look professional, neat and free 
from errors. Therefore, the questionnaire included high-quality graphics arts and was 
checked for grammar and syntax consistency. These aspects (cosmetic appearance and 
presentation accuracy) are critical to augment the response rates (Leedy & Ormrod, 
2013). Secondly, considering the nature of aircraft maintenance operations, work in 
rotating shifts, noisy environment, strict deadlines, etc, the most appropriate mode of 
data collection was considered to be the internet (email communication). This allows 
the employees to answer at their convenience, in a non-stressful environment and 
timing. Moreover, this is a cost-effective and environmentally friendly way to conduct 
surveys, as no-cost is associated with printing or posting survey material. 
In order to cover the requirements and to provide privacy to the participants, the 
LimeSurvey web-based tool was used. LimeSurvey is available via an institutional 
(University of Southern Queensland) subscription. LimeSurvey protects the 
participants’ anonymity while assisting the researcher with the aesthetics of the 
questionnaires’ graphics and design, in conjunction with ease of management of the 
survey.  
The participants received the invitation to participate by email. The email included a 
personalised cover letter, addressed to each participant, which outlined the: 
• Scope, significance and purpose of this research; 
• Value of each participant’s input; 
• Duration anticipated for the completion of the questionnaires; 
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• Anonymity guarantees and confidentiality of the data obtained; 
• Commitment of offering feedback; 
• Information on ethics approval. 
The survey administration was structured in phases, each corresponding to a week. 
This phased approach is based on the process proposed by Creswell (2014). The 
participants received two weekly reminders in case they had not responded within a 
week of the initial invitation email. This practice was followed to gradually improve 
the response rate. The full survey administration process is summarised in Figure 3.5. 
 
Figure 3.5 Survey administration process.  
 
 
3.3.4.2 Sampling Technique 
The respondents of the survey (Communication and Trust Question Set) were aircraft 
maintenance professionals from around the world, with working experience in civil 
and military aircraft maintenance organisations. For this study, snowball sampling was 
used, as firstly participants were selected both randomly and from an initial circle of 
colleagues and associates. Then, these participants were requested to propose 
additional participants from their wider circle of colleagues and associates.  
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Respondents were recruited by using two different approaches: 
• Recruitment Approach 1: Respondents were contacted through their 
managers as their company agreed to participate in the survey and  
• Recruitment Approach 2: Respondents were contacted directly by the 
principal investigator. 
In Recruitment Approach 1, eleven aircraft maintenance organisations were contacted 
initially for participation, and five accepted the invitation. The questionnaire was sent 
to 121 aircraft maintenance employees, with full responses from 62, leading to a 
response rate at 51%, which is consistent with past research (Chan & Lai, 2017; Leedy 
& Ormrod, 2013). In Recruitment Approach 2, another 380 aircraft maintenance 
employees were contacted directly by the principal investigator, with full responses 
from 197 giving a response rate of 52%. In total 259 fully answered (Communication 
and Trust Question Set) questionnaires were collected, while in total 271 
questionnaires were used in SPSS for statistical analysis. This was determined by the 
set of items to be analysed and the statistical techniques to be used at each step of the 
analysis (259 fully and 12 partially answered). 
 
3.3.4.3 Data Analysis 
The quantitative analysis of the responses to the questionnaire was conducted using 
the IBM SPSS Statistics 25.0.0 software. A correlational research design was selected 
to evaluate the relationship between the two traits (communication satisfaction and 
trust) and avoid implying any causational relationship in any way (Fraenkel & Wallen, 
2003). Following data screening, to address any anomalies, the reliability of each 
construct, communication satisfaction and trust, were measured using the Cronbach’s 
alpha. This was followed by descriptive statistics, correlations between variables, t-
tests and analyses of variance (ANOVA).  
To assist the reader in understanding the statistical sections of this research study, a 
brief description of all statistical tools (terms, tests, methods, etc) is provided: 
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General statistical terms 
• Snowball sampling is the survey recruitment technique where research 
participants are requested to recruit other participants for a test or study. It is 
used where potential participants are hard to find. 
• Descriptive statistical analysis. A synoptic statistical process that 
quantitatively describes or summarises features of a collection of information. 
• The null hypothesis is the hypothesis that there is no significant difference 
between specified groups. 
• Mean score (M) is the arithmetic average of a set of given numbers. 
• Standard Deviation (SD) is a measure that is used to quantify the amount of 
variation or dispersion of a set of data values. A low standard deviation 
indicates that the data points tend to be close to the mean the set, while a high 
standard deviation indicates that the data points are spread out over a wider 
range of values. 
Statistical tests 
• Bivariate (Pearson) correlational methods (r). It is a measure of linear 
(straight line) relationships between two variables. Generally describes the 
simultaneous effect of two or more phenomena; therefore, for this reason, they 
are linked. A positive r value indicates a positive relationship between the 
variables, while a negative r value indicates a negative relation. 
• Independent samples t-test. An inferential statistical test to treat the relevant 
data and compare the means, to identify if there is statistical evidence to 
support whether the two compared groups’ means are statistically different or 
not. 
• Hedge’s g. It indicates the effect size of the difference in means (how much 
one group differs from another group) due to the large difference in sample 
sizes. Hedge's g is used when sample sizes are very small (<20). 
• Mann-Whitney U test. A non-parametric test used to assess for significant 
differences in a scale or ordinal dependent variable by a single dichotomous 
independent variable. This test is used when a large difference in sample sizes 
between the examined groups exist and in this study was used to validate 
results obtained from the independent samples t-tests. 
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• One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). A statistical method that compares 
the means of the research's target groups to identify if any of those means are 
statistically different from the others. This method is used to compare thee or 
more means of groups that are independent (unrelated) with each other. It 
specifically tests the null hypothesis H0=μ1=μ2=μ3=...μκ.  (H0 = null 
hypothesis, μ = group mean, κ = number of groups). In the case that one-way 
ANOVA results in the significant difference between some of the groups, the 
alternative hypothesis is accepted (HA) therefore, at least two of the examined 
groups appear to have significantly different means. 
• Cohen’s d values were used to measure the effect sizes of differences between 
different groups of participants, to verify the results of the ANOVA.   
• Bonferroni post hoc test (F). It is used to treat the relevant data and compare 
the means, to identify if there is statistical evidence to support whether multiple 
compared groups’ means are statistically different or not. The Bonferroni test 
is selected to avoid the significant results increases in each test run, due to the 
simultaneous statistical testing of the multiple groups. 
• Post hoc LSD tests are used to identify the groups of means with significant 
statistical differences, as this significant difference was shown at the one-way 
ANOVA test. 
• Cronbach's alpha is a function of the number of items in a test, the average 
covariance between item-pairs, and the variance of the total score. It is used to 
estimate the reliability of psychometric tests. 
• Harman’s one factor analysis. A technique to identify the existence or 
absence of the common method bias. 
Statistical representation methods 
• Scatterplot is a type of plot or mathematical diagram using Cartesian 
coordinates to display values for typically two variables for a set of data. The 
scatterplot is used for the visualisation of the relationship between two 
variables. 
• The error bar charts are graphical representations of the variability of data 
and used on graphs to indicate the error or uncertainty in a reported 
measurement. They provide a general representation of how precise a 
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measurement is, or conversely, how far from the reported value the true (error 
free) value might be.  
The complete set of the statistical analysis methods used for each of the research 
hypotheses is described in detail in the following sections. These explain the technical 
aspects of each method, in connection to the examination (answer) of the research 
hypotheses of this study. 
Research Hypothesis 1 
(a) Aviation maintenance employees’ levels of interpersonal trust towards their 
colleagues has a positive association with their communication satisfaction; and 
(b) supervisors/managers’ levels of interpersonal trust towards their subordinates 





This is explored with correlational methods.  
Using these methods, the extent of the differences between two traits 
or variables and their relationship are investigated.  
The bivariate (Pearson) correlation was selected to treat the relevant 
data and determine whether the two variables are related.  
The results are plotted on a scatterplot for visualisation and to allow for 
easier identification of the relationship between the two variables: 
communication satisfaction and interpersonal trust for all aviation 
maintenance employees among them, and the 
supervisors/managers towards their subordinates. 
 
Research Hypothesis 2 
(a) Employees’ trust towards the company’s software has a positive association 
with their Communication satisfaction; and (b) supervisors/managers’ trust 






This is explored with correlational methods.  
Using these methods, the extent of the differences between two traits 
or variables and the relationship between these differences are 
investigated.  
The bivariate (Pearson) correlation was selected to treat the relevant 
data and determine whether the two variables are related.  
The results are plotted on a scatterplot for visualisation and to allow for 
easier identification of the relationship between the two variables: 
communication satisfaction and trust towards the company’s 
software for all aviation maintenance employees and the 
supervisors/managers. 
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Research Hypothesis 3 
(a) Subordinates’ levels of interpersonal trust has a positive association with their 
Communication satisfaction; and (b) subordinates’ trust towards the company’s 





This is explored with correlational methods.  
Using these methods, the extent of the differences between two traits 
or variables and the relationship between these differences are 
investigated.  
The bivariate (Pearson) correlation was selected to treat the relevant 
data and determine whether the two variables are related.  
The results are plotted on a scatterplot for visualisation and to allow for 
easier identification of the relationship between the two variables: 
communication satisfaction and interpersonal trust for the aviation 
maintenance subordinates and communication satisfaction and 
trust towards the company’s software for the aviation maintenance 
subordinates. 
 
Research Hypothesis 4 
High initial trust levels are detectable in (a) interpersonal trust and (b) company’s 





Due to the substantial difference in sample sizes of the two groups, the 
use of descriptive statistical analysis was decided to be the most 
effective method to treat this set of data.  
A comparison between the means of each group is conducted and is 
used as an indicator of possible support of both parts of Research 
Hypothesis 4. 
 
Since the snowball sampling was used, the Harman’s one-factor analysis was 
performed to determine the existence or absence of the common method bias. This 
analysis identified that the largest single factor explained less than 50% of the variance, 
i.e. 41%. Therefore, no significant common method bias was identified in this research 
project. 
Regarding the Communication Satisfaction Questionnaire, since this is an established 
questionnaire that has been used extensively by many other researchers in the past, the 
statistical analysis method was selected from those methods successfully employed in 
other past studies. In both the Trust Constructs and Measures Questionnaire and the 
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Communication Satisfaction Questionnaire the data analysis should compare and 
contrast the results in the aviation maintenance industry against other industries 
researched so far, e.g. hospitality industry (Carrière & Bourque, 2009), schools 
(Zwijze-Koning & De Menno, 2007) automobile industry (Jalalkamali et al., 2016). 
By analysing the data in a similar way, this research study is contributing directly to 
the relevant body of knowledge, by reinforcing the questionnaire’s validity and 
reliability (broadening of the sample is broadened). Moreover, this is the first use of 
the Communication Satisfaction Questionnaire in the aviation industry, which can 
offer useful conclusions about the specific characteristics of communication within 
organisations operating in this industry. 
Apart from the research hypotheses that were recognised and set at the early stages of 
this research projects, the nature (different categories of licences, experience, 
military/civil personnel, etc) of the data allowed further statistical analysis to be 
conducted. This process assisted in the in-depth analysis and understanding of the 
association under investigation and contributed greatly to the general scope of this 
research project. The statistical analyses used in this section, which were conducted 
beyond the exploration of the research hypotheses, are presented below in detail and 
each observation is tabulated to the specific method used (Additional Observations).  
Additional Observation 1 
Differences in the means of communication satisfaction and trust scores for civil 





The independent samples t-test was selected to treat the relevant data 
and compare the means, to identify if there is statistical evidence to 
support whether the two compared groups’ means are statistically 
different or not.  
Hedge’s g is used here as well, to indicate effect size of the difference 
in means due to the large difference in sample sizes between the 
military and civil employees.  
Due to the large difference in sample sizes between the two groups of 
employees, Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted as well to validate 
the results of the two previous methods used.  
The results are graphically represented on error bar charts for 
visualisation and to allow for easier identification of the relationship 
between the three scores: overall communication satisfaction score, 
interpersonal trust score and software trust score for the two groups 
(civil and military aviation maintenance personnel). 
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Additional Observation 2 
Differences in the means of communication satisfaction and trust scores for 





The independent samples t-test was selected to treat the relevant data 
and compare the means, to identify if there is statistical evidence to 
support whether the two compared groups’ means are statistically 
different or not.  
Cohen’s d values were used to measure effect sizes of differences 
between managers and subordinates on the three traits, to verify the 
results of the independent samples t-test.  
The results are graphically represented on error bar charts for 
visualisation and to allow for an easier identification of the relationship 
between the three scores: mean overall communication satisfaction 
score, interpersonal trust score and software trust score for the two 
groups (managers and subordinates). 
 
Additional Observation 3 
Differences in traits of communication satisfaction and trust amongst four groups 





The one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was selected to treat the 
relevant data and compare the means, to identify if there is statistical 
evidence to support whether these four compared groups’ means are 
statistically different or not. 
Cohen’s d values were used to measure effect sizes of differences 
between managers and subordinates on the three traits, to verify the 
results of the ANOVA.   
The results are graphically represented on error bar charts for 
visualisation and to allow easier identification of the relationship 
between the three scores: overall communication satisfaction score, 
interpersonal trust score and software trust score for the four 
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Additional Observation 4 
Differences in the traits of communication satisfaction and trust among six 
different groups of the employees, based on the type of license held (no license, 





The one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), using the Bonferroni post 
hoc test, was selected to treat the relevant data and compare the means, 
to identify if there is statistical evidence to support whether these six 
compared groups’ means are statistically different or not. The 
Bonferroni test is selected to avoid the significant results increases in 
each test run, due to the simultaneous statistical testing of the six 
groups. 
Hedge’s g is used here as well, to indicate effect size of the difference 
in means due to the large difference in sample sizes between the 
different groups of employees, based on the type of license held.  
The results are graphically represented on error bar charts for 
visualisation to allow for easier identification of the relationship 
between the three scores: overall communication satisfaction score, 
interpersonal trust score and software trust score for the six groups 
based on the type of license held. 
 
3.3.4.4 Ethical Considerations 
A fundamental part of any research project is the ethical considerations. Every 
researcher must comply with the ten principles of ethical considerations, as they have 
been formed after extensive research in ethical guidelines of nine professional social 
sciences research associations (Bryman & Bell 2007). Having in mind these principles, 
this study was designed and implemented to meet the requirements of the National 
Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007) and a full ethical approval 
has been granted by the University of Southern Queensland (approval No. 
H17REA156). The questionnaire and any material that was distributed to the 
participants included appropriate, a polite non-discriminatory language that assured 
the researcher’s and the participants’ dignity. There was also care in the distribution 
of the questionnaires through an online tool (LimeSurvey) which protected the 
anonymity of the participants and as a result, made them feel reassured and confident 
for their participation. The data collected were treated securely, and no person other 
than those authorised by the University of Southern Queensland had access to them. It 
is also noted that the highest level of objectivity in all aspects of this study was ensured, 
throughout all facets of the research. 
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CHAPTER 4 CONTENT ANALYSIS AND SURVEY RESULTS 
4.1 Content Analysis of Accident and Incident Investigation Reports 
4.1.1 Results 
As per Chapter 3 ‘Research Methods’, the content analysis technique was used to 
answer Research Question 1: ‘Are trust and communication detectable in aviation 
maintenance?’. Content analysis was chosen for its capability for a thorough 
investigation of the existence of both communication and trust in real occurrences 
within aviation maintenance. As discussed in section 3.3.2.2 of Chapter 3, the selection 
of the accident and incident investigation reports would be performed by applying 
criteria in relation to the language, origin and recency of the report. When applying 
these criteria, the following accident and incident investigation authorities/bodies were 
shortlisted: 
1. Komite National Keselamatan Transportasi (Republic of Indonesia); 
2. Air Accident Investigation Unit (Ireland); 
3. Australian Transport Safety Bureau (Australia); 
4. Dutch Safety Board (Netherlands); 
5. Air Accidents Investigation Board (UK);  
6. National Transportation Safety Board (USA); 
7. Directorate General of Civil Aviation (India); 
8. Japan Transport Safety Board (Japan); 
9. Gabinete de Precenção e Investigação de Acidentes com Aeronaves e de 
Acidentes Ferroviarios (Portugal); 
10. Accident Investigation Division (Hong Kong); 
11. United States Air Force Accident Investigation Board (USA).  
 
Initial filtering of the databases of these authorities/bodies was performed with the 
term ‘maintenance’, producing an extensive list of (100+) accidents/incidents. Thus, 
further shortlisting was necessary, in this case performed by searching in the internet 
for incidents/accidents considered as ‘high profile’ (based on their order of appearance 
in the google search engine results) and for reports containing substantial information 
(in terms of volume and detail) on the maintenance related causal factors. This 
shortlisting exercise identified the fifteen representative (for the purposes of this study) 
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accidents/incidents selected for the content analysis. It is noted that an exhaustive 
investigation (involving a higher volume of reports) would not add more to the scope 
of this analysis, as the reports selected were able to reveal the existence of these two 
traits (communication and trust) and, most importantly, answer Research Question 1. 
The reports which were selected to be analysed corresponded to accidents, incidents 
or serious incidents that included maintenance error, are listed here:  
• Report 1 (R1): Airbus A320-214, EI-GAL, 07/05/2019, Air Accident 
Investigation, Ireland (Serious Incident) (Air Accident Investigation Unit, 
2019); 
• Report 2 (R2): Airbus A320-216, PK-AXC, 30/11/2015, Komite National 
Keselamatan Transportasi, Republic of Indonesia (Accident) (Komite National 
Keselamatan Transportasi, 2015); 
• Report 3 (R3): de Havilland Canada DHC 6-300, C-GSGF, 18/02/2016, Air 
Accident Investigation Unit, Ireland (Serious Incident) (Air Accident 
Investigation Unit, 2016); 
• Report 4 (R4): Airbus A320, VH-VGZ, 22/03/2019, Australian Transport 
Safety Bureau, Australia (Incident) (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 
2019); 
• Report 5 (R5): Bombardier DHC-8-Q402, G-JECP, 23/02/2017, , Dutch 
Safety Board, Netherlands (Accident) (The Dutch Safety Board, 2018); 
• Report 6 (R6): Boeing 747-443, G-VROM, 01/10/2015, Air Accidents 
Investigation Board, UK (Serious Incident) (Air Accidents Investigation 
Branch, 2015a); 
• Report 7 (R7): Airbus A330-243, A6-EYJ, 06/05/2016, Australian Transport 
Safety Bureau, Australia (Serious Incident) (Australia Transport Safety 
Bureau, 2016); 
• Report 8 (R8): Boeing 767, N360AA, 07/12/2012, National Transportation 
Safety Board, USA (Incident) (National Transportation Safety Board, 2012); 
• Report 9 (R9): Boeing 767, N669US, 28/09/2016, National Transportation 
Safety Board, USA (Incident) (National Transportation Safety Board, 2016); 
• Report 10 (R10): Airbus A319, VT-SCQ, 16/09/2016, Directorate General of 
Civil Aviation, India (Accident) (Directorate General of Civil Aviation, 2016); 
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• Report 11 (R11): Boeing 737-800, B 18616, 21/08/2009, Japan Transport 
Safety Board, Japan (Accident) (Japan Transport Safety Board, 2009); 
• Report 12 (R12): Airbus A319-131, G-EUOE, 14/07/2005, Air Accident 
Investigation Branch, UK (Accident) (Air Accidents Investigation Branch, 
2015b); 
• Report 13 (R13): Embraer 190-100LR, P4-KCJ, 02/05/2019, Gabinete de 
Precenção e Investigação de Acidentes com Aeronaves e de Acidentes 
Ferroviarios, Portugal (Accident) (Gabinete de Precenção e Investigação de 
Acidentes com Aeronaves e de Acidentes Ferroviarios, 2019); 
• Report 14 (R14): Airbus A330-342, B-HLL, 03/07/2013, Accident 
Investigation Division, Hong Kong (Accident) (Accident Investigation 
Division, 2013); 
• Report 15 (R15): Lockheed WC-130H, 65-0968, 09/10/2018, United States 
Air Force Accident Investigation Board, USA (Accident) (United States Air 
Force Accident Investigation Board, 2018). 
Each report was thoroughly scanned for the keywords: ‘communication’ and ‘trust’. 
In the case that a keyword was found in the report this is mentioned accordingly. From 
the previous keywords, the only found was ‘communication’ (‘trust’ was not found in 
any report). In this case, the items of the Communication and Trust Question Set were 
used to identify any underlying communication or trust factor. The Communication 
Satisfaction Questionnaire items were used to identify underlying communication 
issues while the Trust Constructs and Measures Questionnaire items to locate trust 
issues. The preconditions for errors identified were mapped against the questionnaire 
items, with a detailed justification provided. The output of this identification and 
mapping exercise is presented in detail in the following sections. It is noted that direct 
quoting from the accident/incident investigation report is included in this analysis, in 
order to unveil the underlying issues related to communication and trust. An example 
of the full analysis performed is presented in section 4.1.1.1 for three of the reports 
(R3, R6 and R7), while for the remaining reports the results are presented for brevity 
in section 4.1.1.2 in a summarised way. 
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4.1.1.1 Examples of Full Analysis 
Example 1: Report 3 (R3) - de Havilland Canada DHC 6-300, C-GSGF, 
18/02/2016, Air Accident Investigation Unit, Ireland (Serious Incident) 
Synopsis of the incident 
“On take-off (…) the nose cone from the right-hand mission equipment pod fell 
from the aircraft (…). The Flight Crew experienced a significant amount of yaw 
to the right which they felt through the flying controls. The aircraft (…) landed 
safely.”  (Air Accident Investigation Unit, 2016). 
 
The contribution of maintenance in this incident was narrowed down to six distinct 
maintenance errors. These maintenance errors are presented below, with 
communication and trust factors recognised and analysed as contributing factors 
(based on the Communication and Trust Question Set). 
R3.1 Precondition for Maintenance Error 
“…The personnel who carried out this check advised (…) that the Operator’s 
standard practice calls for the fitting of flagging tape when parts are removed and 
that the flagging tape should only be removed following re-installation of the 
removed part(s)… The Operator informed the Investigation that at the time of the 
event the use of flagging tape was a standard practice but was not in the 
Operator’s Policy Manual… (…) the personnel involved advised (…) that 




The operator had the fitting of the flagging tape as a standard 
practice during the removal of parts. However, the investigation 
indicated the lack of the relevant organisational policy that 
would communicate this practice to the maintenance personnel.  
This indicates that the information about organisational policies 
and goals was not satisfactory, item C3 ‘Information about 
organisational policies and goals’ of the Communication and 
Trust Question Set. 
  
R3.2 Precondition for Maintenance Error 
“…The Operator’s standard practice of attaching flagging tape to highlight when 
components are removed during maintenance was not followed...” (Air Accident 




Maintenance personnel failed to follow the company’s standard 
practice. This indicates that the maintenance personnel deviated from 
an expected good practice in their duties. Specifically, by using the  
Communication and Trust Question Set the following three items are 
identified in this failure: F2 ‘My colleagues perform their duties very 
well’, F3 ‘Overall, my colleagues are capable and proficient 
technical staff’ and F5 ‘My colleagues act in the best interest of the 
project’. Items F2 and F3 fall in the construct of trust in colleagues’ 
competence while item F5 falls in the construct of trust in colleagues’ 
benevolence. 
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R3.3 Precondition for Maintenance Error 
“(…) during the EM Pod maintenance, while the nose cone was being re-installed, 
a fault was detected with its sensor system. Re-installation of the nose cone was 
halted pending identification of the cause of the fault and consequently only the 
top two nose cone retaining screws were re-installed. Troubleshooting 
subsequently traced the origin of the sensor problem to a location inboard of the 
pod and the fault was rectified. The Inspection was then completed but the 14 
remaining nose cone retaining screws were not re-installed…” (Air Accident 
Investigation Unit, 2016). 
Trust Factor 
Identified 
Maintenance personnel failed to re-install the nose cone. This 
indicates that the maintenance personnel deviated from an 
expected good practice in their duties. Specifically, by using the 
Communication and Trust Question Set, the following three 
items are identified in this failure: F2 ‘My colleagues perform 
their duties very well’, F3 ‘Overall, my colleagues are 
capable and proficient technical staff’ and F5 ‘My colleagues 
act in the best interest of the project’. Items F2 and F3 fall in 
the construct of trust in colleagues’ competence while item F5 




Maintenance personnel involved in the re-installation of the nose 
cone, did not communicate that the 14 remaining nose cone 
retaining screws were not re-installed. This demonstrates issues 
in relation to items: D19 ‘The amount of communication in the 
organisation is about right’, D12 ‘Communication with my 
colleagues within the organisation is accurate and free 
flowing’ and D17 ‘The attitudes towards communication in 
the organisation are basically healthy’. 
 
R3.4 Precondition for Maintenance Error 
“…The two maintenance engineers who were responsible for the maintenance 
carried out on the previous day also carried out a pre-flight check of the aircraft 
on the morning of the event. The Investigation noted that the Aircraft Technical 
Logbook (ATL) entry simply stated, “Supplemental Inspection 125 Hr 
requirements carried out as per MSA PAH-6656-DHC-6 – Satisfactory”. The 
engineers informed the Investigation that it would not have been clear to the pilots 
from the ATL that the EM pod nose cone had been removed…” (Air Accident 




This statement by the two maintenance engineers, that the 
information passed to the pilots from the ATL was not clear, 
indicate that there were issues in the written communication 
among them. The communication problems identified here are in 
relation to items: D19 ‘The amount of communication in the 
organisation is about right’ and D12 ‘Communication with 
my colleagues within the organisation is accurate and free 
flowing’. 
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R3.5 Precondition for Maintenance Error 
“…AFMS No. SGL1298 prescribes, inter alia, the pre-flight Inspections to be 
carried out on the EM Pods. Of particular relevance to this Investigation is the 
requirement to “check that all visible attaching fasteners are installed and secure” 




In this instance, maintenance personnel failed to check the installation 
and security of all visible attaching fasteners. This indicates that the 
maintenance personnel deviated from an expected good practice in their 
duties. Specifically, by using Communication and Trust Question Set, 
the following three items are identified: F2 ‘My colleagues perform 
their duties very well’, F3 ‘Overall, my colleagues are capable and 
proficient technical staff’ and F5 ‘My colleagues act in the best 
interest of the project’. Items F2 and F3 fall in the construct of trust in 
colleagues’ competence while item F5 falls in the construct of trust in 
colleagues’ benevolence. 
 
R3.6 Precondition for Maintenance Error 
“…The initial maintenance error was not detected during separate walkaround 




In this instance, maintenance personnel failed to detect this maintenance 
error, in the opportunity of the walkaround. This indicates that the 
maintenance personnel deviated from an expected good practice in their 
duties. Specifically, by using the Communication and Trust Question 
Set, the following three items are identified: F2 ‘My colleagues 
perform their duties very well’, ‘Overall, my colleagues are capable 
and proficient technical staff 'and F5 ‘My colleagues act in the best 
interest of the project’. Items F2 and F3 fall in the construct of trust in 
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Example 2: Report 6 (R6) - Boeing 747-443, G-VROM, 01/10/2015, Air Accidents 
Investigation Board, UK (Serious Incident) 
Synopsis of the serious incident 
“The aircraft departed (…) for a scheduled flight (…). Following retraction of the 
landing gear after take-off, low quantity and pressure warnings occurred on 
hydraulic system 4, due to a hydraulic fluid leak. The required checklists were 
completed, and the aircraft returned to land (…). As the landing gear extended 
during the approach, the right-wing landing gear struck the gear door, preventing 
the gear leg from fully deploying. The crew carried out a go-around and, following 
a period of troubleshooting and associated preparation, a non-normal landing 
was successfully completed. It was subsequently determined that the hydraulic 
retract actuator on the right-wing landing gear had been incorrectly installed.” 
(Air Accidents Investigation Branch, 2015a). 
 
R6.1 Precondition for Maintenance Error 
“…The maintenance teams tasked with the replacement of the gear actuator (…) 
faced a number of problems. They were not able to locate a number of the 
specialist tools required by the AMM, including the hoist which the manufacturer 
specified for safe lifting of the weight of the actuator whilst it was being 
manoeuvred into place…” (Air Accidents Investigation Branch, 2015a). 
Trust Factor Identified 
Maintenance personnel were unable to locate the tools 
required for their task. This incident shows their 
ignorance on their organisation specific equipment’s 
availability and/or their location on its premises. This 
indicates that the maintenance personnel deviated from 
an expected good practice in their duties. Specifically, 
by using the Communication and Trust Question Set, the 
F4 ‘In general, my colleagues are knowledgeable 
about our organisation’ item is identified in this 




Maintenance personnel were not knowledgeable about 
the company’s equipment availability. Therefore, the 
maintenance personnel did not have the adequate 
information to proceed with their task successfully, so 
the communication problem identified here is at the 
information about the requirements of the maintenance 
personnel’s job, item C8 ‘Information about the 
requirements of my job’ of the Communication and 
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R6.2 Precondition for Maintenance Error 
“…the maintenance team (…) elected not to use any form of mechanical support, 
thus greatly increasing the difficulty and risk associated with installing the 
replacement actuator. The result of this decision was that the task became so 
physically demanding that the maintenance team became entirely focused on just 
attaching the actuator to the aircraft, in order to relieve themselves of the 85 kg 
weight they had manually supported for over 30 minutes. As such, they had no 
remaining capacity to ensure they installed the actuator in the correct orientation. 
It was subsequently determined that they had rotated it 180° about its long axis 
during installation, effectively installing it upside down…” (Air Accidents 




Maintenance personnel chose to use no mechanical support, putting 
themselves into an extreme physically challenging and error prone 
situation. This indicates that the maintenance personnel deviated from 
an expected good practice in their duties. Specifically, by using the 
Communication and Trust Question Set, the following three items are 
identified in this failure: F2 ‘My colleagues perform their duties 
very well’, F3 ‘Overall, my colleagues are capable and proficient 
technical staff’ and F5 ’My colleagues act in the best interest of the 
project’. Items F2 and F3 fall in the construct of trust in colleagues’ 
competence while item F5 falls in the construct of trust in colleagues’ 
benevolence. 
 
R6.3 Precondition for Maintenance Error 
“…However, the team identified that even if the hoist had been available, the 
manual did not specify how to operate the sling, or how best to utilise it together 
with the hoist in the difficult task of manoeuvring the actuator through the wing 
structure surrounding the actuator location. The AMM is the main source of 
guidance for completing any maintenance task. If specific guidance is not found 
in the AMM, then engineers and technicians might develop improvised techniques 
to accomplish a task, particularly outside normal office support hours such as 




Maintenance personnel were able to identify the lack of 
information provided in the manual about the usage of specific 
equipment. In this case, the maintenance personnel did not have 
the adequate information to proceed with their task successfully, 
so the communication problem identified here is in relation to 
items C8 ‘Information about the requirements of my job’ and 
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Example 3: Report 7 (R7) - Airbus A330-243, A6-EYJ, 06/05/2016, Australian 
Transport Safety Bureau, Australia (Serious Incident) 
Synopsis of the serious incident 
“ (…) Airbus A330 (…) landed at Brisbane airport and was taxied to the terminal. 
Approximately 2 hours later, the aircraft was pushed-back from the gate for the 
return flight (..). The captain rejected the initial take-off attempt after observing 
an airspeed indication failure (…). The aircraft taxied back to the terminal where 
troubleshooting was carried out, before being released back into service. During 
the second take-off roll, the crew became aware of an airspeed discrepancy (…). 
Once airborne, the crew declared a MAYDAY and (…) an overweight landing was 
carried out. Engineering inspection (…) found that the Captain’s pitot probe was 
almost totally obstructed by an insect nest, consistent with mud-dauber wasp 
residue. The pitot obstruction had occurred during the 2-hour period that the 
aircraft was on the ground at Brisbane and was not detected during 
troubleshooting after the initial rejected take-off.…” (Australia Transport Safety 
Bureau, 2016). 
 
R7.1 Precondition for Maintenance Error 
“…Pitot probe covers were not installed by maintenance staff during the period 
the aircraft was at the gate. The maintenance staff advised that the use of pitot 
covers was dependent on customer requirements and was not a standard practice. 
Operators can minimise the risk of pitot probe obstruction by consistently using 




Maintenance personnel did not install pitot covers, resulting in 
the formation of the wasps’ nest which caused the airspeed 
indication failure on the pilot’s display. This indicates that the 
maintenance personnel deviated from an expected good 
practice. By using the Communication and Trust Question Set, 
the following three items from the Communication and Trust 
Question Set are identified: F2 ‘My colleagues perform their 
duties very well’, F3 ‘Overall, my colleagues are capable and 
proficient technical staff’ and F5 ‘My colleagues act in the 
best interest of the project’. 
Items F2 and F3 fall in the construct of trust in colleagues’ 





Maintenance personnel were aware that even on aircraft’s short 
stays, the operators benefit from the use of the pitot covers. 
However, they did not apply it as a standard practice and this 
practice was dependent on the operator’s requirements. In this 
case, the maintenance personnel did not have the adequate 
information to proceed with their task successfully, so the 
communication problem identified here is in relation to items: 
C7 ‘Information about departmental policies and goals’, C8 
‘Information about the requirements of the maintenance 
personnel’s job’ and D19 ‘The amount of communication in 
the organisation is about right’. 
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R7.2 Precondition for Maintenance Error 
“…Although no ‘hard’ (permanent) faults had been identified, the engineer, in 
consultation with the operator’s Maintenance Control Centre considered that the 
best resolution would have been to make ADR 1 inoperative. However, this was 
not permitted under the MEL requirements for ETOPS16 dispatch. Therefore, the 
engineer transposed ADIRU 1 and 2 and performed a BITE test of both units. The 
aircraft was dispatched with the ADR part of ADIRU 2 inoperative (switched off) 
in accordance with the MEL. The FO’s air data source was switched to ADIRU 3 
and the captain’s air data source remained switched to the normal (ADIRU 1) 
position. As a result, the blocked captain’s pitot probe remained undetected and 
the aircraft was dispatched with only one of the three airspeed sources able to 
provide valid data…” (Australia Transport Safety Bureau, 2016). 
Trust Factor 
Identified 
maintenance personnel failed to detect the blocked captain’s pitot 
at the troubleshooting that followed the initial rejected take-off. 
This indicates that the maintenance personnel deviated from an 
expected good practice. Specifically, by using the 
Communication and Trust Question Set, the following four items 
are identified: F1 ‘My colleagues fulfil my expectations in our 
collaboration’, F2 ‘My colleagues perform their duties very 
well’, F3 ‘Overall, my colleagues are capable and proficient 
technical staff’ and F5 ‘My colleagues act in the best interest 
of the project’. Items F1, F2 and F3 fall in the construct of trust 
in colleagues’ competence while item F5 falls in the construct of 
trust in colleagues’ benevolence, see Table 4.1. 
 
R7.3 Precondition for Maintenance Error 
“…The blocked captain’s pitot probe was not detected by engineering staff after 
the initial rejected take-off. The relevant tasks in the trouble shooting manual did 
not specifically identify the pitot probe as a potential source of airspeed indication 
failure. [Safety issue] …” (Australia Transport Safety Bureau, 2016). 
Trust Factor 
Identified 
The relevant manual did not contain the specific information 
required to successful handling of the task. In this case, the 
maintenance personnel did not have the adequate information 
to proceed with their task successfully, so the communication 
problem identified here is in relation to items: C7 ‘Information 
about departmental policies and goals’, C8 ‘The information 
about the requirements of the maintenance personnel’s job’ 
and D19 ‘The amount of communication in the organisation 
is about right' of the Communication and Trust Question Set. 
 
4.1.1.2 Summarised Results 
The summarised results from the analysis of all (fifteen) accident and incident 
investigation reports are presented in Table 4.1. This table offers a quick view of the 
items of the Communication and Trust Question Set identified in these reports. 
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Table 4.1 Tabulation of the accident and incident investigation reports analysed. 
No 
Aircraft, Registration, Date, 
Accident Investigation Authority, 







that indicate the 
existence of 
trust issues 
Communication Factor: Survey 
items that indicate the existence of 
communication issues 
R1 
Airbus A320-214, EI-GAL, 
07/05/2019, Air Accident 
Investigation, Ireland (Serious 
Incident) 
R1.1 F2, F3, F5  
R1.2  C3 
R1.3 F2, F3, F5  
R2 
Airbus A320-216, PK-AXC, 
30/11/2015, Komite National 
Keselamatan Transportasi, Republic 
of Indonesia (Accident) 
R2.1 F2, F3, F5  
R2.2  D19, D8, C7 
R3 
de Havilland Canada DHC 6-300, C-
GSGF, 18/02/2016, Air Accident 
Investigation Unit, Ireland (Serious 
Incident) 
R3.1  C3 
R3.2 F2, F3, F5  
R3.3 F2, F3, F5 D19, D12, D17 
R3.4  D19, D12 
R3.5 F2, F3, F5   
R3.6 F2, F3, F5  
R4 
Airbus A320, VH-VGZ, 22/03/2019, 
Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 
Australia (Incident) 
R4.1 F2, F3, F5 D19, D12, D17 
R4.2 F2, F3, F5 D17 
R4.3 F2, F3, F5 D19, D17, D8, C7 
R4.4 F2, F3, F5 D19, D17, D8, C7 
R5 
Bombardier DHC-8-Q402, G-JECP, 
23/02/2017, , Dutch Safety Board, 
Netherlands (Accident) 
R5.1 F2, F3, F5  
R5.2 F2, F3, F5  
R5.3  D19, D17, D8, C7 
R6 
Boeing 747-443, G-VROM, 
01/10/2015, Air Accidents 
Investigation Board, UK (Serious 
Incident) 
R6.1 F4 C8 
R6.2 F2, F3, F5  
R6.3  C8, D19 
 
R7 
Airbus A330-243, A6-EYJ, 
06/05/2016, Australian Transport 
Safety Bureau, Australia (Serious 
Incident) 
R7.1 F2, F3, F5 C7, C8, D19 
R7.2 F1, F2, F3, F5  
R7.3  C7, C8, D19 
R8 
Boeing 767, N360AA, 07/12/2012, 
National Transportation Safety Board, 
USA (incident) 
R8.1 F2, F3, F5  
R8.2  C8, D19 
R9 
Boeing 767, N669US, 28/09/2016, 
National Transportation Safety Board, 
USA (Incident) 
R9.1 F2, F3, F5  
R9.2  C8, D19, D8 
R10 
Airbus A319, VT-SCQ, 16/09/2016, 
Directorate General of Civil Aviation, 
India (Accident) 
R10.1 F2, F3, F5  
R10.2  C8, D19, D8 
R11 
Boeing 737-800, B 18616, 
21/08/2009, Japan Transport Safety 
Board, Japan (Accident) 
R11.1 
F2, F3, F5, F8, 
F9, F11 
D19, D17, D8, D12 
R11.2  D19, C10, D8, C8 
R12 
Airbus A319-131, G-EUOE, 
14/07/2005, Air Accident 
Investigation Branch, UK (Accident) 
R12.1 F2, F3, F5  
R12.2  D19, D17, D8, C7 
R12.3 F2, F3, F5 D19, D17, D8, D6 
R12.4 F2, F3, F5  
R12.5   D19, D17, D6, D8 
R12.6  D19, D15, D17, D12, D3, D6  
R12.7  D19, D6, D17, D12, D3, D6 
R12.8 F1, F2, F4, F5, F7   
R12.9 
F1, F2, F4, F5, 
F7, F8, F11 
D19, D2, C3, D8, D6, D17, C7, D15, 
D12, D3, D6 
R12.10 F12, F13, F14  
R13 
Embraer 190-100LR, P4-KCJ, 
02/05/2019, Gabinete de Precenção e 
Investigação de Acidentes com 
Aeronaves e de Acidentes 
Ferroviarios, Portugal (Accident) 
R13.1 F2, F3, F5   
R13.2   D19, C8, D17, C3, D6, D8 
R13.3 F1, F2, F3, F5 D19, D17, D16, D12, D13, D15, D6 
R13.4 F1, F2, F3, F4, F5 
D19, D17, C3, D6, D8, D12, D15, D2, 
D6, C7, D3 
R14 
Airbus A330-342, B-HLL, 
03/07/2013, Accident Investigation 
Division, Hong Kong (Accident) 
R14.1 F1, F2, F3, F4, F5 
D19, D2, C3, D8, D6, D17, C7, D15, 
D12, D3, D6 
R14.2 F1, F2, F3, F4, F5 
D19, D2, C3, D8, D6, D17, C7, D15, 
D12, D3, D6 
R14.3 F1, F2, F3, F4 
D19, D2, C3, D8, D6, D17, C7, D15, 
D12, D3, D6 
R15 
Lockheed WC-130H, 65-0968, 
09/10/2018, United States Air Force 
Accident Investigation Board, USA 
(Accident) 
R15.1 F1, F2, F3, F4, F5 
D19, D2, C3, D8, D6, D17, C7, D15, 
D12, D16, C1, C8, D3, D4, D6 
R15.2 
F1, F2, F3, F4, 
F5, F8, F9, F11 
D19, D2, C3, D8, D6, D17, C7, D15, 
D12, D16, C1, C8, D3, D4, D6 
R15.3 F1 D19, D17, D16, D12, D13, D15, D6 
R15.4 F1, F2, F3, F4 
D19, D2, C3, D8, D6, D17, C7, D16, 
D15, D12, D3, D6 
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4.1.2 Discussion  
Considering all data obtained from the content analysis (as summarised in Table 4.1), 
it stems that both trust and communication are detectable in the aviation maintenance 
sector. Therefore, based on these findings, a positive answer can be offered to Research 
Question 1. Trust and communication, as they are reported in the accident and incident 
investigation reports, are identified as distinct preconditions in the vast majority (78%) 
of the distinct maintenance errors. In six of the examined distinct maintenance errors 
(accounting to 14% of the total 42) trust only can be identified as a precondition to 
maintenance error, while communication is identified in just four distinct maintenance 
errors (corresponding to 8% of the errors analysed) (Table 4.2).  
 
Table 4.2 Absolute number and percentage (%) of maintenance errors where trust, 
communication and combination of both identified as preconditions within the 






Distinct Maintenance Errors where … were 
identified as Precondition(s) 







6 4 31 
14% 8% 78% 
 
Only 22% (out of the total forty-two errors analysed in this phase of the study) included 
solely one (communication or trust) as an error precondition and not both. It is, 
however, noted that these numerical results are not conclusive, as the investigation 
reports reflect the accident/incident investigators’ exposition of evidence. This means 
that the investigators were not necessarily looking for ‘communication’ or ‘trust’ 
evidence; therefore, both factors may have not been exhaustively investigated (and 
subsequently reported).  
The issues identified concerning trust were about interpersonal trust and software trust. 
The Trust Constructs and Measures Questionnaire items are grouped in different 
constructs, with each group indicating specific attributes of trust. Therefore, the 
specific characteristics identified here were trust towards colleagues’ competence, 
integrity and benevolence and trust towards the company software’s capability. 
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Regarding the communication satisfaction, the issues identified were in relation to 
satisfaction with the organisation’s communication climate, their superiors, the 
organisation’s integration, the media quality, the general organisational perspective 
and the horizontal informal communication. These are the wider groups of the 
Communication Satisfaction Questionnaire items, that were initially introduced by 
Downs and Hazen (1977) and can describe categorically the specific issues with 
communication satisfaction identified in these scenarios.  
Nonetheless, the aim of the content analysis here is to identify qualitatively the co-
existence of these two factors as maintenance error preconditions. Considering the 
limitation of this analysis method, which has been explained above, a positive answer 
may be offered to Research Question 1, since both factors were revealed through the 
technique and process employed.  
 
4.2 Content Analysis of Human Factors Training Curriculum and Material  
4.2.1 Results 
The best way to answer Research Question 2 ‘Are communication and trust covered 
in aviation maintenance human factors basic training?’ is to obtain all the required 
information directly from official/approved aviation maintenance training sources. 
Since it has been noted that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) does not 
include mandatory human factors training, it is the European Union Aviation Safety 
Agency (EASA), Directorate General of Civil Aviation, Government of India (DGCA) 
and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) from which approved training 
material can be obtained for review. All three regulatory authorities practically share 
the same curriculum for their maintenance human factors training; thus, the analysis is 
performed on the EASA Part-66 Category A and B Module 9 ‘Human Factors’ 
curriculum (Table 4.3).  
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Table 4.3 Curriculum of the EASA (2012) Part-66 Category A and B Module 9 
‘Human Factors’.  
Chapter Title Content 
9.1 General 
The need to take human factors into account; 






Vision; Hearing; Information processing; Attention 






Responsibility: individual and group; Motivation 
and de-motivation; Peer pressure; ‘Culture’ issues; 






Fitness/health; Stress: domestic and work related; 
Time pressure and deadlines; Workload: overload 
and underload; Sleep and fatigue, shift work; 





Noise and fumes; Illumination; Climate and 
temperature; Motion and vibration; Working 
environment. 
9.6 Tasks 
Physical work; Repetitive tasks; Visual inspection; 
Complex systems. 
9.7 Communication 
Within and between teams; Work logging and 
recording; Keeping up to date, currency; 
Dissemination of information. 
9.8 Human Error 
Error models and theories; Types of error in 
maintenance tasks; Implications of errors (i.e. 
accidents); Avoiding and managing errors. 
9.9 
Hazards in the 
Workplace 
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Aircraft maintenance training under the EASA framework is highly regulated with 
provisions of consistency and high quality in the delivered course material by all 
approved maintenance training organisations (commonly referred as EASA Part-147 
organisations, reflecting the applicable regulatory set). As discussed in section 3.3.3.3 
of Chapter 3, two coursebooks were selected for the content analysis, which were the 
following: 
• Coursebook 1: ‘Module 9-Human Factors’ (by C. Strike), published in 2018 
by Cardiff and Vale College in the UK (Strike, 2018); 
• Coursebook 2: ‘Human factors for A level Certification, module 9’ (by N. 
Gold), published in 2015 by Aircraft Technical Book Company in the USA 
(Gold, 2015). 
 
The first examination of these coursebooks determined that both followed the EASA 
curriculum, as expected. Furthermore, the content of both books was found to cover 
the curriculum in a similar way, having a comparable structure and content. Therefore, 
these two coursebooks were the adequate required body of material for answering 
Research Question 2 with the use of the content analysis technique. 
The EASA curriculum and the two coursebooks were examined to locate the words 
‘communication’ and ‘trust’. The EASA Part-66 Module 9 ‘Human Factors’ 
curriculum covers only the chapters and subchapters of the material approved to be 
taught. In the curriculum, the word ‘trust’ is not used while the word ‘communication’ 
is solely used in chapter seven (Communication) one time in the title of the chapter. 
The next step was to scan the two EASA Part-66 Module 9 coursebooks for the same 
words. The results were as follows: 
• In Coursebook 1 (Strike, 2018), the word count in Chapter Seven-
Communication, for the word ‘communication’ is 52, while for the word ‘trust’ 
is 0. It is noted that in the whole Chapter Seven-Communication, there is no 
reference to trust, even though communication is analysed and different 
communication techniques are presented there. 
• In Coursebook 2 (Gold, 2015), the word count in Sub-module 07, 
Communication, for the word ‘communication’ is 63 while for the word ‘trust’ 
is 1. Trust towards a message sender is referred one time, in the communication 
chapter, as a precondition in the effective receipt of a message. 
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The summary of findings in the curriculum and the coursebooks are shown in Table 
4.4. 
 
Table 4.4 Word count of ‘communication’ and ‘trust’ in the EASA Part-66 Module 9 
curriculum and the two coursebooks. 
EASA Part 66 Module 9 ‘Human 




Curriculum 1 0 
Coursebook 1 52 0 
Coursebook 2 63 1 
 
The second phase of this examination continued into the in-depth analysis to identify 
any concealed elements of communication and trust into the twelve elements of the 
Dirty Dozen tool (see subchapters 1.1 and section 3.3.3.3). As explained in detail in 
section 3.3.3.3, the results of this analysis were obtained by the mapping of the twelve 
elements of the Dirty Dozen with the use of the Communication and Trust Question 
Set. The results of this process are presented next. 
Dirty Dozen Element 1 
Lack of communication can result to maintenance error which can be potentially 
responsible for an aviation incident or accident 






All communication items in sections C, D and E can describe 
communication preconditions that can lead to ineffective 
communication, namely: C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C7, C8, C9, 
C10, C11, C12, C13, C14, D1, D2, D3, D4, D5, D6, D6, D7, D8, 
D9, D10, D11, D12, D13, D14, D15, D16, D17, D18, D19, E1, 
E2, E3, E4 and E5. 
Trust Preconditions 
Ineffective communication (oral, written, emails, documentation 
etc) can produce either interpersonal or software trust 
preconditions. These preconditions may lead to maintenance 
error and consequently to an aviation incident or accident. This 
occurrence can be further analysed with the items consisting the 
following trust constructs: trust in colleagues’ competence, trust 
in colleagues’ benevolence, trust in colleagues’ integrity, trust in 
company's software capability, trust in company's software 
reliability, trust in managers-subordinates’ competence, trust in 
managers-subordinates’ benevolence and trust in managers-
subordinates’ integrity. 
The identified items, linked to ineffective communication, are: 
F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12, F13, F14, F15, 
F16, F17, G1, G2, G3, G4, G5, G6, G7, G8, G9, G10 and G11. 
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Dirty Dozen Element 2 
Complacency can lead to not having the need to double check, question or try 
one’s best over it. An aviation professional might experience complacency during 
repetitive tasks while having established an overreliance on his/her relative 
abilities 






Symptoms from complacency can be prevented with proper 
training. Training can promote knowledge on the subject which 
again can enable maintenance professionals to actively look for 
complacency signs on oneself and communicate them to others. 
This communication can promote the successful completion of 
tasks. All communication items in sections C, D and E describe 
communication preconditions that can lead to ineffective 
communication, namely: C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C7, C8, C9, 
C10, C11, C12, C13, C14, D1, D2, D3, D4, D5, D6, D6, D7, D8, 
D9, D10, D11, D12, D13, D14, D15, D16, D17, D18, D19, E1, 
E2, E3, E4 and E5. 
 
Dirty Dozen element 3 
Lack of knowledge can lead to a gap to the aviation professional’s knowledge and 
perform his/her duties unsuccessfully 






Lack of knowledge is caused by the aviation maintenance 
professional's insufficient preparation to proceed to the task in 
hand. This lack of knowledge can stem from insufficient 
training, studying, obtaining current information on 
modifications etc. Lack of knowledge also may refer to the 
obtained ability in the proper use of all high-tech aids in the 
maintenance activities e.g. tools, materials, equipment, 
software. Therefore, the trust preconditions that may lead to 
maintenance error and consequently to an aviation incident or 
accident can be further analysed by the items consisting the 
following trust constructs: trust in colleagues’ competence, 
trust in colleagues’ benevolence, trust in colleagues’ integrity, 
trust in company's software capability, trust in company's 
software reliability, trust in managers-subordinates’ 
competence, trust in managers-subordinates’ benevolence and 
trust in managers-subordinates’ integrity. 
The identified items, linked to ineffective communication, are: 
F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12, F13, F14, 
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Dirty Dozen element 4 
Distractions might prevent the professionals to attend accurately back to their 
work, possibly resulting in a maintenance task process error 






Distractions lead aviation maintenance professionals to lose 
concentration and return inaccurately back to their task. This 
situation may result in maintenance error and consequently to 
an aviation incident or accident. Regardless of the cause of 
destruction, the potential error reveals issues in the following 
constructs of the questionnaire: trust in colleagues’ 
competence, trust in colleagues’ benevolence, trust in 
colleagues’ integrity, trust in company's software capability,  
trust in company's software reliability, trust in managers-
subordinates’ competence, trust in managers-subordinates’ 
benevolence and trust in managers-subordinates’ integrity. 
The identified items, linked to ineffective communication, are: 
F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12, F13, F14, 
F15, F16, F17, G1, G2, G3, G4, G5, G6, G7, G8, G9, G10 and 
G11. 
 
Dirty Dozen element 5  
Lack of teamwork due to failure to establish mutual understanding and 
cooperation, there is a great risk of a maintenance error occurrence 






Unsuccessful teamwork can find its causes into the lack of 
mutual understanding, which stems in problematic 
communication. All communication items in sections C, D 
and E describe communication preconditions that can lead to 
ineffective communication, namely: C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, 
C7, C8, C9, C10, C11, C12, C13, C14, D1, D2, D3, D4, D5, 
D6, D6, D7, D8, D9, D10, D11, D12, D13, D14, D15, D16, 
D17, D18, D19, E1, E2, E3, E4 and E5. 
Trust Preconditions 
Unsuccessful teamwork reveals issues in the collaboration 
between colleagues. These preconditions can potentially lead 
to maintenance error and consequently to an aviation incident 
or accident. This occurrence can be further analysed with the 
items consisting the following trust constructs: trust in 
colleagues’ competence, trust in colleagues’ benevolence, 
trust in colleagues’ integrity, trust in managers-subordinates’ 
competence, trust in managers-subordinates’ benevolence and 
trust in managers-subordinates’ integrity. 
The identified items, linked to ineffective communication, are: 
F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12, F13, F14, 
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Dirty Dozen element 6  
Fatigue can affect aviation maintenance employees’ performance and relevant 
training is necessary to promptly recognize symptoms of physical tiredness or 
mental and/or emotional fatigue on oneself or colleagues 






Symptoms from fatigue can be prevented with proper training. 
Training can promote knowledge on the subject which again 
can enable maintenance professionals to actively look for 
tiredness signs on oneself and colleagues and communicate 
them to others. This communication can promote the 
successful completion of tasks. All communication items in 
sections C, D and E describe communication preconditions 
that can lead to ineffective communication, namely: C1, C2, 
C3, C4, C5, C6, C7, C8, C9, C10, C11, C12, C13, C14, D1, 
D2, D3, D4, D5, D6, D6, D7, D8, D9, D10, D11, D12, D13, 
D14, D15, D16, D17, D18, D19, E1, E2, E3, E4 and E5. 
 
Dirty Dozen element 7 
Lack of resources (time, personnel, equipment) might lead to an error prone 
situation 






When maintenance employees deal with lack of resources, 
unless they communicate it to their colleagues, it may lead to 
maintenance error occurrences. Communication can promote 
the successful completion of tasks. All communication items 
in sections C, D and E can describe communication 
preconditions that can lead to ineffective communication, 
namely: C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C7, C8, C9, C10, C11, C12, 
C13, C14, D1, D2, D3, D4, D5, D6, D6, D7, D8, D9, D10, 
D11, D12, D13, D14, D15, D16, D17, D18, D19, E1, E2, E3, 
E4 and E5. 
 
Dirty Dozen element 8 
Pressure refers to the management’s-imposed expectations or self-induced 
pressure for prompt and flawless employees’ performance 






Symptoms from self or management-imposed pressure can be 
prevented with proper training. Training can promote 
knowledge on the subject which again can enable maintenance 
professionals to actively look for pressure signs on oneself and 
colleagues and communicate them to others. Communication 
can promote the successful completion of tasks. All 
communication items in sections C, D and E describe 
communication preconditions that can lead to ineffective 
communication, namely: C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C7, C8, C9, 
C10, C11, C12, C13, C14, D1, D2, D3, D4, D5, D6, D6, D7, 
D8, D9, D10, D11, D12, D13, D14, D15, D16, D17, D18, 
D19, E1, E2, E3, E4 and E5. 
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Dirty Dozen element 9 
Lack of assertiveness may lead to maintenance errors as it can leave maintenance 
deviations undetected 






Lack of assertiveness can be prevented with proper training. 
Training can promote knowledge on the subject which again 
can enable maintenance professionals to actively 
communicate their concerns and opinions to others. 
Communication can promote the successful completion of 
tasks. All communication items in sections C, D and E 
describe communication preconditions that can lead to 
ineffective communication. These items are: C1, C2, C3, C4, 
C5, C6, C7, C8, C9, C10, C11, C12, C13, C14, D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5, D6, D6, D7, D8, D9, D10, D11, D12, D13, D14, D15, 
D16, D17, D18, D19, E1, E2, E3, E4 and E5. 
 
Dirty Dozen element 10 
Stress can affect work performance 






Symptoms from stress can be prevented with proper training. 
Training can promote knowledge on the subject which again 
can enable maintenance professionals to actively look for 
stress signs on oneself and communicate them accordingly. 
Communication can promote the successful completion of 
tasks. All communication items in sections C, D and E 
describe communication preconditions that can lead to 
ineffective communication, namely: C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, 
C7, C8, C9, C10, C11, C12, C13, C14, D1, D2, D3, D4, D5, 
D6, D6, D7, D8, D9, D10, D11, D12, D13, D14, D15, D16, 
D17, D18, D19, E1, E2, E3, E4 and E5. 
 
Dirty Dozen element 11  
Lack of awareness can be the cause in the failure of foreseeing all possible 
consequences by one’s actions 






Lack of awareness can be prevented with proper training. 
Training can promote knowledge on the subject which again 
can enable maintenance professionals to actively look for 
awareness resources and communicate this issue to others. 
Communication can promote the successful completion of 
tasks. All communication items in sections C, D and E 
describe communication preconditions that can lead to 
ineffective communication, namely: C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, 
C7, C8, C9, C10, C11, C12, C13, C14, D1, D2, D3, D4, D5, 
D6, D6, D7, D8, D9, D10, D11, D12, D13, D14, D15, D16, 
D17, D18, D19, E1, E2, E3, E4 and E5. 
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Dirty Dozen element 12 
Norms can be either in accordance or not with the organisation’s policies and 
therefore can follow unsafe practices and procedures 






Following rules that are unofficial and potentially unsafe, can 
potentially lead to maintenance error and consequently to an 
aviation incident or accident. A safety occurrence can be 
further analysed with the items consisting the following trust 
constructs: trust in colleagues’ competence, trust in 
colleagues’ benevolence, trust in colleagues’ integrity, trust in 
managers-subordinates’ competence, trust in managers-
subordinates’ benevolence and trust in managers-
subordinates’ integrity. 
The identified items, linked to ineffective communication, are: 
F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12, F13, F14, 
F15, F16, F17, G1, G2, G3, G4, G5, G6, G7, G8, G9, G10 and 
G11. 
 
All Dirty Dozen elements refer to the total population of the aviation maintenance 
professionals; therefore, all levels of management are included (sections E and G of 
the Communication and Trust Question Set which are only for supervisors/managers). 
Ten factors appear to have either the communication or trust elements concealed into 
their meaning. Two of them, the lack of communication and lack of teamwork, appear 
to have both communication and trust concealed. For illustrative purposes, the overall 
mapping of the Communication and Trust Question Set items against the Dirty Dozen 
elements is provided in Table 4.5. 
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Dirty Dozen element 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
C1 X X   X X X X X X X  
C2 X X   X X X X X X X  
C3 X X   X X X X X X X  
C4 X X   X X X X X X X  
C5 X X   X X X X X X X  
C6 X X   X X X X X X X  
C7 X X   X X X X X X X  
C8 X X   X X X X X X X  
C9 X X   X X X X X X X  
C10 X X   X X X X X X X  
C11 X X   X X X X X X X  
C12 X X   X X X X X X X  
C13 X X   X X X X X X X  
C14 X X   X X X X X X X  
D1 X X   X X X X X X X  
D2 X X   X X X X X X X  
D3 X X   X X X X X X X  
D4 X X   X X X X X X X  
D5 X X   X X X X X X X  
D6 X X   X X X X X X X  
D7 X X   X X X X X X X  
D8 X X   X X X X X X X  
D9 X X   X X X X X X X  
D11 X X   X X X X X X X  
D12 X X   X X X X X X X  
D13 X X   X X X X X X X  
D14 X X   X X X X X X X  
D15 X X   X X X X X X X  
D16 X X   X X X X X X X  
D17 X X   X X X X X X X  
D18 X X   X X X X X X X  
D19 X X   X X X X X X X  
E1 X X   X X X X X X X  
E2 X X   X X X X X X X  
E3 X X   X X X X X X X  
E4 X X   X X X X X X X  
E5 X X   X X X X X X X  
F1 X  X X X       X 
F2 X  X X X       X 
F3 X  X X X       X 
F4 X  X X X       X 
F5 X  X X X       X 
F6 X  X X X       X 
F7 X  X X X       X 
F8 X  X X X       X 
F9 X  X X X       X 
F10 X  X X X       X 
F11 X  X X X       X 
F14 X  X X X       X 
F15 X  X X X       X 
F16 X  X X X       X 
F17 X  X X X       X 
G1 X  X X X       X 
G2 X  X X X       X 
G3 X  X X X       X 
G4 X  X X X       X 
G5 X  X X X       X 
G6 X  X X X       X 
G7 X  X X X       X 
G8 X  X X X       X 
G9 X  X X X       X 
G10 X  X X X       X 
G11 X  X X X       X 
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The third phase included the scanning of the EASA Part-66 Module 9 ‘Human Factors’ 
course material against the elements of the Dirty Dozen. This scanning (using the 
mapping of the Dirty Dozen elements to the Communication and Trust Question Set) 
revealed the concealed elements of communication and trust in Coursebook 1 and 2. 
The summary of the findings is presented in Table 4.6. From this analysis, it stems that 
both coursebooks include all factors of the Dirty Dozen and consequently include 
indirectly and concealed both communication and trust elements in their content.  
 
Table 4.6 Dirty Dozen elements found in the examined EASA Part-66 Module 9 
‘Human Factors’ coursebooks in relation to communication and trust elements. 
Coursebook 
Dirty Dozen Element 
included in the 
Coursebook 
Preconditions identified based 




1. Lack of Communication X X 
2. Complacency X  
3. Lack of knowledge  X 
4. Distraction  X 
5. Lack of teamwork X X 
6. Fatigue X  
7. Lack of resources X  
8. Pressure X  
9. Lack of assertiveness X  
10. Stress X  
11. Lack of awareness X  
12. Norms  X 
Coursebook 2 
(Gold, 2015) 
1. Lack of Communication X X 
2. Complacency X  
3. Lack of knowledge  X 
4. Distraction  X 
5. Lack of teamwork X X 
6. Fatigue X  
7. Lack of resources X  
8. Pressure X  
9. Lack of assertiveness X  
10. Stress X  
11. Lack of awareness X  
12. Norms  X 
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4.2.2 Discussion 
Considering all data from the content analysis (presented in Table 4.4), the answer to 
Research Question 2 is negative, as trust is not considered to be covered sufficiently 
in the aviation maintenance human factors basic training. In particular, the EASA 
curriculum has no mention of trust, neither as a separate chapter nor in any other 
chapters (and most importantly in the communication chapter). In the two examined 
coursebooks’ chapters covering communication, there was only one mention to trust. 
Therefore, there is neither direct mention nor further explanation/discussion on trust. 
However, with the assistance of the mapping of the Dirty Dozen factors with the items 
of Communication and Trust Question Set, concealed communication and trust 
elements were identified into the material of the two coursebooks. The direct absence 
of the trust factor in the training material may be partially covered by these concealed 
elements, although this has limited pedagogic value and effectiveness. 
 
4.3 Survey 
In the survey phase of this study, both interpersonal trust and company software trust 
are investigated. In correspondence with the technology trust (Li, Rong, & Thatcher, 
2012), software trust is the aviation maintenance employees’ beliefs of the 
trustworthiness towards their company software’s performance. The purpose is to 
explore the association between communication satisfaction and trust of the aviation 
maintenance employees. This population is chosen for this study for its critical 
characteristics. These characteristics are mainly influenced by its global nature, yet it 
is governed by different laws in different geographical areas. The aviation maintenance 
profession is highly complex, highly skilled and highly regulated around the world. 
Aviation maintenance employees, after multiyear training to obtain their 
qualifications, can work autonomously in a busy, constantly physically challenging 
working environment. Their work requires a fast pace, long hours, overtime due to 
shortages in staffing, shift work, and ongoing training as new technology and 
legislation are constantly introduced. Additionally, full attention and situational 
awareness can be limited due to the physical restrictions of their immediate working 
environment. Considering that the managers’ posts do not require the same hours as 
the rest of the employees (morning shifts) and the same locations (offices rather than 
ramps or painting shops etc), it is believed that communication and trust between them 
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may influence safety. Therefore, ongoing research of human factors, and especially 
the investigation of traits such as communication and trust, will continue to contribute 
to aviation maintenance safety and more efficient performance.  
 
4.3.1 Results 
4.3.1.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The respondents were mostly civil aircraft maintenance employees (83%) while their 
military counterparts made up 13% of respondents (4% of the sample did not state 
their civil/military status). The newly hired employees (less than 6 months of 
experience) comprised just 7%. Respondents were found to be evenly equally 
distributed according to their total experience: 19% had total experience between 0 to 
9.5 years, 26% 10 to 19.5 years, 31% between 20 to 29.5 years and 24% more than 30 
years of experience.  
Approximately half of the respondents were either holding a supervisory or a 
managerial post. Of the respondents 51% held one license and worked for a 
maintenance company regulated by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), 
6% held a single license from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and 9% 
held a single license from the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA). 12 % of the 
respondents held military license while another 12% held multiple licenses and the 
remaining held no license. 
The Cronbach’s alpha values were measured for both the Communication Satisfaction 
Questionnaire and the Trust Constructs and Measures Questionnaire and the different 
group of questions (constructs) that each questionnaire was divided in: the managers’ 
questions group in Communication Satisfaction Questionnaire and the 7 constructs of 
the Trust Constructs and Measures Questionnaire. All of these Cronbach’s alpha 
values ranged between 0.77 and 0.97. Particularly, the Cronbach’s alpha for the whole 
Communication Satisfaction Questionnaire was 0.97 similar to that found by past 
researchers who used the same questionnaire (Downs & Hazen, 1977; Mount & Back, 
1999) , the whole Trust Constructs and Measures questionnaire was 0.91, the 
Communication Satisfaction Questionnaire managers’ group was 0.88 and the Trust 
Constructs and Measures Questionnaire’s Trust in the company's software Capability 
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was 0.92. These were high-reliability scores and were, therefore, considered 
acceptable for this research. 
The full results of the mean and standard deviation for all items of the Communication 
and Trust Question Set are provided in Table 4.7.  
 
Table 4.7 The mean and standard deviation (SD) calculated for all items contained in 
the Communication and Trust Question Set. 
Item Mean SD  Item Mean SD  Item Mean SD 
C1 5.01 1.57  D1 4.55 1.68  E1 5.52 1.13 
C2 4.99 1.40  D2 4.15 1.67  E2 5.40 1.24 
C3 4.73 1.51  D3 5.09 1.77  E3 5.06 1.38 
C4 4.80 1.57  D4 5.10 1.62  E4 5.34 1.19 
C5 4.71 1.62  D5 4.56 1.67  E5 5.27 1.30 
C6 4.81 1.73  D6 4.51 1.55     
C7 4.71 1.59  D7 5.89 1.29     
C8 5.26 1.45  D8 4.83 1.58     
C9 4.23 1.58  D9 4.62 1.58     
C10 4.43 1.52  D11 5.08 1.69     
C11 4.35 1.60  D12 5.27 1.43     
C12 4.51 1.79  D13 5.14 1.38     
C13 4.53 1.78  D14 5.45 1.24     
C14 4.76 1.39  D15 4.55 1.61     
    D16 5.30 1.43     
    D17 4.65 1.55     
    D18 4.75 1.44     
    D19 4.45 1.54     
           
Item Mean SD  Item Mean SD     
F1 5.48 1.17  G1 5.66 0.90     
F2 5.66 1.06  G2 5.81 0.96     
F3 5.89 0.97  G3 6.00 0.86     
F4 5.56 0.98  G4 5.48 0.97     
F5 5.54 1.13  G5 5.77 0.97     
F6 6.05 1.06  G6 5.97 0.96     
F7 5.13 1.42  G7 5.25 1.23     
F8 5.45 1.31  G8 5.55 1.14     
F9 5.67 1.14  G9 5.69 1.05     
F10 5.56 1.09  G10 5.65 0.99     
F11 5.54 1.15  G11 5.68 0.99     
F14 5.46 1.77         
F15 4.48 1.77         
F16 4.76 1.67         
F17 4.89 1.51         
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The 33% of the items' mean scores range is between 5.10 to 5.60, while the maximum 
range of 5.60 to 6.10 is 20.6% of the questionnaire's items. Similar percentage holds 
the minimum range of the mean scores (4.10 to 4.60), while the remaining range (4.60 
to 5.10) holds 27% of the items (Figure 4.1). 
Figure 4.1 The range of the items' mean scores and their percentages 
 
The question D10 ‘The grapevine (person to person informal communication/gossip) 
is active in our organisation’ was included in the questionnaire that was distributed to 
the participants; however, it was inconsistent with the other items’ (based on reliability 
measures) and was therefore excluded from the analysis. Furthermore, other 
researchers have excluded the same question from their research projects as it was 
found to be unclear to the participants (Chan & Lai, 2017; Mount & Back, 1999). Also, 
the two questions, F12 ‘My company's software has the functionality I need’ and F13 
‘My company's software has the ability to do what I want it to do’ were included in 
the questionnaire that was distributed to the participants. However, these questions 
showed problematically high correlations to F14 ‘Overall, my company's software has 
the capabilities I need’. As a result, they were not included in the statistical analysis. 
A comparison of the mean and standard deviation for various groups of questions of 
this study was conducted with the results of two published research studies. The 
importance of this comparison, presented in Table 4.8, lays to the fact that four 
different categories of professionals (aviation maintenance, teachers, nurses and 
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administrative) have responded to the same questionnaire and therefore they have 
provided comparable data and results. In particular, the following observations are 
made: 
• Two of these categories, aviation maintenance and nurses, are operating within 
a highly regulated environment, while teachers and administrative employees 
do not share this distinct characteristic within their working environment.  
• Aviation maintenance employees and nurses work in rotating shifts, during 
weekdays, weekends and public holidays, while the teachers and 
administrative employees have standard morning weekdays working hours. 
• Aviation maintenance employees and nurses are assigned tasks in teams. Their 
working structure is based on the formation of teams and team leaders and the 
tasks are assigned under the criteria of the personnel's qualifications, seniority, 
experience. Teachers and administrative personnel, even though they operate 
under organisational team structures, they usually operate independently from 
a team. 
• Aviation maintenance employees are the only among these four categories 
under examination in this section that have safety/quality management systems 
in place in their working operations and human factors basic training. These 
aspects increase the employees’ awareness and caution around communication 
within their working environment.  
 
When examining the means provided in Table 4.8 and having in mind the different 
characteristics for each one of the professional groups that are described above, 
substantial diversity is observed. In Dimension 1 ‘Satisfaction with Communication 
Climate’, aviation employees have the maximum mean score (M = 4.54) while the 
minimum is M = 3.37 for administration employees. In Dimension 2 ‘Satisfaction with 
superiors’, the mean scores for the aviation employees, administrators and teachers do 
not differ greatly (teachers have the maximum mean score at M = 5.21) while the 
nurses have less than half mean score (M = 2.35). In Dimension 3 ‘Satisfaction with 
Organizational Integration’, the four groups have a completely different picture as they 
do not group in any direction and no group appears to have a mean more than 5 
(aviation employees have the maximum mean score of M = 4.90).   
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Table 4.8 Comparison of the statistical results obtained in this study with published 


























M SD M SD M SD M SD 
1. Satisfaction with 
Communication 
Climate 
4.54 1.63 4.03 1.10 4.41 1.05 3.37 1.02 
2. Satisfaction with 
Superiors 
5.02 1.61 5.21 1.20 2.35 1.20 4.96 1.22 
3. Satisfaction with 
Organizational 
Integration 
4.90 1.56 4.54 - 2.47 1.09 3.18 1.19 
4. Satisfaction with 
Media Quality 
4.88 1.50 4.21 - 3.29 0.87 3.74 1.01 
5. Satisfaction with 
Horizontal Informal 
Communication 
5.15 1.37 5.08 0.89 - - - - 




4.54 1.56 3.94 - 2.23 0.61 3.26 1.29 
7. Satisfaction with 
Communication 
with Subordinates 
5.32 1.25 5.57 0.73 - - - - 
8. Satisfaction with 
personal feedback 
4.64 1.64 4.35 - 2.96 0.85 3.77 1.17 
 
In Dimension 4 ‘Satisfaction with Media Quality’, again, aviation employees have the 
highest mean score (M = 4.88), while nurses again hold the minimum score (M = 3.29). 
In Dimension 6 ‘Satisfaction with General Organizational Perspective’, aviation 
employees mean score is the highest among all four groups (M = 4.52), with nurses 
the lowest of all groups across all dimensions (M = 2.23). In dimension 8 ‘Satisfaction 
with personal feedback’, aviation employees show the higher satisfaction of all four 
groups (M = 4.64) and nurses again have the lowest satisfaction on their feedback (M 
= 2.96). Looking at all these findings together, it stems that aviation personnel show 
the highest satisfaction among all four groups of professionals across all dimensions 
except Dimension 2 ‘Satisfaction with Superiors’. On the other hand, nurses show the 
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lowest satisfaction among the four groups, at all dimensions except for Dimension 1 
‘Satisfaction with Communication Climate’.  
The results presented above were extracted from different research papers, published 
in peer-reviewed journals, followed similar methodology, but not all row data were 
available. Due to this limitation, further statistical analysis and interpretation of the 
results were not possible. The comparison of these mean scores indicates the existence 
of differences in communication satisfaction within the different dimensions among 
the different groups of employees. Further investigation of the significance of the 
differences between aviation maintenance and nursing professionals and the 
exploration of the association with trust and its implications with safety would offer a 
better understanding of these two highly regulated industries. 
 
4.3.1.2 Results from the Hypotheses Testing 
Hypothesis 1(a)(b) are suggesting that interpersonal trust is positively linked to overall 
communication satisfaction among aircraft maintenance employees and between 
supervisors/managers (referred as managers in the rest of the text) and their 
subordinates. Hypothesis 1 (a) was supported using the bivariate correlation. This 
correlation indicated a positive association between interpersonal trust and overall 
communication satisfaction among employees (r = 0.56, p < 0.01, N = 271) and is 
illustrated in Figure 4.2. In Figure 4.2 it should be noted there are some outliers present 
that have increased slightly the strength of the association. The overall communication 
satisfaction score for all employees and their interpersonal trust score are the means of 
the scores of all items of Communication Satisfaction Questionnaire (sections C, D 
excluding D10 and D20) and the items F1 to F11 of the Trust Constructs and Measures 
Questionnaire respectively. The overall scores are measured on the same scale as the 
original scores and this applies to all scores measured in this section. 
For Hypothesis 1(b) the strong association between the managers’ communication 
satisfaction towards their subordinates and the managers’ interpersonal trust towards 
their subordinates (r = 0.75, p < 0.01, N = 129) is shown in Figure 4.3. It is noted here 
that the outliers do not significantly alter the correlation. The managers-subordinates 
communication satisfaction score and the managers-subordinates’ interpersonal trust 
score are the means of the scores of all items of Communication Satisfaction 
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Questionnaire that were responded to by managers only (section E) and all items of 
the section G of the Trust Constructs and Measures Questionnaire respectively.  
Hypothesis 2(a)(b) was statistically well supported. The correlations indicated the 
positive association between trust towards the company’s software for employees and 
their overall communication satisfaction, as well as the managers’ trust towards the 
company’s software and their overall communication satisfaction.  For Hypothesis 
2(a) the Pearson correlation r between employees’ overall communication satisfaction 
and their software trust was r = 0.51, p < 0.01, N = 271. The association between 
employees’ software trust and overall communication satisfaction is shown in Figure 
4.4, indicating moderate-large scatter about the line of best fit. The employees’ overall 
communication satisfaction score and their trust towards the company’s software score 
are the means of the scores of all items of Communication Satisfaction Questionnaire 
(sections C, D excluding D10 and D20) and the items F14 to F17 of the Trust 
Constructs and Measures Questionnaire respectively. For Hypothesis 2(b) the 
correlation between the managers’ levels of trust for the company’s software and their 
communication satisfaction towards their subordinates indicated a weak association (r 
= 0.33, p < 0.01, N = 132), as illustrated by the large scatter in Figure 4.5.  
It is worth mentioning here that, even though there is a statistically significant 
correlation between these two traits, the association is quite weak.  On the other hand, 
the correlation between the managers’ levels of trust for the company’s software and 
their communication satisfaction towards their company and peers indicated a stronger 
association (r = 0.57, p < 0.01, N = 132), see Figure 4.6. It should be noted there are 
some outliers present that have increased slightly the strength of the association. The 
managers-subordinates communication satisfaction score and the managers’ trust 
towards the software score are the means of the scores of the items in section E of the 
Communication Satisfaction Questionnaire and managers’ responses in items of the 
Trust Constructs and Measures Questionnaire (items F14 - F17) respectively. The 
managers’ Communication satisfaction towards their company and peers score is the 
mean of the score of the items in sections C and D for the selected cases of the 
managers.  
Hypothesis 3(a)(b) was supported as well. Specifically, for Hypothesis 3(a) the 
correlation between the subordinates’ overall communication satisfaction and their 
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interpersonal trust, indicated a moderate relationship between the two traits (r = 0.60, 
p < 0.01, N = 129) with Figure 4.7 supporting the evident association of this form of 
trust with the subordinates’ overall communication satisfaction. The subordinates’ 
overall communication satisfaction score and their interpersonal trust score are the 
means of the scores of the items in sections C and D of the Communication Satisfaction 
Questionnaire for the subordinates’ as selected cases and items of the Trust Constructs 
and Measures Questionnaire (items F1 - F11) respectively. 
For Hypothesis 3(b) the correlation between the subordinates’ overall communication 
satisfaction and their trust towards the company’s software, showed a medium-
strength relationship between the two traits (r = 0.45, p < 0.01, N = 129) and indicated 
some association of this form of trust with the subordinates’ overall communication 
satisfaction. In particular, see Figure 4.8, where a moderate-large scatter about the line 
of best fit is observed. The subordinates’ overall communication satisfaction score and 
their trust towards the company’s software score are the means of the scores of the 
items in sections C and D of the Communication Satisfaction Questionnaire for the 
subordinates’ as selected cases and items of the Trust Constructs and Measures 
Questionnaire (items F14 - F17) respectively. 
Concerning Hypothesis 4(a)(b), for this analysis, the sample size of the newly hired 
personnel (N = 17) was anticipated and found to be very small compared to the rest of 
the experienced personnel (N = 244). Due to the large difference in sample sizes of the 
two groups, descriptive statistical analysis was conducted and a comparison between 
the means of each group was used as an indicator of possible support of each part of 
this hypothesis. In particular: For Hypothesis 4(a), while measuring interpersonal trust, 
the newly hired group showed greater levels of trust (M: 5.90, SD = 0.72) in 
comparison to the experienced group (M: 5.57, SD = 0.87). For Hypothesis 4(b) the 
levels of trust towards the company’s software were found to be greater among the 
newly hired group (M: 5.51, SD = 0.87) than the levels of trust in the experienced 
group (M: 4.59, SD = 1.53). Furthermore, the group of newly hired personnel showed 
greater overall communication satisfaction (M: 5.40, SD = 0.97) than the group of 
more experienced personnel (M: 4.75, SD = 1.09). 
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Figure 4.2 Scatterplot of interpersonal trust score and overall communication 
satisfaction score for all employees.  
 
Figure 4.3 Scatterplot of managers’ communication satisfaction towards subordinates 
and managers’ interpersonal trust towards subordinates. 
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Figure 4.4 Scatterplot of employees’ overall communication satisfaction and their 
software trust. 
 
Figure 4.5 Scatterplot of managers’ levels of trust for the company’s software and 
their overall communication satisfaction towards their subordinates. 
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Figure 4.6 Scatterplot of managers’ levels of trust for the company’s software and 
their overall communication satisfaction towards their company and peers. 
 
Figure 4.7 Scatterplot of subordinates’ levels of interpersonal trust and their 
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Figure 4.8 Scatterplot of subordinates’ levels of trust for the company’s software and 
their communication satisfaction. 
 
 
4.3.1.3 Additional Observations 
As discussed in subsection 3.3.4.3 ‘Data Analysis’, a set of four additional 
observations (Additional Observation 1 to 4) were formed to analyse the data beyond 
the scope of the research hypotheses. The results from the analysis of these additional 
observations are provided in the subsequent sections. 
4.3.1.3.1 Additional Observation 1 
Differences in the means of communication satisfaction and trust scores for civil 
aviation maintenance employees when compared with their military counterparts. 
 
An independent samples t-test was conducted to examine these differences, obtaining 
the results shown in Figure 4.9.  
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Figure 4.9 Means of overall communication satisfaction, interpersonal trust and 
software trust for civil and military aviation maintenance employees. 
 
 
The independent samples t-test showed a statistically significant difference in the 
means for the overall communication satisfaction score and trust towards software 
between the civil and military employees. However, the difference in the means of the 
interpersonal trust scores between civil and military employees was not statistically 
significant (Table 4.9). It is noted here that the means of all three traits in Table 4.9 
are higher for the civil than the military employees. The Hedge’s g is used here to 
indicate the effect size of the difference in means due to the large difference in sample 
sizes between the military and civil employees. The Hedges’ g values for the effect 
size the difference between the two types of employees with reference to overall 
communication satisfaction and software trust represent a small to medium effect size 
and were found to be statistically significant, while the Hedge’s g for the interpersonal 
trust represents a small effect size and is not statistically significant (Table 4.9). Due 
to the large difference in sample sizes between the two groups of employees, Mann-
Whitney U tests were conducted and since they led to the same conclusions as those 
from the t-tests, it was deemed that only results from the t-tests need be reported.  
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Table 4.9 T-tests for communication satisfaction and trust between civil and military 
aviation maintenance employees. 
Traits Group N Mean SD t df p Hedges’ g 
Overall 
communication 
satisfaction score  
(C and D) 
Civil 227 4.88 1.12 
2.75 58.98 0.008* 0.40 




Civil 210 5.63 0.88 
1.27 246 0.206 0.22 
Military 38 5.44 0.70 
Software Trust 
score (F14-F17) 
Civil 210 4.75 1.51 
2.22 246 0.027* 0.39 
Military 38 4.17 1.33 
*Statistically significant 
 
4.3.1.3.2 Additional Observation 2 
Differences in the means of communication satisfaction and trust scores for 
managers compared with subordinates in aviation maintenance. 
 
Accordingly, independent samples t-tests were conducted to examine the differences 
in the means of communication satisfaction and trust scores for managers compared 
with subordinates in aviation maintenance, as shown in Figure 4.10 and 4.11. The t-
tests indicated no statistically significant differences in communication satisfaction 
and trust scores for managers compared with subordinates (Table 4.10). Thus, it is 
noted here that the overall communication satisfaction score, the interpersonal trust 
score and the trust towards the company’s software are statistically no different for the 
groups of managers and subordinates in aviation maintenance as all p values are 
greater than 0.05 (Table 4.10). Differences were not statistically significant as Cohen’s 
d values were used to measure effect sizes of differences between managers and 
subordinates on the three traits and all were found to be small.  
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Table 4.10 T-tests for communication satisfaction and trust between managers and 
subordinates in aviation maintenance. 
Traits Group N Mean SD t df p Cohen’ g 
Overall 
communication 
satisfaction score  
(C and D) 
Managers 136 4.86 1.07 
0.93 269 0.353 0.11 




Managers 133 5.66 0.78 
1.25 259 0.211 0.16 
Subordinates 128 5.52 0.94 
Software trust 
score (F14-F17) 
Managers 133 4.52 1.54 
-1.37 259 0.171 0.17 
Subordinates 128 4.77 1.47 
 
4.3.1.3.3 Additional Observation 3 
Differences in traits of communication satisfaction and trust amongst four groups 
based on years of experience (0 to 9.5, 10 to 19.5, 20 to 29.5 and 30 and more). 
 
Differences in traits of communication satisfaction and trust amongst four groups 
based on years of experience were investigated using a one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) as shown in Figure 4.12. The differences in communication satisfaction 
mean scores across the levels of experience were found to be statistically significant 
(F = 5.96, p < 0.01). Post hoc LSD tests showed significant differences amongst the 
groups as follows: 0 to 9.5 years of experience compared with 20 to 29.5 years (p = 
0.001, Cohen’s d= 0.57), indicating a medium effect size; 0 to 9.5 years of experience 
compared with 30 years and more (p = 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.56). Also, it indicates a 
medium effect size; 10 to 19.5 years of experience compared with 20 to 29.5 years (p 
= 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.44) indicating a small to medium effect size; and 10 to 19.5 
years of experience compared with 30 years and more (p = 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.43) 
indicating a small to medium effect size (Table 4.11).  
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Figure 4.12 Means of overall communication satisfaction, interpersonal trust and 
software trust for all participants in their total years of experience.  
 
 
Table 4.11 Means and standard deviations of communication satisfaction for groups 
of aviation maintenance employees based on years of experience. 
Total Years of 
Experience 
N Mean SD 
0 to 9.5 55 4.41 1.16 
10 to 19.5 71 4.60 1.00 
20 to 29.5 87 5.04 1.02 
30 years and more 65 5.06 1.12 
Total 278 4.81 1.10 
 
There was no significant statistical difference between the 0 to 9.5 years group and the 
10 to 19.5 years group, as well as between the 20 to 29.5 years group and the 30 years 
and more group. Furthermore, the differences in the means of interpersonal trust and 
software trust were investigated using one-way ANOVA tests, among the different 
groups by level of experience, and none were statistically significant. Another 
observation from Table 4.11 is that the employees with less experience (0 to 9.5 and 
10 to 19.5 years) have lower communication satisfaction scores than the employees 
with more years of experience (20 to 29.5 and 30 years and more). 
  106 
4.3.1.3.4 Additional Observation 4 
Differences in the traits of communication satisfaction and trust among six 
different groups of the employees, based on the type of license held (no license, 
EASA, FAA, CASA, multiple licenses, military). 
 
One-way ANOVA, using the Bonferroni post hoc test, was run to identify the 
differences in the traits communication satisfaction and trust among six different 
groups of the employees, based on type license held (no license, EASA, FAA, CASA, 
multiple licenses, military) as shown in Figure 4.13. The differences in communication 
satisfaction mean scores were investigated, across the different licenses under which 
employees are operating, and was found statistically significant (F = 3.71, P < 0.003). 
The two pairs of groups that showed significant differences in the post hoc tests are as 
follows: FAA-CASA (p = 0.037, Hedge’s g = 1.13) indicating a large effect size and 
FAA-military (p = 0.008, Hedge’s g = 1.43) also indicating a large effect size. As a 
verification, due to concerns about violations of assumptions and large differences in 
sample sizes amongst the groups, the Kruskal-Wallis test was run for the same traits 
and gave the same results (see Table 4.12) for means and standard deviations of 
communication satisfaction).  
 
Figure 4.13 Means of overall communication satisfaction, interpersonal trust and 
software trust for all participants according to the type of license held.  
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Statistically significant differences were not indicated between the following pairs: no 
license-EASA, no license-CASA, EASA-CASA, EASA-multiple licenses, FAA-
multiple licenses, military-EASA, military-CASA, military-no license, military-
multiple licenses, FAA-EASA and FAA-no license. Furthermore, the differences in 
the means of interpersonal trust and software trust among the different license groups 
were investigated with a one-way ANOVA, and none were found to be statistically 
significant.  
 
Table 4.12 Means and standard deviations of communication satisfaction for the 
different license groups of aviation maintenance employees. 
License Groups of 
Employees 
N Mean SD 
No license 27 4.61 1.18 
EASA 142 4.82 1.11 
FAA 16 5.56 0.72 
CASA 24 4.50 1.05 
Multiple licenses 33 5.15 1.19 
Military 36 4.43 0.82 
Total 278 4.81 1.10 
 
4.3.2 Discussion 
The Communication Satisfaction Questionnaire has been used in the past and results 
from past research projects were used to compare the results of this study. Similar 
results from two research projects were used to compare the means of three more 
professional groups in the Communication Satisfaction directions, as they were 
introduced by Downs and Hazen (1977). The comparison indicated aviation 
maintenance employees to have the maximum mean score in the majority of the 
dimensions while nurses have the minimum mean score again in the majority of the 
dimensions. These findings, due to the limitations that have been presented in the 
previous section, cannot be generalised or lead to any conclusive results without being 
investigated further. This further investigation, with the proper preparation, can 
research in depth different groups from completely different backgrounds.  
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All four research hypotheses were supported by the statistical results and findings of 
the survey. The highest correlation was found between communication satisfaction and 
interpersonal trust between managers and their subordinates (Figure 4.3). The 
communication satisfaction and interpersonal trust association of the subordinates 
follow in strength the association identified to managers towards their subordinates. In 
overall communication satisfaction for all employees, the 31% in variation comes next 
in strength and can be explained by variation in interpersonal trust, with a high 
supporting correlation between these two traits as well. The association, even though 
it is not as strong as that of the managers, is considered strong enough to support a 
statistically significant positive association.  
On the other hand, the weakest association identified in this study was trust towards 
the company’s software and communication satisfaction (especially for the managers 
towards their subordinates). The association between the subordinates’ 
communication satisfaction and their software trust is only slightly greater (r = 0.45), 
while the association of the managers communication satisfaction towards their 
company and peers and their trust towards the company’s software (r = 0.57), is 
slightly higher than the previous two, but still weak.  
Then, a t-test was run to investigate the statistical significance between managers and 
subordinates in regard to the association between their interpersonal trust, software 
trust and communication satisfaction. The results indicated that there is not enough 
evidence to show that differences between the managers and the subordinates’ levels 
of communication satisfaction, interpersonal trust and software trust were statistically 
significant. However, a t-test identified statistically significant differences in their 
levels of communication satisfaction and software trust, with the civil employees 
having larger means for both these traits. 
The civil aviation employees were broken down into smaller groups, according to their 
different licence status, to proceed with a more detailed investigation. This division 
has led to the formation of the following six groups (no license, EASA, FAA, CASA, 
multiple licenses, military), which were investigated to determine the differences in 
their communication satisfaction and the various types of trust. The use of one-way 
ANOVA for these groups revealed that there were no differences for the different 
groups in their interpersonal and software trust, but there were significant differences 
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in the communication satisfaction for two of the pairs of the groups (FAA-CASA and 
FAA-military).  
In relation to the exploration of the two traits (communication satisfaction and trust) 
in the span of the employees’ experience, differences were identified in the levels of 
the communication satisfaction between the less experienced and more experienced 
employees. The significant differences in the levels of communication satisfaction 
appear when any one of the less experienced groups is compared with any one of the 
more experienced groups.  Thus, it stems that communication satisfaction is a trait that 
changes as the level of experience increases and since the mean scores of 
communication satisfaction are larger for the more experienced groups, it is considered 
reasonable to infer that communication satisfaction levels increase with experience 
build-up. 
With regards to the limitations of this statistical analysis, it is noted that this survey 
was conducted using a sample of aviation maintenance employees that is not 
necessarily a representative sample of the total of these employees’ population. More 
specifically, there were small numbers of participants from many different 
geographical areas, and this does not mean that they would be representative of the 
total population of these areas. Therefore, it is suggested that further research is 
necessary before any results can be generalised for aviation maintenance professionals 
in a single country or at a global level. 
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CHAPTER 5 COMMUNICATION AND TRUST MODEL 
5.1 Diagnosis of Communication and Trust in Aviation Maintenance 
In this research study, the first and most important step was to identify, directly and 
indirectly, communication and trust in the aviation maintenance context. The answer 
to this question (Research Question 1: Are trust and communication detectable in 
aviation maintenance?) was the starting point and the motivation for this research 
study. The dual answer to Research Question 1, negative to the direct and positive to 
the indirect inquiry of both traits in the reports, led the way for a deeper and wider 
investigation.  
The aviation maintenance human factors basic training material was thoroughly 
examined, again, for the direct and indirect identification of communication and trust. 
The answer to this question (Research Question 2: Are communication and trust 
covered in aviation maintenance human factors basic training?) was negative with 
regards to the direct identification of trust, while communication was found to be 
covered in the course material (positive answer). However, the answer was positive to 
the indirect identification of both traits as the elements of communication and trust 
were found to be concealed in the course material. Aviation maintenance professionals 
from around the world (see subchapter 4.3.1) were asked to participate in a survey to 
examine their perception on the association between these traits. This survey offered 
valuable results on the association among communication satisfaction, interpersonal 
trust and software trust.  
Following the confirmation of the hypothesised positive association among those three 
aspects of the two traits, the next step would be to employ a similar process in an 
additional step, prediction. Prediction can form different hypothetical occurrences 
(possible events and scenarios) by using the survey's results as a guide and can, 
therefore, contribute to the process of the examination of the two traits. More 
specifically, this step includes hypothetical scenarios about possible aviation 
maintenance deviations that can take place in real life.  
In turn, a new model is proposed for the diagnosis of communication and trust in the 
aviation maintenance environment, expanding and formalising the multifaceted 
research methodology and processes developed and implemented in this research. The 
following sections describe in detail the development, form and the implementation of 
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this model in a case study. Moreover, the model’s usability in Safety Management 
Systems (SMS) is discussed. 
 
5.2 The DiCTAM Model 
5.2.1 Development 
The process described in subchapter 5.1 ‘Diagnosis of Communication and Trust in 
Aviation Maintenance’ (accidents/incidents’ reports content analysis, aviation 
maintenance training content analysis, survey and prediction case study) can be 
formalised to become a conceptual process that can be used for the diagnosis of 
communication and trust issues. Examining closely the methodology construct 
followed in this study, it is noticed that it can form a cyclical process. This cyclical 
process follows the logic and sequence of the research questions and hypotheses and 
forms a closed circle. The starting point can differ depending on the 
topic/project/theme researched. This process can be used as a pattern in aid of 
predicting any deviation in maintenance practice, possibly caused by communication 
and trust preconditions. Thus, the following four-phase Conceptual Investigation 
Process is proposed (schematically represented in Figure 5.1): 
• Phase 1: The two traits, communication and trust, are examined whether they 
exist or not in the aviation maintenance environment (which has been described 
in subchapter 4.1 ‘Content Analysis of Accident and Incident Investigation 
Reports’); 
• Phase 2: Relevant training material is examined to determine whether the 
aviation maintenance employees are trained for communication and trust, and 
consequently if they have developed awareness and relevant good practices in 
their work (which has been described in subchapter 4.2 ‘Content Analysis of 
Human Factors Training Curriculum and Material’); 
• Phase 3: The aviation maintenance sector is investigated (safety occurrences’ 
reports or any other relevant data indicating safety performance) for the 
detection and measurement of the relation between the communication and 
trust (which has been described in subchapter 4.3 ‘Survey’); 
• Phase 4: Having completed Phase 1, 2 and 3, with all information and data 
available, the researcher can predict any communication and trust precondition, 
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as a possible cause of error in any already established or new maintenance 
procedure/process/task in the workplace (described in this Chapter).  
As this is a cycle, the starting point may also be Phase 4, which can act as the trigger 
to the process. In this case, Phases 1, 2 and 3 can act as the preparatory steps for the 
work that will happen in Phase 4. The introduced Conceptual Investigation Process 
can also be very helpful in the visualisation and synthesis of the four steps in order to 
investigate the traits of communication and trust holistically and efficiently. 
 
Figure 5.1 Conceptual Investigation Process used for the diagnosis of communication 
and trust in aviation maintenance. 
 
 
A common tool is used in all Phases of this conceptual process, which is the 
Communication and Trust Question Set (which has been described in section 3.3.1 of 
Chapter 3 ‘Research Methods’). This tool, customised for aviation maintenance, was 
instrumental for the successful design and implementation of this research study.  The 
Communication and Trust Question Set has been used both as a qualitative tool 
(having a recognition function) and a quantitative tool (having a diagnosis function).  
As a qualitative tool, its recognition function was used not only in actual aviation 
occurrences (accident and incident investigation reports; Phase 1 of the Conceptual 
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Investigation Process) but also in the hypothetical scenarios of a prediction process 
(prediction case study; Phase 4 of the conceptual process) (Figure 5.1).  
The Conceptual Investigation Process can have a qualitative and a quantitative use. Its 
qualitative functionality in this research project, depended on the volume, nature and 
quality of the data. However, there is no limitation in its quantitative use, even in 
qualitative methods such as the content analysis or the case study method. As a 
quantitative tool, its diagnosis function was used in the survey phase of this study 
(Phase 3 of the Conceptual Investigation Process), which explored the perceptions of 
aviation maintenance professionals about their work (Figure 5.1). 
The recognition function of this tool can describe qualitatively the characteristics of 
communication and trust which are recognised/identified within aviation maintenance. 
Besides aviation maintenance occurrences from accident and incident investigation 
reports, other areas of aviation maintenance can be explored for the recognition of 
communication and trust, such as audits by aviation authorities/ICAO/etc, internal 
audits, discrepancy and safety reports etc. Also, depending on the nature and amount 
of the body of material available, a quantitative approach of these data through this 
function is possible.  
The tool’s diagnosis function can treat and present the traits of communication and 
trust quantitatively. This can be performed via a survey method, which can determine 
and measure the perceptions at a specific point in time of a target group of aviation 
professionals (i.e. aviation professionals at a specific organisational or geographical 
area). With this functionality, it can categorise the respondents into different groups, 
according to their work characteristics (license, experience, position in their 
organisation) and provide results to be analysed statistically (exploring the association 
among them and the two traits of communication and trust). Also, it could compare 
the perceptions of the same target group at two different points in time. 
The overall construct and functionalities of the Communication and Trust Question 
Set are illustrated in Figure 5.2. 
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It is highlighted that the use of the same tool (Communication and Trust Question Set) 
in all four Phases of the Conceptual Investigation Process ensures the consistency of 
this research project, as all aspects of communication and trust, are treated and 
measured with the same identification codes (items contained in the Communication 
and Trust Question Set).  
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5.2.2 Formulation 
The Conceptual Investigation Process, matched with the use of the Communication 
and Trust Question Set (as a multifunctional tool), has been described extensively in 
this research study. The formulation of a complete model is, therefore, the logical next 
step towards formalising the overall construct of the research methodology developed. 
In connection with the foundations of this research study on communication and trust, 
this model would aim to: 
• Establish a structured methodological approach; 
• Extract usable data and draw meaningful results; 
• Contribute to the promotion of safe practice within aviation maintenance. 
 
Therefore, the Diagnosis of Communication and Trust in Aviation Maintenance 
(DiCTAM) model proposed answers in the most inclusive way the Research Questions 
and Hypotheses. The formulation of the DiCTAM model is provided schematically in 
Figure 5.3, where the merge of the overarching Conceptual Investigation Process with 
the Communication and Trust Question Set shown, along with the description of the 
different functions performed in each of the Phases. In summary, the DiCTAM model 
is capable to:  
• Detect the traits of communication and trust,  
• Examine in depth the extent of the aviation maintenance employees’ exposure 
to them, through their training.  
 
The model’s capability of investigating the aviation maintenance professionals' 
perceptions and synthesising all these results into the deviations prediction aspires to 
examine holistically the traits of aviation and trust in the aviation maintenance 
environment with a goal to promote safe operations in this field. 
The novelty of this model lies in the development and utilisation of a dedicated 
(Communication and Trust Question Set) survey/question tool for aviation 
maintenance, which addresses methodically, for the first time, the association between 
communication and trust in aviation maintenance. The model can predict hypothetical 
deviations during maintenance practice attributed to communication and trust 
preconditions. These preconditions are identified (and can be quantified) based on the 
target group's perceptions on communication and trust. This model is expected to 
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contribute to the advancement of research in this area, having, in turn, a positive 
contribution to the promotion of aviation maintenance safety. 
 




The operation of the DiCTAM model is described and discussed in detail through its 
implementation in a hypothetical case study presented in subchapter 5.3 ‘DiCTAM 
Model Implementation Case Study’. 
 
5.2.3 Transferability 
As discussed, the overarching Conceptual Investigation Process of the DiCTAM 
model is a cyclical process:  
• Identifying, investigating and associating the perceptions of the people 
involved and  
• Predicting their actions regarding communication and trust preconditions in 
aviation maintenance. 
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This process can be expanded to include more preconditions and offer a structured 
approach applicable to other similar research projects. Thus, the Conceptual 
Investigation Process would be transferable to other human factors preconditions, 
which, similarly to communication and trust, are present in aviation maintenance and 
affect safety. This would render the Conceptual Investigation Process a useful tool for 
aviation maintenance human factors researchers. To accommodate this extension and 
the transferability of the Conceptual Investigation Process, the following adaptation to 
the Phases is performed (also presented graphically in Figure 5.4): 
• Phase 1: The two traits, which are under investigation, are examined whether 
they exist or not in the aviation maintenance environment; 
• Phase 2: Relevant training material is examined to determine whether the 
aviation maintenance employees are trained for these two traits, and 
consequently if they have developed awareness and relevant good practices in 
their work; 
• Phase 3: The aviation maintenance sector is investigated (safety occurrences’ 
reports or any other relevant data indicating safety performance) for the 
detection and measurement of the relation between the two traits which are 
under investigation; 
• Phase 4: Having completed Phase 1, 2 and 3, with all information and data 
available, the researcher can predict any precondition that is under 
investigation, as a possible cause of error, in any already established or new 
maintenance procedure/process/task in the workplace. 
In this process, general questions, similar to the research questions asked in this study, 
can provide the methodical process into the prediction of possible maintenance 
practice deviations. These deviations can reveal to be in a causal relationship with the 
different human factors traits under investigation. 
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Figure 5.4. The Conceptual Investigation Process as transferred to other human 
factors’ research areas. 
 
 
5.3 DiCTAM Model Implementation Case Study 
The case study presented has the purpose of presenting the operation of the DiCTAM 
model, as well as exemplifying its use. The case study approach has been considered 
a simple and illustrative way to cover both aspects, allowing the reader to develop a 
clear understanding of the model’s functionality and practical value. A well-known 
case has been selected, that of the engine fan cowl door losses experienced in the 
Airbus A320 family fleet in worldwide level.  
 
5.3.1 Background 
Several Airbus A320 family engine fan cowl door (FCD) (Figure 5.5) losses have 
occurred in the past due to uninspected unlocked situations that have occurred in 
service (Air Accidents Investigation Branch, 2015b). This issue has been known to the 
industry for almost 18 years; however, it has not been addressed adequately by the 
aircraft manufacturer (Airbus) and the various operators or regulating authorities. 
Similar issues have been faced in the past with other aircraft types, such as the ATR-
42 (Aircraft Engineering and Aerospace Technology, 2002). 
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Figure 5.5 A British Airways Airbus A319-100, where the (blue-painted) fan cowl 
doors (FCDs) surrounding the engines are shown.  
 




A historical overview offers an interesting insight on the FCD safety issue, by looking 
at the preceding modifications (manufacturers’ SBs), issued by EASA and Federal 
Aviation Authority (FAA) ADs and FAA proposed rulemaking documents (Notice for 
Proposed Rule Making, NPRM) (Figure 5.6). What stems from this brief examination 
is that following an activity in the early 2000’s, the issue was practically silenced (from 
the standpoint of redesign and safety regulation) for 12 years, despite the ongoing 
incidents. Airbus, as the aircraft design approval holder, has re-opened the 
investigation and mitigation of this safety issue in reaction to an accident investigation 
report released in 2015 by the United Kingdom (UK) Air Accidents Investigation 
Branch (AAIB). 
In particular, it was a double FCD loss from a British Airways Airbus A319 in 2013 
(Figure 5.7) that has led to the escalation of this issue, following the release of the 
2015 AIB accident investigation report (Air Accidents Investigation Branch, 2015b). 
Airbus, in an attempt to address the issue permanently, proceeded in redesigning the 
FCD locking arrangement and control philosophy (Airbus, Service Bulletin A320-71-
1068, 18 December 2015; Airbus, Service Bulletin A320-71-1069, 18 December 
2015), which were subsequently adopted by the European Aviation Safety Agency 
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(EASA), in 2015 and 2016, as Airworthiness Directives (ADs) (EASA, 2016c; EASA, 
2016d). Both EASA ADs are currently under consideration by FAA (FAA, 2016a; 
FAA, 2016b). 
 
Figure 5.6 A historical overview of the manufacturers’ and regulating authorities’ 
(EASA, FAA) actions on the Airbus A320 family engine FCD safety issue.  
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Figure 5.7 Remaining parts of the right-hand engine inboard FCD of the British 
Airways Airbus A319-131 G-EUOE following the 24 May 2013 accident.  
 
(photograph reproduced from the AAIB Aircraft Accident Report 1/2015 (Air 
Accidents Investigation Branch, 2015b)  
 
The 2016 EASA ADs and the relevant Airbus Service Bulletins (SBs) describe the 
modification that the aircraft operators have to implement on all affected models of 
the Airbus A320 family (A318/319/320/321) fitted with the IAE V2500 and CFM56 
engines. The main features introduced by this modification are (EASA, 2016c; EASA, 
2016d): 
• A new FCD front latch which locks/unlocks with use of a specific key (the two 
other latches remain unchanged) (Figure 5.8). This key cannot be removed 
once the latch is unlocked. 
• A new locking/unlocking key for the FCD front latch with a (‘remove before 
flight’) flag fitted on it (Figure 5.8). The flag increases the visibility-
detectability of an unlatched condition since the key-flag assembly is attached 
to the latch as long as it remains in the open position.   
• A key keeper assembly at a designated storage area in the cockpit, where the 
key and the (‘remove before flight’) flag assembly are kept when once the FCD 
is closed. 
• Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) adaptation, to include provisions for a 
logbook entry requirement when opening/closing the FCDs is performed, as a 
way to assist communication and raise awareness over the matter. 
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Figure 5.8 Modified A320 family engine FCD with new latch and key - ‘remove 
before flight’ flag assembly. 
 
 
However, as part of the EASA ADs’ consultation process (conducted prior to their 
issue), a number of major operators (United Airlines, American Airlines, All Nippon 
Airways, Air Canada) have expressed reservations on the effectiveness of the Airbus 
redesign, on the basis of human factors issues, potential financial impact on operations 
and implementation cost (EASA, 2016a; EASA, 2016b). For example, United 
Airlines, in their comments to EASA (EASA, 2016a) argued that the implementation 
of another visual cue does not guarantee that the people involved will not miss it unless 
they are careful and attentive. In the same response, United Airlines highlighted that 
dual sign-off for the FCD closure and other steps they have introduced in their 
operational procedures (towards increasing the awareness of the technical staff) have 
proved to be successful in addressing human factor related issues. United Airlines has 
not had any incidents occurring since the introduction of these; human factor focused, 
measures in 2006. Similarly, Air Canada supported the suitability and effectiveness of 
the dual sign procedure, expressing a strong negative view on the usefulness of the 
modification (EASA, 2016b). As Air Canada highlighted in their comments, a uniform 
solution approach is not likely to be effective, since each organisation should work 
towards changing the technical staff culture to address the safety issues around FCDs 
(EASA, 2016b). As also recorded in the (EASA, 2016a; EASA, 2016b), one may note 
that, in response to these comments, EASA did not make any changes in the final ADs, 
while they suggested that operators may apply for an Alternative Means of Compliance 
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(AMC) to the AD, by providing data supporting their requests (for exemption from the 
AD). 
The EASA’s reasoning behind the adoption of the Airbus FCD SB is not described in 
the ADs. Moreover, the design principles employed by Airbus, in the development of 
the SB, is not known (as the SB is not publicly available). The adopted solution is 
considered peculiar for aviation maintenance, from the point of view of human factors, 
since it is not usual practice to restrict access to aircraft compartments via specific 
keys, rather than standard or special tools. An extensive review has failed to identify 
similar solutions utilised in civil aviation.  
This subchapter intends to examine and discuss in a systematic way, the possible 





The method of the case study is a suitable method to examine hypothetical scenarios 
in the Fan Cowl Doors (FCDs) maintenance occurrences (after the implementation of 
the new procedures, provisioned by the latest EASA ADs). The case study 
methodology assists in the holistic examination of these hypothetical occurrences to 
unveil concealed elements and identify or even predict future trends or patterns (Leedy 
& Ormrod, 2013).  
At this stage of the study, the aim is to examine these hypothetical scenarios for the 
identification of communication and trust elements and then, based on these findings, 
to predict the possibility of occurrence of each scenario. The complete process is 
explained in detail in the subsequent sections. 
 
5.3.2.2 Scenarios 
Considering the aircraft modifications and the changes in the maintenance processes, 
which occur from the EASA ADs, steps in the new procedures have been identified 
and examined.   These steps may prove problematic from the point of view of safety 
effectiveness (increase errors or lead to deviations from safe practice) and disruption 
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of operations (create delays/obstructions in aircraft dispatch/maintenance). An array 
of error-prone scenarios is presented and analysed under the prism of the human 
element. The scenarios, after their development, were validated by consulting aircraft 
maintainers having prior experience on the A320 family aircraft. Thus, both the 
development and validation of the scenarios did not require any physical work on 
aircraft (or any interaction with an aircraft maintenance organisation). Then, these 
scenarios were scanned to identify the items of the Communication and Trust Question 
Set. The analysis of the seven scenarios aimed to reveal any underlying 
communication and/or trust causal preconditions.   
Moreover, accident prevention solutions are proposed for each of the scenario 
examined. It is noted that within the EASA framework, these recommendations are 
part of the existing Maintenance Resource Management (MRM) training and the 
EASA Part-66 and Part-145 human factors training requirements (EU, 2014). Errors 
related to handovers generally have more severe and dangerous consequences, as 
approximately half of the aircraft maintenance failures, due to ineffective 
communication, are related to the shift handover (Parke & Kanki, 2008). Debriefs 
which are based upon human factors considerations have the potential to enhance 
productivity by 20%–25% (Tannenbaum & Cerasoli, 2013).  
Effective teamwork is known to be essential in safer aviation maintenance practice 
(Leonard et al, 2004; Robertson, 2005; Sexton et al, 2000), mainly due to the nature 
of the profession (organisational structure of work, rather than individuals working in 
isolation). Time pressure, such as that experienced in the flight line environment, is a 
primer for errors (Goglia et al, 2002; Reason 2000) and, in this case, it is considered 
important to be examined. Overall, teamwork, dual sign-offs, effective time 
management and request for assistance from colleagues and supervisors (whenever 
required) constitutes good practice in aviation MRM. 
According to the FAA, MRM can also act as a training programme, as it aims to alter 
the technicians’ attitude and perspectives in order to establish safety as their primary 
goal (Robertson 2005). As regularly reported in the literature, training in aviation is 
important and it acts beneficiary, while its design, delivery and implementation need 
to be tailored to the needs of the organisation (Lappas and Kourousis, 2016; Salas et 
al, 2012; Taylor and Thomas, 2003). Consequently, aircraft maintenance managers 
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should consider the training process as a proactive safety measure and actively support 
MRM training. It is of note that employees, working within the highly regulated 
aviation industry, are inclined towards safety than productivity (Karanikas et al, 2017). 
This is a strong indicator of how the ‘safety over productivity’ equilibrium can be 
positively influenced (towards safety) by regulation.  
It is interesting to look at the definition of Wiegmann,et al, (2004) on safety culture 
“as the shared values, beliefs, assumptions, and norms that may govern organisational 
decision making, as well as individual and group attitudes about safety”. Focusing on 
the norms of an organisation, these set the framework within employees are expected 
to think and operate (Wreathall, 1995). Therefore, if the norms contradict the 
organisation’s safety policy, they should be revised or abolished. Any organisation, in 
order to action changes in culture, must establish effective safety communication 
between the various organisational and managerial levels. In aircraft maintenance 
training, this can include the establishment of a thorough safety training programme 
(Geldart et al, 2010; Hall et al, 2016). 
The devised seven scenarios are not intended to be exhaustive, in terms of presenting 
the full spectrum of combinations of actions. However, they represent several cases 
which are deemed likely to occur in service, and that can have a considerable impact 
on safety and operations. All scenarios start from the case of a maintenance task 
requiring access to the area enclosed by the FCD (in the cases examined ‘engine failure 
troubleshooting’), which is secured by the specific key (introduced with the Airbus 
modification/EASA ADs). Each precondition that was identified is presented 
separately with the relevant matching item/s of the Communication and Trust Question 
Set with the relevant justification. 
The sequence of the events and causes for each of the seven Scenarios (1 to 7) is 
graphically represented in Figure 5.9, where all interconnections are shown. The graph 
illustrates characteristically the complexity of the various problematic situations that 
may arise out of the subject matter FCD safety modification.  
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Since all scenarios are realistic, they are considered more or less probable. Typically, 
these may be encountered by technicians working both in the line and base level 
aircraft maintenance environment. However, since these scenarios are neither 
exhaustive nor have been tested/validated in actual aircraft maintenance practice 
further analysis is necessary. For that purpose, a substantial survey, which should 
include a wider array of scenarios, would be necessary to obtain the necessary data for 
a quantitative (statistical) analysis. 
The seven scenarios are divided into two broader groups, those which are occurring 
from two different situations: 
• The technician retrieves the FCD key from the designated storage area in the 
cockpit and inserts a logbook entry for the opening/closing of the FCD 
(Scenarios 1, 2 and 3), presented in subsection 5.3.2.2.1; 
• The technician does not find the FCD key in the designated storage area in the 
cockpit (Scenarios 4, 5, 6 and 7), presented subsection 5.3.2.2.2. 
 
5.3.2.2.1 FCD Key in Designated Area 
Scenario 1 
The technician leaves the maintenance task (in the area enclosed by the FCD) for 
the end of the failure troubleshooting. He/she performs the maintenance task at 
the end of his/her shift. However, he/she does not dedicate adequate time for the 
maintenance task, as he/she inadvertently prioritised the FCD task [return of the 
key, closure of the logbook entry (‘FCD closed’)], in an effort to avoid the FCD is 
not left open. This poor practice may result in reduced maintenance quality, under 
stressful or very time constrained situations, since FCD-related tasks are added to 






Maintenance personnel failed to dedicate the time required for this 
task, risking the quality of this work. This indicates that the 
maintenance personnel deviated from an expected good practice in 
their duties. Specifically, by using the Communication and Trust 
Question Set, the following three items are identified in this failure: 
F2 ‘My colleagues perform their duties very well’, F3 ‘Overall, my 
colleagues are capable and proficient technical staff’ and F5 ‘My 
colleagues act in the best interest of the project’. 
Items F2 and F3 correspond to the ‘construct of trust in colleagues’ 
competence’ category while item F5 in the ‘construct of trust in 




Putting more focus on time management techniques and requesting 
assistance from peer-workers/team leader in stressful/time-pressing 
situations. 
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Scenario 2 
The technician performs the maintenance task straight away but leaves the key 
return and logbook entry closure for later. Since these steps were left for a later 
time, the technician either forgets completely to return the key/close the logbook 
entry or gets distracted near that time, having the same result. As a consequence, 
the aircraft release to service can be delayed, since the involved personnel (flight 
crew, technical staff) will have to locate the missing key and complete the FCD 




Not performing a proper handover, makes the ideal preconditions 
for errors. This deviation from accurate reporting can result in 
lack of effective communication between colleagues and can 
prevent from the proper actions taken to mitigate the errors. 
Therefore, the communication problems identified here are in 
relation to items: D19 ‘The amount of communication was not 
about right’, D2 ‘The organisation’s communication motivates 
and stimulates an enthusiasm for meeting its goals’, C3 ‘
Information about organisational policies and goals’, D8 ‘
Personnel receive in time the information needed to do their job’, 
D6 ‘The organisation’s communications are interesting and 
helpful, item’, D17 ‘Issues whether the attitudes towards 
communication in the organisation are healthy’, C7 ‘Information 
about departmental policies and goals, item C7’, D15 ‘Meetings 
are well organised’, D12 ‘Communication with colleagues 
within the organisation is accurate and free flowing’, D3‘ 
Supervisor listens and pays attention to personnel’ and D6 ‘The 





A dual sign off practice would offer the opportunity for a 
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Scenario 3 
The technician does not perform the maintenance task and has to pass it over to 
the next shift. Since these steps were left for the next shift, he/she either forgets to 
return the key/close the logbook entry or gets distracted to do that. In case that the 
shift handover is not performed properly, the FCD tasks are not completed. As a 
consequence, similarly to Scenario 2, the aircraft release to service can be delayed, 




As with Scenario 2, not performing a proper handover, makes the 
ideal precondition for errors. This deviation from accurate 
reporting can result in lack of effective communication between 
colleagues and can prevent from the proper actions taken to 
mitigate the errors. Therefore, the communication problems 
identified here are in relation to items: D19, D2, C3, D8, D6, 




As with Scenario 2, the dual sign off practice can mitigate this 
issue. Moreover, a thorough (verbal and written) shift handover 
would be helpful in avoiding communication gaps in relation to 
the FCD tasks (reducing the possibility for misses and errors). 
 
5.3.2.2.2 FCD missing from Designated Area 
Scenario 4 
The technician attempts to find the FCD key. He/she prioritises this task over the 
maintenance task itself. In the case that he/she finds the key, the amount of time 
spent on the search does not allow him/her to focus on the maintenance task, thus 




Similarly to Scenario 1, maintenance personnel, failed to dedicate the 
time required for this task, risking the quality of this work. This 
indicates that the maintenance personnel deviated from an expected 
good practice in their duties. Specifically, following three items are 




Similarly, to Scenario 1, it would be beneficial if better time 
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Scenario 5 
The technician attempts to find the FCD key, prioritising the search over the 
maintenance task (same as in Scenario 4). He/she does not manage to find the 
key, leaving the maintenance task unaccomplished. In the case that the technician 
is forgetful or distracted, he/she will not report the missing key, causing more 
delay, as other personnel in later time will repeat the search process. 
Communication 
factor identified 
As with Scenario 2 and 3, not performing a proper handover, 
makes the ideal precondition for errors. This deviation from 
accurate reporting can result in lack of effective communication 
between colleagues and can prevent from the proper actions 
taken to mitigate the errors. Therefore, the communication 
problems identified here are in relation to items: D19, D2, C3, 




Similarly to other scenarios, the dual sign off in conjunction with 
a robust handover process could mitigate this miss. 
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Scenario 6 
The technician attempts to find the FCD key, prioritising the search over the 
maintenance task (same as in Scenario 4 and 5). He/she does not manage to find 
the key, therefore deciding to use his/her own key or the spare key as per the 
organisation’s ‘norm and fills in the logbook entry (‘open FCD’). After 
completing the maintenance task, the technician is forgetful/omits or gets 
distracted and does not report the missing key. As with Scenario 5, this may cause 
a delay in the future. Moreover, using his/her own key means that this may not 
have the ‘remove before flight’ flag attached, increasing the probability of leaving 




Maintenance personnel deliberately chooses to use own key, 
opposite to the company’s policies, which might not include the 
dedicated visual cue. This indicates that the maintenance 
personnel deviated from an expected good practice in their 
duties. Specifically, by using the Communication and Trust 
Question Set, the following four items are identified in this 
failure: F2 ‘My colleagues perform their duties very well’, F3 
‘Overall, my colleagues are capable and proficient technical 
staff’, F ‘In general, my colleagues are knowledgeable about our 
organisation’ and F5 ‘My colleagues act in the best interest of the 
project’.  
Items F2, F3 and F4 fall in the construct of trust in colleagues’ 




As with Scenario 2, 3 and 5, not performing a proper handover, 
makes the ideal precondition for errors. This deviation from 
accurate reporting can result in lack of effective communication 
between colleagues and can prevent from the proper actions 
taken to mitigate the errors. Therefore, the communication 
problems identified here are in relation to items: D19, D2, C3, 




Similarly to previous scenarios, the dual sign off in conjunction 
with a robust handover process could mitigate this miss. In 
addition, a change in the organisational culture would be 
necessary to abolish unsafe practices in relation to established 
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Scenario 7 
The technician does not have the required time or attitude to attempt to find the 
missing key, thus he/she decides not to perform the assigned maintenance task 
and, for example, to move onto a different task. He/she forgets about the missing 
FCD key or gets distracted and does not report that. This shall cause delay in the 
work of the personnel who are then assigned to the maintenance task in the FCD-
accessed area (as they will have to search for the missing key). 
Communication 
factor identified 
As with Scenario 2, 3, 5 and 6, not performing a proper handover, 
makes the ideal precondition for errors. This deviation from 
accurate reporting can result in lack of effective communication 
between colleagues and can prevent from the proper actions 
taken to mitigate the errors. Therefore, the communication 
problems identified here are in relation to items: D19, D2, C3, 




Dual sign off and in-shift/inter-shift handover would be an 
effective solution to avoid such situations. 
 
5.3.3 Results and Discussion 
The seven scenarios presented (Scenario 1 to 7) refer to seven different causal 
situations in which safety issues, related to the fan cowl doors of modified aircraft of 
the Airbus 320 family, may arise. These scenarios were investigated against the items 
of the Communication and Trust Question Set. As shown in Table 5.1, many different 
trust and/or communication issues corresponded to each one of the scenarios, therefore 
all scenarios showed communication and trust preconditions. Trust was found present 
in five scenarios, while communication was found present in three. One scenario had 
communication and trust preconditions present at the same time, while the rest six had 
solely one precondition present (either trust or communication). 
More specifically, the issues identified in relation to trust were about interpersonal 
trust. The Communication and Trust Question Set items are grouped in different 
constructs, each one indicating specific attributes of trust. Therefore, the specific 
characteristics identified here were trust towards colleagues’ competence and 
benevolence. Concerning the communication satisfaction, issues were identified in 
relation to the satisfaction with the organisation’s communication climate, with the 
superiors, with the organisation’s integration, with the media quality, the general 
organisational perspective and with the horizontal informal communication. These are   
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Table 5.1 Communication and trust items, of the Communication and Trust Question 




Communication Factor Items 
Scenario 1 F2, F3, F5  
Scenario 2  D19, D2, C3, D8, D6, D17, C7, D15, D12, D3, D6 
Scenario 3  D19, D2, C3, D8, D6, D17, C7, D15, D12, D3, D6 
Scenario 4 F2, F3, F5  
Scenario 5  D19, D2, C3, D8, D6, D17, C7, D15, D12, D3, D6 
Scenario 6 F2, F3, F4, F5 D19, D2, C3, D8, D6, D17, C7, D15, D12, D3, D6 
Scenario 7  D19, D2, C3, D8, D6, D17, C7, D15, D12, D3, D6 
 
the wider groups of the Communication Satisfaction Questionnaire items, that were 
initially introduced by Downs and Hazen (1977) and can describe categorically the 
specific issues with communication satisfaction identified in these scenarios.  
The communication and trust items identified (listed in Table 5.1) are not factors that 
have to exist in combination to contribute to the hypothetical scenario. At least one of 
these factors (namely, one of the possible items) could suffice in the occurrence of the 
relevant scenario. The mean value of each item corresponds to the level of 
communication satisfaction and trust exhibited by the surveyed population. Namely, a 
high mean score is a positive indicator of high levels of communication satisfaction or 
trust. For this reason, an item’s lower mean score of each scenario was selected as the 
criterion for the hierarchical categorisation of the scenarios relative to the possibility 
of occurrence. For example, a scenario with an item having a higher mean is less 
probable than that of a scenario with an item of a lower mean. Lower mean scores 
reveal lower communication satisfaction and trust, which subsequently include issues 
with communication and trust (yielding higher probability of occurrence).   
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Trust Factor 
identified 
F2 5.66 - - 5.66 - 5.66 - 
F3 5.89 - - 5.89 - 5.89 - 
F4 - - - - - 5.56 - 
F5 5.54 - - 5.54 - 5.54 - 
Communication 
Factor identified 
D19 - 4.45 4.45 - 4.45 4.45 4.45 
D2 - 4.15 4.15 - 4.15 4.15 4.15 
C3 - 4.73 4.73 - 4.73 4.73 4.73 
D8 - 4.83 4.83 - 4.83 4.83 4.83 
D6 - 4.51 4.51 - 4.51 4.51 4.51 
D17 - 4.65 4.65 - 4.65 4.65 4.65 
C7 - 4.71 4.71 - 4.71 4.71 4.71 
D15 - 4.55 4.55 - 4.55 4.55 4.55 
D12 - 5.27 5.27 - 5.27 5.27 5.27 
D3 - 5.09 5.09 - 5.09 5.09 5.09 
D6 - 4.51 4.51 - 4.51 4.51 4.51 
 
The identification of more probable and less probable scenarios involves the 
comparison of the means for all scenarios, listed in Table 5.2. The lower mean score 
is accounted as to have a higher occurrence probability of the scenario tabulated to this 
mean score. The least mean score in each scenario, that determined the ranking of the 
relevant scenario, is shown in Table 5.2 in bold font and highlighted in yellow colour. 
This process identified two items; whose mean scores categorised the seven scenarios. 
Therefore, the two mean scores categorised the seven scenarios into two groups: Group 
A, corresponding to more possible to occur, and Group B, to less possible to occur 
scenarios. 
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The output of this exercise summarised the results presented in Table 5.3, with a two-
tier ranking obtained (Group A and B). Based on this ranking, Scenarios 2, 3, 5,6 and 
7 are more possible to occur that Scenarios 1 and 4.  
 






A. More Possible  
Scenario 2 4.15 D2 
Scenario 3 4.15 D2 
Scenario 5 4.15 D2 
Scenario 6 4.15 D2 
Scenario 7 4.15 D2 
B. Less Possible 
Scenario 1 5.54 F5 
Scenario 4 5.54 F5 
 
5.4 The DiCTAM Model in Safety Management Systems 
In aviation maintenance, the anticipation of safety is of major importance; therefore, 
the examination of communication and trust as causal preconditions to maintenance 
error can be proven valuable. The importance of this examination lays not only at the 
investigation and deeper understanding of these preconditions but also at their 
prediction, which is examined next. The structured approach offered by the DiCTAM 
model can be beneficial towards enhancing safety in the aircraft maintenance industry, 
or causal factors related directly or indirectly to communication and trust. Safety 
Management Systems (SMS) have been attracting increasing attention from the 
aircraft maintenance industry, both for regulatory compliance reasons but also for their 
capability to systemise approaches around safety. In that regards, the possible 
interconnection of the DiCTAM model with Safety Management Systems (SMS) 
within aviation maintenance organisations is examined here. This examination can 
yield useful conclusions on the applicability of this model within the existing SMSs. 
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5.4.1 Background and Objectives of Safety Management Systems 
Aviation is one of the most complex and regulated industries around the world. From 
its early years, while its operations were growing rapidly, and tragic accidents with 
great loss of life and cost had started to occur, safety arose as a major factor in its 
operations. International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) is the United Nation’s 
specialised agency which works with 191 member States and industry groups to set 
common Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) and policies to implement 
safe, efficient, financially and ecologically sustainable activity in civil aviation.  
Since 1944, when the Chicago Convention took place, the first 52 attending Nations 
signed the International Convention for Civil Aviation, setting the regulations and 
principles for all National Aviation Authorities (NAAs) (Purton, Clothier, & 
Kourousis, 2014). These policies and guidelines are used by Member States to ensure 
that their civil aviation authorities include them in their legislations content to the 
State’s harmonisation with the global standards and safety procedures set by ICAO 
(Gerede, 2015; Purton & Kourousis, 2014). From the 1960s the quality management 
system term (QMS) appeared on the aviation field to pave the way to occupational 
health and safety management system (SMS) (Stolzer, Goglia, & Stolzer, 2015). 
Safety management systems have evolved gradually with the influence of other 
management systems and disciplines until they finally took their most current form 
(Stolzer et al., 2015). SMS and QMS are closely related to each other as they both 
promote safety. They are the most basic and complementary systems in managing 
safety in aviation (International Civil Aviation Organisation, 2013).  
All sectors in aviation regardless if they are maintenance, operators, air traffic 
management, airport operations etc. operate under the same regulatory framework. 
SMSs are applied across the different sectors ensuring their safe operation. However, 
these different sectors have different operational circumstances and requirements that 
might affect the way the SMSs are applied and even affect their activities. The 
globalisation of operations dictated the standardisation of SMSs as well, to the 
harmonisation and efficient collaboration of different aviation organisations, as their 
international character grew bigger and more complicated. More than 20 years ago, 
the first standardisation of quality assurance was a reality (Stolzer et al., 2015). Today, 
aviation regulatory bodies around the world have institutionalised safety management 
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systems, that follow the standardisation requirements, and aviation companies are 
obliged to have them in place. 
 
5.4.2 Safety Management Systems Components 
According to the 3rd edition of the ICAO’s Safety Management Manual (SMM) 
(2013) “SMS is a systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary 
organisational structures, accountabilities, policies and procedures” (International 
Civil Aviation Organisation, 2013, p. xii). In the same document ICAO states the 
significance of the implementation of SMSs by the NAAs internationally in order to:  
• Locate the potential threats to safety,  
• Make certain to enforce all corrective actions necessary to keep the agreed 
safety performance,  
• Contribute to continuous monitoring and orderly assessment of safety 
performance, and  
• Target a higher quality of performance of the safety management system. 
 
To meet these criteria, a set of four components were proposed to form the SMS’s 
framework. It is understandable that the size of each organisation and the complexity 
of the services provided defines the form of the frame in which the SMS is 
implemented. These four components include twelve elements and they are the 
minimum requirement for an aviation company to implement an SMS. The four 
components of SMS, according to ICAO’s Safety Management Manual (SMM) (2013) 
are safety policy and objective, safety risk management, safety assurance and safety 
promotion (illustrated in Figure 5.10). Moreover, each of the components’ elements 
that categorise its activities as shown in Table 5.4. 
In the development of the components of SMS, safety culture emerged as a critical 
element is an ultimate goal for every management in aviation. Within the frame of a 
well-established safety culture, staff are fully aware of safety requirements and willing 
to promote safety. 
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Figure 5.10 Schematic representation of the four SMS components. 
 
 
Table 5.4 SMS individual elements and corresponding activities. 
Safety policy and objectives • Management commitment and 
responsibility; 
• Safety accountabilities; 
• Appointment of key safety personnel; 
• Coordination of emergency response 
planning; 
• SMS documentation. 
Safety risk management • Hazard identification; 
• Safety risk assessment. 
Safety assurance 
 
• Safety performance monitoring and 
measurement; 
• The management of change; 




• Training and education; 
• Safety communication. 
 
These components and their elements are set by ICAO’s Safety Management Manual 
(SMM) (2013) as the minimum requirements each aviation organisation should have, 
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each of the NAA guidance materials and requirements available to the aviation 
companies within their jurisdiction. Aviation regulatory bodies such as the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) and European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) have 
developed themselves SMS structures under the direction of ICAO’s guidelines. As a 
result, NAAs around the globe are designing their SMSs following either FAA’s or 
EASA’s policies or directly ICAO’s guidelines to ensure their compliance with 
ICAO’s directions (Figure 5.11). 
 
Figure 5.11 Schematic representation of the policymaking process. 
 
 
In the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Advisory Circular AC 120-92B 
(2015), the four components of SMS, as they are introduced by ICAO, are presented. 
Aviation companies are obliged to follow this structure in order to ensure their 
successful implementation of an SMS programme within their operational activities. 
These four components, as they are retrieved from the FAA’s AC 120-92B, are 
explained, examined and mapped against the components and functions of the 
DiCTAM model. 
 
5.4.2.1 Component 1 - Safety Policy and Objectives 
The core of every organisational structure is its policies and procedures. In order for 
safety to be established as a fundamental part of this core, it needs to be dominated by 
relevant guidelines and to be included in the policies and the organisational structure. 
Under this framework, safety is organisationally in the company’s goals to set 
objectives, assign responsibilities and set standards. The implementation of this stage 
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The management’s role is critical, regarding the safety policy and objectives, as it is 
the management’s active support and anticipation that keeps all employees focused 
and motivated to this direction. It is clearly the management’s responsibility to oversee 
the accurate implementation of all policies and procedures as well as to ensure that 
safety is one of the primary goals of the company. This means that safety is included 
in the strategic plans of the company and is being assessed regularly along with the 
company’s SMS. This assessment is a very critical phase for every aviation 
organisation. It includes feedback from the implementation of the safety risk 
management component and the risk assurance component of the SMS. This 
assessment and feedback give the opportunity to ensure that all policies and procedures 
are realised in the way they were designed to be, and all standards are accurately held. 
From the examination of the ‘Safety Policy and Objectives’ Component of SMS (and 
its constituent activities), it stems that the DiCTAM model cannot have any role or 
direct/indirect contribution. 
 
5.4.2.2 Component 2 - Safety Risk Management 
The safety risk management component consists of decision-making processes, such 
as identifying hazards and mitigating risks, by carefully evaluating the organisation’s 
systems and their operating environment. Evidently, the most important element in 
this component is the risk management system that is in place and its effectiveness. It 
is of high importance in each aviation organisation to successfully measure risk and to 
develop efficient strategies to manage it. This is particularly important for military 
aviation, due to the nature of operations, both in peace and wartime. 
Acceptable risk is a value that each aviation organisation has to set for itself, following 
specific procedures, and then making decisions on ways to reduce that risk. This 
process requires a thorough understanding of the operational systems, which includes 
the structures, the procedures and the policies of the company along with the staff, 
equipment and the artefacts of the company. This means risk experts are called to use 
all available tools to process risk management by identifying the hazard in the 
company’s activities and calculate the associated risk accordingly. Once the risk is 
analysed, its assessment comes next and eventually follows the reducing of the risk to 
conclude the process. Reducing the risk is a realistic term as elimination is rarely 
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accomplished, either in civil or military aviation. In reality, reduction of risk to an 
acceptable level of risk is doable, with risk experts evaluating this acceptable level 
after thorough investigations and analyses.  
From the examination of the ‘Safety Risk Management’ Component of it stems that 
the DiCTAM model can direct and indirect role and contribution in the following 
activities: 
• Hazard identification, both the qualitative and quantitative function of the 
DiCTAM model can assist in identifying hazard areas related to 
communication and trust. In particular, it is the recognition and diagnostic 
functions of the DiCTAM model that can be employed in this direction. 
• Safety risk assessment, the DiCTAM model can feed in the risk 
minimisation/elimination loop, as part of assessing hypothetical scenarios in 
relation to causation factors attributable to communication and trust. 
 
5.4.2.3 Component 3 - Safety Assurance 
Safety assurance is the stage in which the safety risk management process is evaluated. 
It means that this is the reassuring component which gives an aviation organisation the 
reassurance that their SMS is meeting their strategically set safety objectives and that 
all risk controls and mitigations, that took place during the safety risk management 
component, had a positive impact and were effective. Thus, in safety assurance 
procedure, detailed monitoring is of primary importance in measuring safety 
performance in the company’s operations and in improving their level of safety 
constantly. 
A robust safety assurance process uses as many resources as possible to preserve the 
integrity of risk controls. These resources may stem from information gained through 
the staff reporting system, audits (external or internal), experts’ investigations and 
analyses. The key element at this stage is again the management’s commitment to 
safety. Management is the organisational factor that is responsible for the realisation 
of all necessary changes in order to proceed to the desired level of safety. Therefore, 
safety assurance is the framework that enhances the safety performance of the 
organisation, makes corrections whenever it is necessary and pointing out existing 
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processes that need to be under consideration. The DiCTAM model has a direct and 
indirect role and contribution to the safety performance monitoring and measurement. 
In particular, both the qualitative and quantitative function of the DiCTAM model can 
assist in identifying areas related to communication and trust. It is the recognition and 
diagnostic functions of the DiCTAM model that can be employed towards safety 
reporting, audits, investigations and analyses. 
 
5.4.2.4 Component 4 - Safety Promotion 
Safety promotion is the last component of SMS and is designed to promote safety 
among the organisation’s employees. All staff from the upper management to the 
newly hired have to acknowledge their responsibility in safety by familiarising 
themselves with the safety policies and procedures, the reporting procedures that are 
in place and the risk controls. For a safety promotion to be effective, the creation and 
application of a robust safety culture are of high importance. 
A safety culture within the organisation enables all staff to comprehend and maintain 
their part in safety operations of the company by following all the relevant policies and 
procedures while empowering the company’s reporting culture and the just culture 
(Stolzer et al., 2015). An efficient reporting culture comprises of a system that enables 
safety-related issues to be reported freely among employees having as a goal their 
correction. A healthy just culture is the culture "in which individuals are both held 
accountable for their actions and treated fairly by the organization"  (Stolzer et al., 
2015, pp. 33).  
In these regards, training and communication are essential elements of safety 
promotion. Continuous staff training ensures that all individuals involved are updated 
with all the requirements for their roles in the company and the properly certified 
qualifications have been provided to them. Training can be helpful; however, 
fundamental education is also very important for aviation staff. Thus, several 
companies are placing emphasis on the combination of training with education. 
Moreover, every organisation should have an efficient communications system in 
place, for staff to have untrammelled access to all safety regulations and policies. At 
the same time, this access should be unrestricted to qualified safety personnel for help 
and guidance. 
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From the examination of the ‘Safety Risk Management’ Component of it stems that 
the DiCTAM model can direct and indirect role and contribution in the following 
activities:  
• ‘Training and Education’, the DiCTAM model is a tool having the capability 
to identify training needs gaps concerning communication and trust. This 
function can be used both in the assessment and development of training 
material (and curriculum where necessary) related to communication and trust 
matters. 
• ‘Safety communication’, the outreach and impact of safety communication can 
be enhanced indirectly by developing a series of effective communications 
based on the construct of the Communication and Trust Question Set (acting 
as a guide for the development of such material). 
 
5.4.3 Conclusion 
From this examination and analysis of the SMS components and constituent activities, 
it is concluded that the DiCTAM model can have a contribution (direct/indirect) in 
SMS Component 2 ‘Safety Risk Management’, Component 3 'Safety Assurance' and 
Component 4 ‘Safety Promotion’. These findings highlight again the practical value 
of the developed model, also considering its capacity to accommodate various human 
factors traits, in addition to the ones for which it was originally developed for 
(communication and trust). 
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CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION 
6.1 Content Analysis of Accident and Incident Investigation Reports 
As there was no direct mention of the word ‘trust’ and as the word ‘communication’ 
was mentioned at only one distinct occurrence, Research Question 1 had a negative 
answer. Then, the items of the questionnaire, which were developed to be used at the 
survey phase of this study, the Communication and Trust Question Set, were used. The 
Communication and Trust Question Set (Tables 3.2 and 3.4) helped to identify 
indirectly the preconditions of communication and trust in the maintenance errors, that 
were presented in these reports, and provided Research Question 1 with a positive 
answer. 
During the indirect investigation phase of Research Question 1, indeed, the concealed 
elements of communication and trust were identified but not all items of the 
Communication and Trust Question Set were present in the reports. A comprehensive 
list of all items (found and not found in the reports) is provided in Table 6.1. Even 
though the items, not used in the content analysis, describe widely the two traits of 
communication and trust as well, there were no relevant references in the reports by 
the investigators, and consequently these items could not be linked to the reports’ 
maintenance errors. 
After a thorough examination of the fifteen accident and incident investigation reports, 
the following observations were made: 
 
• The reports originate from various sources, and there were differences in their 
structure, content and methodologies. This means that these reports were not 
prepared in a standardised or consistent way. However, even though the 
investigators were not specifically investigating for communication and trust 
causal preconditions, the accident/incident content analysis revealed that both 
traits (communication and trust) might have contributed to all maintenance 
occurrences. 
• None of the fifteen reports examined the supervisor/manager’s perspective and 
therefore no item from the supervisor/manager’s sections G and E of the 
Communication and Trust Question Set could be used in the content analysis. 
Since the aviation maintenance environment is a complicated, multilayer 
environment, as maintenance employees perform their duties mostly in teams 
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and in shifts, a reference about the supervisor/manager’s perspective would be 
expected to be covered in at least some of these reports. 
• Furthermore, some additional aspects of the association between 
communication and trust, in the examined maintenance errors in subchapter 
4.1 ‘Content Analysis of Accident and Incident Investigation Reports’, were 
not identified in any of the analysed reports. This is of major importance as 
these specific elements could be present but undetected and therefore, an 
opportunity to be examined might have been lost. The relevant questionnaire’s 
items that reflected these aspects and were not used (Table 6.1) are:   
o Communication: these questionnaire’s items are about: maintenance 
employees’ personal feedback on the quality of their job, efforts, their 
personal judgement by colleagues, personnel news, financial and 
regulatory information in relation to their organisation and their 
personal situation, information on emergencies and problem handling, 
information on how superiors see and handle issues from bellow and 
information on informal communication (Table 6.1); 
o Trust: these questionnaire’s items are about: keeping verbal 
commitments, assist colleagues when it is required, and reliability, 
dependence and predictability of the software used for maintenance 
tasks (Table 6.1). 
Considering the above, the content analysis of the accident and incident investigation 
reports indicate that communication and trust are present preconditions in aviation 
maintenance errors. In particular, 48% of the Communication Satisfaction 
Questionnaire items (sections C and D) were used to identify the communication 
preconditions, as they were presented in the accidents/incidents’ reports, and 71% of 
the Trust Constructs and Measures Questionnaire items (section F) were used to 
identify the trust preconditions (as summarised in Table 6.2). This is considered 
important in identifying and defining the conditions, under which, maintenance errors 
occur. These strong indications, that stem from the accident and incident investigation 
reports’ content analysis, helped this study in understanding better the relationship 
between these two traits.  
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Table 6.1 Questionnaire’s items that were identified as communication and trust 
preconditions in the accident and incident investigation reports in subchapter 4.1 
‘Content Analysis’.  
Items found in the 
accidents/incidents' reports 
Items not found in the 
accidents/incidents' reports 
Item Mean SD Item Mean SD 
C1 5.01 1.57 C2 4.99 1.40 
C3 4.99 1.40 C4 4.80 1.57 
C7 4.71 1.59 C5 4.71 1.62 
C8 5.26 1.46 C6 4.81 1.73 
C10 4.43 1.52 C9 4.26 1.58 
D2 4.15 1.67 C11 4.35 1.60 
D3 5.09 1.77 C12 4.51 1.79 
D4 5.10 1.62 C13 4.53 1.78 
D6 4.51 1.55 C14 4.76 1.39 
D8 4.83 1.58 D1 4.55 1.68 
D12 5.27 1.43 D5 4.56 1.67 
D13 5.14 1.38 D7 5.89 1.29 
D15 4.55 1.61 D9 4.62 1.58 
D16 5.30 1.43 D11 5.08 1.69 
D17 4.65 1.55 D14 5.45 1.24 
D19 4.45 1.54 D18 4.75 1.44 
F1 5.48 1.17 E1 5.52 1.13 
F2 5.66 1.06 E2 5.40 1.24 
F3 5.89 0.97 E3 5.06 1.38 
F4 5.56 0.98 E4 5.34 1.19 
F5 5.54 1.13 E5 5.27 1.30 
F7 5.13 1.42 F6 6.05 1.06 
F8 5.45 1.31 F10 5.56 1.09 
F9 5.67 1.14 F15 4.48 1.77 
F11 5.54 1.15 F16 4.76 1.67 
F14 5.46 1.77 F17 4.89 1.51 
   G1 5.66 0.90 
   G2 5.81 0.96 
   G3 6.00 0.86 
   G4 5.48 0.97 
   G5 5.77 0.97 
   G6 5.97 0.96 
   G7 5.25 1.23 
   G8 5.55 1.14 
   G9 5.69 1.05 
   G10 5.65 0.99 
   G11 5.68 0.99 
 
Note: The items highlighted in green (left-hand side), are those that were identified as 
communication and trust preconditions in the accident and incident investigation 
reports. The items highlighted in orange (right-hand side), are the items that were not 
identified as communication and trust preconditions in the accident and incident 
investigation reports. 
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Table 6.2 Descriptive statistics of the questionnaire’s items used in the content 
analysis performed on the selected accident and incident investigation reports.  
 Number of items Percentage 








Communication for all 
employees 
33 16 48% 
Communication for 
supervisors/managers 
5 0 0 
Trust for all employees 17 12 71% 
Trust for supervisors/managers 9 0 0 
 
6.2 Content Analysis of Human Factors Training Curriculum and Material 
Human factors training promotes safety in aviation maintenance practice. This is 
signified by the following facts:  
• EASA, one of the most influential regulatory authorities around the world, has 
introduced this element in regulated training; 
• Investigators from accident/incident investigation boards consider training to 
be an important element in the occurrence investigation and provide feedback 
on it in their reports. 
The aviation authorities selected to investigate the coverage of this relationship 
between communication and trust, are responsible for the regulation of aviation 
maintenance training in countries having a total registered carrier departure of 48.6% 
of the world (Table 6.3). This is a significant proportion of the global departures, 
including countries having very mature aviation regulatory frameworks and high 
volumes of air transport traffic. In their approved aviation maintenance training, the 
three regulatory agencies (EASA, DGCA and CASA), that include human factors 
training in their regulated training programmes, do not refer directly to trust. On the 
other hand, concealed communication and trust elements were indirectly identified in 
the EASA approved training material. In the accident and incident investigation 
reports’ content analysis, there were references to whether aviation maintenance 
personnel had undergone human factors training and investigators appeared to 
highlight this issue (Air Accidents Investigation Branch, 2015).  
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The answer to the Research Question 2, by conducting the aviation maintenance 
training content analysis, was negative in the direct identification of trust, and positive 
to the indirect identification of communication and trust in the aviation maintenance 
human factors basic training. The concealed elements of trust into the aviation 
maintenance training contribute to the evaluation of the training material and further 
research may be necessary.  
 
Table 6.3 Regulatory authorities and their registered carrier departures worldwide. 





FAA 9,879,630 26.7% 
EASA 6,252,643 16.9% 
DGCA 1,200,111 3.2% 
CASA 665,384 1.8% 
Total  17,997,768 48.6% 
World 36,999,575  
 
6.3 Survey 
The scatterplots in Figures 4.2 to 4.8 present the correlation between the variables of 
trust and communication satisfaction. In particular, it was found that 57% of the 
variation in managers’ communication satisfaction towards their subordinates can be 
explained by the variation in their interpersonal trust towards them, with a supporting 
very high correlation between these two traits. This is the strongest association found 
in this study and could be due to the high interaction and interrelation between the two 
groups (managers and subordinates). In comparison in the subordinates’ group, 37% 
of that group’s variation in communication satisfaction can be explained by variation 
in interpersonal trust which is lower than that of the managers. Next, 31% in variation 
in overall communication satisfaction for all employees can be explained by variation 
in interpersonal trust, with a supporting high correlation between these two traits as 
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well. The association, even though it is not as strong as that of the managers, is strong 
enough to support a statistically significant positive association.  
Conversely, trust towards the company’s software and communication satisfaction 
(especially for the managers towards their subordinates) indicate a very weak 
association (r = 0.33) (the weakest association found in this study). This could be partly 
due to other uses of the company’s software, apart from the communication between 
managers and their subordinates. The use of the company’s software could explain 
why the association between the subordinates’ communication satisfaction and their 
software trust is only slightly greater (r = 0.45), while the association of the managers 
communication satisfaction towards their company and peers and their trust towards 
the company’s software (r = 0.57), is slightly higher than the previous two, but still 
considered weak. 
After finding the mean scores of all measures for all aviation maintenance employees 
and the differences between the managers and the subordinates in their communication 
satisfaction and the different types of trust, t-tests were performed to identify if any of 
the differences between these groups regarding communication satisfaction and trust 
were statistically significant. The results indicated that there is not enough evidence to 
show that differences between the managers and the subordinates’ levels of 
communication satisfaction, interpersonal trust and software trust were statistically 
significant. However, a t-test to identify differences between the military and civil 
aviation personnel on these measures, while indicating no difference between them in 
the levels of interpersonal trust, did identify statistically significant differences in their 
levels of communication satisfaction and software trust, with the civil employees 
having larger means for both these traits. 
Aviation maintenance employees were separated into six groups according to their 
license status (no license, EASA, FAA, CASA, multiple licenses, military) and were 
investigated to determine the differences in their communication satisfaction and the 
various types of trust. A one-way ANOVA was performed for these groups, and it 
revealed that there were no differences for the different groups in their interpersonal 
and software trust but, there were significant differences in the communication 
satisfaction for two of the pairs of the groups (FAA-CASA and FAA-military). It is 
noted here that due to the small size of some of the license groups, they were not 
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proportionally correspondent to the population sample, so they cannot be characterised 
as representative and further research is recommended. However, these results imply 
the existence of important differences among these groups and further investigation 
would be very beneficial.  
In the exploration of the two traits (communication satisfaction and trust) in the span 
of the employees’ experience, there were differences in the levels of the 
communication satisfaction between the less experienced and more experienced 
employees. More specifically, between the two less experienced groups (0 to 9.5 and 
10 to 19.5 years) there is no difference in their communication satisfaction and the 
same happens with the two more experienced groups (20 to 29.5 and 30 years and 
more). The significant differences in the levels of communication satisfaction appear 
when any one of the less experienced groups is compared with any one of the more 
experienced groups.  So, it seems that communication satisfaction is a trait that 
changes, as the level of experience increases, and since the mean scores of 
communication satisfaction are larger for the more experienced groups, it seems 
reasonable to infer that communication satisfaction levels get higher as experience 
grows.   
Furthermore, in an attempt to identify the formation of the initial trust levels theory 
(McKnight et al., 1998), the aviation maintenance employees formed two groups 
according to the length of employment with their current employer. The newly hired 
employees formed one group, and the other more experienced employees formed the 
second group. The newly hired group’s communication satisfaction, interpersonal and 
software trust mean scores were calculated and compared to the means of the more 
experienced group, for the same traits. All three mean scores for interpersonal trust, 
software trust and communication satisfaction were found to be larger for the newly 
hired employees. As the newly hired group is a very small group, these results cannot 
be characterised as representative; however, they are consistent with the initial trust 
levels theory and further investigation is recommended. 
Moreover, the aviation maintenance participants were able to be compared, in terms 
of their communication satisfaction, to other three professional groups (nurses, 
teachers and administrative employees). The limitation of this process did not allow 
an in-depth analysis. The results, though, indicated that aviation employees have 
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higher satisfaction in most of the dimensions examined, compared to the other three 
categories. These results highlight the need for further research in the deeper 
investigation and analysis in the validation and exploration of the contributing factors. 
A further examination of the existence and association of trust across different 
professional groups could contribute greatly to the research community as well. 
 
6.4 DiCTAM Model 
The synthesis of the methodology followed in this research project led to the formation 
of the proposed Conceptual Investigation Process (Figure 5.1). This process provides 
a comprehensive, structured process in the investigation of the 
identification/association of communication and trust. This process is cyclical, with 
four consecutive phases, which are used in the:  
• Identification of communication and trust in the real aviation maintenance 
environment, 
• Examination of the aviation maintenance training about   communication and 
trust,  
• Investigation of the association of communication and trust in the aviation 
maintenance perception and the prediction of communication and  
• Exploration of trust as error precondition in possible future occurrences. 
 
The tool that was used in the implementation of this process is the Communication and 
Trust Question Set and was formed by the items of the questionnaire used in the survey 
phase of this study. The multifunctional nature of this tool and its different uses are 
described and discussed in subchapter 5.2.1 ‘Development’ (Figure 5.2). This 
multifunctional tool, when matched on the Conceptual Investigation Process, takes the 
form of a complete model capable of extracting methodically useful results towards 
aviation safety practice. The novelty of (DiCTAM) model not only lies in its 
methodological sequence, namely its capability in investigating and synthesising 
results about communication and trust towards deviation prediction in aviation 
maintenance practice. It also lies in the ability to predict hypothetical deviations during 
aviation maintenance practice and in the advancement of the research in the area of 
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aviation maintenance safety promotion. Especially in the aviation Safety Management 
Systems, the usability of the DiCTAM model in Component 2 ‘Safety Risk 
Management’, Component 3 'Safety Assurance' and Component 4 ‘Safety Promotion’, 
can enhance the outreach of these two elements of communication and trust. This 
usability can provide researchers and human factors practitioners with a very useful 
and effective tool for the advancement of these areas of safety. Furthermore, following 
the same methodology, directed towards different human factors traits, it is possible to 
obtain useful results in these domains. This suggests the Conceptual Investigation 
Process's transferability to an extended area of the human factors domain. 
The A320 family FCD safety issue cannot be considered as a trivial issue since it has 
concerned the aviation industry over the past 18 years. It is anticipated that the Airbus 
modification - EASA ADs shall be able to contribute positively to the error 
management regarding FCD losses. However, it is important to consider the associated 
human attitude elements brought in with this modification, as illustrated by this 
qualitative scenario analysis (Figure 5.9). To this end, communication and trust are 
identified as possible contributing preconditions, and a list of human factors centred 
procedures and actions are recommended. These stem from the various scenarios, 
described and discussed in subsection 5.3.2.2 ‘Scenarios’, and consist of all possible 
attitudes and responses of the technicians towards the new modifications.  
In summary, the recommended actions are: provision of better time management 
training, enhancement of communication skills, focused training, encouraging a 
collaborative attitude, implementation of a dual sign off procedure for the 
opening/closing of the FCDs, thorough verbal/written shift handover and facilitation 
of changes in the airline/maintenance organisation culture (where necessary). These 
measures can achieve efficiencies in procedures associated with troubleshooting in the 
area enclosed by the key-accessed FCD, reduce the likelihood of errors, and, most 
importantly, identify and suppress any safety-infringing ‘norms’ within operators and 
maintenance organisations. All recommendations are related to the communication 
and trust preconditions identified through this analysis. 
These seven scenarios, presented in section 5.3.2.2, refer to seven different causal 
situations in which safety issues, related to the fan cowl doors of modified aircraft of 
the Airbus 320 family, may arise. The Communication and Trust Question Set tool 
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was used to identify the traits of Communication and Trust in the hypothetical 
scenarios examined. As shown in Table 5.1, many different trust and/or 
communication issues corresponded to each one of the scenarios; therefore all 
scenarios showed communication and trust preconditions. Trust was found present in 
five scenarios, while communication was found present in three. One scenario had 
communication and trust preconditions present at the same time, while the other six 
had solely one precondition present (either trust or communication). 
Next, the comparison of the mean scores of all items of the Communication and Trust 
Question Set, that were tabulated to the seven hypothetical scenarios, assisted in the 
categorisation of all seven scenarios into two categories: 
• More possible scenarios and  
• Less possible scenarios.  
This categorisation can be indicative of the probability of the deviations, this study's 
sample of respondents might face, if they would come across one of these hypothetical 
scenarios. Therefore, the importance of this aspect of the process lies in the fact that if 
there are communication and trust data available from a group of respondents, a 
researcher can extract the probability of hypothetical deviation scenarios of the same 
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS 
This study has identified the need for greater consideration of communication and trust 
as contributory factors in the causes of aviation maintenance accidents and incidents. 
It has unveiled a positive association between these two traits and human error in the 
aviation maintenance working environment. Also, a gap has been revealed in the 
aviation maintenance basic human factors training (certain aviation jurisdictions do 
not provide compulsory human factors training while the ones who do provide it do 
not directly explore trust). These findings may be used as a starting point for further 
research in aviation maintenance human factors. 
This is the first time that a positive association between communication and trust in 
the aviation maintenance research sector has been reported. These findings can be very 
useful for a human factors approach to aviation maintenance safety management, given 
that both communication and trust are fundamental in aviation maintenance failure 
detection and analysis (Langer & Braithwaite, 2016). Past research has shown 
communication satisfaction associated with job satisfaction, organisational 
commitment and job performance (work values in general) which are important to the 
successful and profitable operation of the organisation and productivity (Carrière & 
Bourque, 2009; Jalalkamali et al., 2016), but to the safety-related practices of the 
employees as well (Dode et al., 2016; Evans et al., 2007; Glendon & Litherland, 2001; 
Luria & Yagil, 2010; O'Connor, 2011). 
Furthermore, poor communication itself has been linked to accident causation and poor 
safe work practices (Flin et al., 2002; Karanikas et al., 2017; Weick, 1990). The content 
analysis conducted in this study was able to verify this connection. Both ineffective 
communication and trust were identified as an accident/incident causal condition. 
Also, utilising the content analysis method, a gap was identified in aviation 
maintenance basic human factors training, regarding the existence of trust and the 
association between communication and trust. There are indications that there is no 
relevant material available (about trust and the positive relationship between 
communication and trust) to the approved training curriculum and resources. This 
means that aircraft maintenance employees who get their basic human factors training, 
are not aware of the association of communication and trust and are not trained 
accordingly, jeopardising the quality of their training.   
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Therefore, since safety is the primary objective of all aviation regulatory authorities, 
it is the approved human factors training that should be initially examined and updated 
according to these new human factor research findings. EASA, which is the largest 
and most influential authority globally, could maximise the benefits of its Part-66 
Module 9 Human Factors training, by implementing training on trust, and its positive 
association to communication, into their approved material. Also, managers should 
find a way to enhance their organisation’s communication system in order to keep their 
employees’ communication satisfaction at high levels. Since this study has shown a 
positive association between communication satisfaction and trust, management must 
take trust into consideration while implementing and/or improving their effective 
communication systems. Due to the nature of aviation maintenance work, trust 
(especially interpersonal trust) is built around co-workers’ relationships and 
cooperation, which are structured in a way to reduce the likelihood of error. 
A new process is introduced (Conceptual Investigation Process) which is able not only 
to predict possible maintenance practice deviations in a causal relationship with 
communication and trust but also with any other human factors traits under 
examination. This means that the methodology used in this study can be transferable 
to other human factors research projects with similar scope. The implementation of the 
Conceptual Investigation Process was made possible with the use of the 
Communication and Trust Question Set. The developed Diagnosis of Communication 
and Trust in Aviation Maintenance (DiCTAM) model introduces the diagnosis and 
recognition functions of this multifunctional tool that made this process possible. The 
DiCTAM model is formed by the methodology that was followed in this research study 
and is proposed to be used by other researchers that also work in the area of aviation 
maintenance human factors.  
As the DiCTAM model was conceived and used for the first time in this research 
project, its implementation by other researchers and the comparisons of all results can 
be of scientific interest. Also, the aviation industry can make use and benefit from the 
implementation of this model, in the identification and investigation of communication 
and trust within their business activities. The Safety Management Systems (SMSs) 
used in various aviation organisations (including maintenance companies) can benefit 
greatly from this model, as it can contribute positively to the SMS’ promotion and 
evolution.  
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Due to the discussed limitations of this study, further research may be necessary for 
the generalisation of the results obtained in the survey and the content analysis. In 
particular, the following limitations have been found: 
• In the content analysis phase of this study, due to a large amount of material 
available and the restriction of the availability of this material in the English 
language, a representative sample was selected to investigate the two more 
general research questions; 
• The sample of aviation maintenance employees in the survey phase of this 
study is not necessarily a representative sample of the total of these employees’ 
population. More specifically, there were small numbers of participants from 
many different geographical areas, and this does not mean that they would be 
representative of the total population of these areas;  
  
To conclude, an overall outline of this PhD study’s research output is provided in Table 
7.1, as a visual aid for the reader. This table presents the answers obtained from this 
study for all the Research Questions and Research Hypotheses examined. 
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Table 7.1 Summary of research output of this study. 
Research question 
 
Answer to the Research Question 
1. Are trust and communication 
detectable in aviation maintenance? 
Positive 
Both trust and communication are not 
directly but indirectly detectable in the 
aviation maintenance sector. 
2. Are communication and trust covered 




Trust is not directly covered in aviation 
maintenance human factors basic 
training. However, a concealed element 
of trust has been identified. 
Research Hypothesis Research Hypothesis Results 
1. (a) Aviation maintenance employees’ 
levels of interpersonal trust towards their 
colleagues has a positive association 
with their communication satisfaction 
and (b) supervisors/managers’ levels of 
interpersonal trust towards their 
subordinates has a positive association 
with their communication satisfaction. 
 
Hypothesis 1(a)(b) is supported. 
Interpersonal trust is positively linked to 
overall communication satisfaction 
among aircraft maintenance employees 
and between supervisors/managers and 
their subordinates.  
2. (a) Employees’ trust towards the 
company’s software has a positive 
association with their communication 
satisfaction and (b) 
supervisors/managers’ trust towards the 
company’s software has a positive 
association with their communication 
satisfaction. 
 
Hypothesis 2(a)(b) is supported.  
The correlations indicated the positive 
association between trust towards the 
company’s software for employees and 
their overall communication 
satisfaction, as well as the managers’ 
trust towards the company’s software 
and their overall communication 
satisfaction.   
3. (a) Subordinates’ levels of 
interpersonal trust has a positive 
association with their communication 
satisfaction and (b) subordinates’ trust 
towards the company’s software has a 
positive association with their 
communication satisfaction. 
 
Hypothesis 3(a)(b) is supported.  
For Hypothesis 3(a) the correlation 
between the subordinates’ overall 
communication satisfaction and their 
interpersonal trust, indicated a moderate 
relationship between the two traits. For 
Hypothesis 3 (b) the correlation 
indicated some association of this form 
of trust with the subordinates’ overall 
communication satisfaction. 
4. High initial trust levels are detectable 
in (a) interpersonal trust and (b) 
company’s software trust to newly 
recruited maintenance employees. 
Hypothesis 4(a)(b) is supported.  
The newly hired group showed greater 
levels of trust in comparison to the 
experienced group while measuring 
interpersonal trust and trust towards the 
company’s software. 
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Abstract: Communication and trust are fundamental factors in the operation of complex and 
highly regulated industries like aviation maintenance. This article reviews two preconditions 
of human error: communication and trust, as well as the way these are linked as aviation 
researchers have only recently started to study factors not individually, but rather by 
combining their effects. Communication is essential in the exchange of information and 
knowledge in aviation maintenance. The conditions that make communication effective and 
miscommunication avoidable are explored. Next, ways of communication, like aircraft 
maintenance documentation, are discussed along with appreciation of how communication 
is valued in aviation maintenance. Trust within different aspects of maintenance practice 
(interpersonal trust, trust towards technology, initial levels of trust) is presented and 
analysed, as well as examined as a prerequisite of effective communication. The 
characteristics of trust, its forms and results are identified in the literature with limited 
sources from the aviation bibliography, as it is a domain barely explored. Therefore, a gap 
has been identified in the study of trust and the exploration of the combined traits of 
communication and trust in aviation maintenance. Recommendations for additional research 
in this field is provided. 
Keywords: human factors; communication; trust; safety; aviation maintenance; error 
 
1. Introduction 
To err is within human nature. However, it is primarily over the last 50 years that human 
error has become a field of scientific research, as errors started to have a great global impact 
in the economy, health, environment and communities. In the US alone, from over $300 billion 
spent on maintenance and operations every year, 80% was spent repairing damage caused by 
human error in equipment, systems and dealing with harm caused to people [1,2]. In 2014 
alone, there were 648 fatalities in 14 fatal accidents caused by human error. This number was 
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1.5% higher than the previous 10 years average. This increase was the result of larger 
airplanes, with larger passenger capacity which has led to an increase of fatalities in the 
occurrence of an accident [3], therefore, since human error led to higher numbers of human 
loss, there is a necessity within the aviation community to address this issue even more 
urgently. 
A greater understanding of human factors became imperative within aviation, and a 
large number of models and systems have been introduced and implemented in the 
continuous attempt to predict and reduce human error. In aviation maintenance, there are 
twelve principal preconditions or conditions that contribute to human errors, widely known 
as the Dupont’s Dirty Dozen [4–9]. These elements (shown in Figure 1) are dissimilar in nature 
and appear either on personal, group or organizational performance levels [10].  
The Dirty Dozen is still used in training, accident, and human error analysis in aviation 
maintenance worldwide [4,5,7,8,11]. These 12 factors are of a different nature and 
quantifiability, nevertheless each one of them represents a precondition/condition to failure 
in the user’s judgement and as such they are treated either individually or in groups of similar 
items [8]. As shown in Figure 1 lack of communication is among these 12 most frequent 
conditions/preconditions of human error.  
Researchers still investigate elements similar to the ones of the Dirty Dozen, but also 
consider mutual interactions. As a most recent example, the Joint Research Program in the 
European Union (EU) ‘Future Sky Safety’, aims to study the concept of the Human 
Performance Envelope (HPE) in aviation. This research is investigating the interactions 
between nine human factors (stress, attention, situation awareness (SA), vigilance, teamwork, 
workload, communication, trust, fatigue) and the pilot’s human performance, how they work 
individually or in combination, and how they affect or decline human performance [12]. 
Communication has been indicated by past research to have a strong association with 
trust [13]. Trust is an important element in human social life and therefore, has been 
researched extensively in the past by many different disciplines of science such as marketing, 
psychology, sociology, political science, economics, etc. [14]. Many researchers agree that trust 
is a very important element in employees’ relations and it is associated with the quality of 
their communication [15–22]. Trust is under-investigated in aviation [19] and its association 
with communication is an unexplored area, especially in aviation maintenance. 
 
Figure 1. The Dirty Dozen [16]. 
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Communication is a field of study that is of interest for many disciplines, such as 
marketing or computer science. Communication is a process that everyone uses in their 
everyday life. However, defining communication has proven to be challenging. There have 
been many definitions of communication in textbooks and different approaches through the 
years since Shannon and Weaver [23] saw communication as the transmission of messages 
[24]. 
There are various definitions of communication depending on the different approaches 
and discipline of each researcher. In some definitions there is emphasis on the significance of 
symbols, as in “the transmission of information, ideas, emotions and skills…by the use of 
symbols” (Page 527 in [25]), while others examine communication as a product, e.g., “We use 
the word ‘communication’ sometimes to refer to what is so transferred, sometimes to the 
means by which it is transferred, sometimes to the whole process” (Page 13 in [26]). In the 
study of communication there are two main streams. One stream considers communication as 
the transmission of messages and the other as the production and exchange of meaning [24].  
At the transmission of the message stream, the member that sends the message is the sender, 
and the one who accepts it is the receiver. Communication, to be effective, must be an active 
process where both the sender and the receiver/s assure that the intended objectives are met. 
To achieve that, both the coding and the decoding process of the message along with the 
channel and/or medium of communication, are very important to success. If the result is not 
the anticipated, then the communication process is characterized as failed and the 
communication steps are investigated to identify the causes of this failure [24]. The second 
stream, the production and exchange of meanings deals with the interaction between messages 
and people and the meaning that comes out of this interaction. In this stream, connotation is 
a term that is usually met. Additionally, misunderstandings, besides being a result of failure 
in communication, may occur due to cultural differences between the sender and the receiver 
[24]. 
According to Schramm [27] important elements that should be added to the 
communication process are the sender’s and receiver’s experiences. The mode of 
communication chosen should be the appropriate one to meet the circumstances of both the 
sender and the receiver. The sender proceeds with the message coding based on his/her 
experience while the receiver understands the message by connecting it to his/her prior 
knowledge/cognitive level. Then the sender needs to ensure that the message has been 
transmitted correctly by evaluating the receiver’s feedback [27] as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Schramm’s [18] communication model with feedback. 
To understand the communication theories fully the definitions of the terms: channel, 
code, and medium are necessary. Channel is the means through which information flows [28]. 
Examples of channels are: light waves, sound waves, radio waves. Medium is the material or 
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the channel. Coding is the sharing of mutual meaning between members of the same culture 
[24].  
The basic features of the chosen channel determine the nature of the medium that will be 
selected. Next, this medium will determine the characteristics and the range of the codes that 
will be used to transmit the message. Fiske [24] further suggests that media can be divided 
into three categories as shown in Figure 3: 
a. The presentational media. The body language, the oral speech, the facial expressions are 
providing communication. This requires the physical presence of the communicator as 
he/she is the medium and communication happens in real-time. 
b. The representational media. Any medium that represents the above by the production of 
a text, picture, painting, piece of art. These media do not require the presence of the 
communicator as they can act independently. 
c. The mechanical media. These media utilize technologically developed channels; 
therefore, they are transmitters of the presentation and representation media. Examples 
are: radio, television, computers, and telephones. 
 
Figure 3. Concept map of communication media. 
Given that communication is effective and complete it can a) be beneficial to staff’s 
interpersonal and group relationships; b) guarantee that attitudes and expectations will be 
clear with no hidden agendas; c) retain focus on the task and situational awareness; and d) act 
as a managing tool [29].  
2.1. Miscommunication 
To understand and define communication, researchers needed to clarify 
miscommunication as well. Communication and miscommunication are strongly interrelated, 
and they present a difficulty in investigating them separately. Miscommunication is treated 
as a kind of communication with its own distinct patterns and characteristics [30]. In this 
context miscommunication can be defined as ‘the dark side of interpersonal communication’ 
[31] not being too far from its standard meaning of missing, flawed, and disrupted rules of 
communication [32].  
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Furthermore, miscommunication includes ‘mismatching interpretation’ and distortion of 
message [30]. This definition also includes the potential cultural differences between the 
sender and the receiver which are responsible for possible alternative interpretative models. 
Miscommunication, in the condition that if it is noticed and attempted to be repaired, has 
positive outcome to the communication process as well as it provides a chance for further 
interaction between the communicators. Miscommunication has been included in several 
communication theories, e.g., Shannon and Weaver [23], through the years as a deviation or a 
disruption, either important or less important, at any stage of the communication process [30].  
In the aircraft maintenance environment, a model of communication fault was developed 
by Shukri, Millar, Gratton and Garner [33] that was inspired by Cushing’s [34] detailed 
overview of communication failures between pilot and a traffic controller. In this model there 
are six message characterisations: “a) A message that is unavailable; b) A message that is 
available but incomplete; c) A message that is available, complete but incorrect; d) A message 
that is available, complete, correct but not clear; e) A message that is available, complete, 
correct, clear but not understood; and f) A message that is available, complete, correct, clear, 
understood but mistakes still happen due to human factors” [33].  
From this model, it is evident that even if the message is free from all the failure prone 
factors, there is still the possibility of mistakes. Subsequently, all the specialists’ efforts lead to 
the direction of the elimination of the known or predictable factors that can lead to fault and 
the constant attempt to identify and eliminate the uncharted ones. Therefore, in the case that 
communication for one or more reasons does not result in the correct exchange of the message, 
the beneficial effects are not fully realised.  
The contribution of communication to the occurrence of human errors has been recorded 
in various reports. Human error can be tagged as ‘the human causal factor associated with 
aviation accidents’ [35] or ‘the failure of planned actions to achieve their desired ends—
without the intervention of some unforeseeable events’ [2]. A study commissioned by the 
Dutch Aerospace Research Centre (NLR), identified various contributory factors to aircraft 
accidents, incidents, and errors. In seven ground service providers in the Netherlands both 
management and operational personnel named the ten most frequent factors that are involved 
in the cause of mistakes on the ramp (see Figure 4). Poor communication is the second most 
prevalent factor on that list [36].  
Ineffective communication is a precondition for human error in all highly complex and 
regulated industries worldwide [34]. Extended research in aviation has shown that human 
factors cause 70–80% of aviation incidents and 15–20% of them relate to maintenance 
procedures [37,38]. The aviation sector was the first to identify that the implementation of 
standardised procedures has contributed to safety and teamwork efficiency, following the 
realisation that 70% of commercial flight accidents were caused due to communication errors 
between crew members [39].  
Another large study in the aviation industry found that 70% of all accidents were caused 
due to crew coordination and communication issues [40]. These findings are supported by 
Wiegmann and Shappell [41] and Yacavone, [42] as they have recognized crew coordination 
to be a major contributing factor in military aviation (as cited by Wiegmann and Shappell, 
[43]). Failed communication has also been reported to be among the most frequent local factor 
in airworthiness events along with tools and equipment, perceived pressure or haste, 
environment and knowledge, skill, and experience [44]. As a comparison, in railway 
maintenance, it has been shown that 92% of incidents occurred due to communication failures 
[44,45]. In the healthcare industry communication is an extremely common element prone to 
flaws as well [39]. Subsequently, healthcare also had the need for standardization of the 
communication tools due to its complexity, the limitations of the human performance, and the 
different training among the medical professionals. For that purpose, tools like SBAR 
(Situation, Background, Assessment, and Recommendation) were introduced for all medical 
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personnel as a means to establish common terminology and methodology to avoid 
communication failures [39]. 
In Figure 4 it is indicated that the management’s awareness is at higher levels than the 
line personnel’s, suggesting that the administration has recognised these factors to be 
preconditions of human errors. The European Commercial Aviation Safety Team (ECAST) has 
acknowledged the awareness of the potential risk of ineffective communication as a human 
factor and that further research is necessary towards that direction [36]. Moreover, various 
researchers have highlighted the problem of ineffective communication between maintenance 
staff, cabin crew, and flight crew, proposing different ways to mitigate this issue [46,47]. It is 
evident from the above that communication is a very important element within complex 
industries like aviation. 
 
Figure 4. the most frequent causal factors involved in mistakes on the ramp [36]. 
An example, in which maintenance communication was involved in an airplane accident, 
is the Atlantic Southeast Airlines flight 529 in August 1995. The aircraft crashed in Georgia, 
USA, during an emergency landing, after the loss of a propeller blade, resulting in 9 fatalities 
and 20 injuries. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that “the 
probable cause of this accident was the in-flight fatigue fracture and separation of a propeller 
blade resulting in distortion of the left engine nacelle, causing excessive drag, loss of wing lift, 
and reduced directional control of the airplane. The fracture was caused by a fatigue crack 
from multiple corrosion pits that were not discovered by Hamilton Standard because of 
inadequate and ineffective corporate inspection and repair techniques, training, 
documentation, and communications.” [48]. The NTSB in this report highlighted as a 
contributing factor the internal inadequate communication and documentation systems of the 
airplane parts’ manufacturer that led maintenance personnel to confusion and faulty 
procedures. 
Even though aviation was the first industry to regulate and implement human factors 
policies and guidelines, the need for further research and procedural improvement is 
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continuous and arduous. In the occurrence of any new procedure introduced, new research 
over the possible reasons for failure of the system or its human element towards its failure 
must be conducted. Moreover, the continuous effort to make communication in aviation 
effective has led to the observation and understanding of all aspects of human expressions. 
Different modes of expression, such as politeness [49], are under review by human factors 
specialists, in their attempt to promote clarity and minimize miscommunication at all levels.  
2.2. Areas in Aviation Maintenance Prone to Communication Failure 
In aviation maintenance one critical aspect is documentation. The most common reason 
for accidents in aviation maintenance is insufficient documentation and procedures [50–52]. 
More recent studies indicate that written communication can be more prone to mistakes than 
oral communication during critical maintenance tasks. The reason is that in oral 
communication any clarification is easier to obtain, so more human errors, that affect aircraft 
safety, are detected [33]. 
The improvement of maintenance documentation can establish communication as an 
important factor that could have a positive contribution to the execution of maintenance tasks 
safely [50,53]. Written procedures govern every action in aircraft maintenance. These are 
manufacturers’ Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA’s), Fault Isolation Manuals 
and all supporting documentation that are continually updated. Additionally, as aircraft 
design is evolving fast and becoming more sophisticated, maintenance-related information is 
expanding in volume. This immense amount of documentation amendments and novelty has 
to be adopted simultaneously by maintenance personnel around the world, even if their first 
language is not the one the documentation was produced in [54,55].  
Moreover, there is extended research in the development and improvement of online 
platforms, that aim to replace workcards, targeting lower cost along with a positive impact on 
the engineers’ situational awareness, error probability, job satisfaction, and adaptability 
[56,57]. Another example is that of a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) three-phase 
sponsored study that dealt with an improved design of the manufacturer’s maintenance 
documentation enabling the transfer of information to the maintenance personnel at a 
satisfactory level [58].  
Many researchers have produced instructions and guidelines, following human factors 
principles, to help maintenance staff avoid mistakes. Their research has been successful in 
reducing human errors [55,59]. However, the people in charge do not always acknowledge 
this work by implementing it in the field [60]. They usually persist in following their own 
former good experience and the employees’ perspective rather than adopt guidelines and 
instructions that stem from research [58].  
Moreover, shift turnover is of great significance in highly complex and regulated business 
environments, such as aviation maintenance, the oil industry, and medicine. According to 
Parke and Kanki, from the 8% of the aircraft maintenance failures that were due to 
communication factors, 51% were related to the shift turnover while 41% had no relation to it 
[61]. The turnover related maintenance occurrences were classified, by the reporting system 
used for this research, to have more severe and dangerous consequences [61] whereas debriefs 
that are conducted according to human factors principles can enhance productivity by 20–25% 
[62]. While debriefs may appear to be cost effective and produce quick results in the 
organizations’ improvement of performance, the study of such processes over the years is 
scattered across different disciplines, such as healthcare, education, psychology, and 
organizational fields with no conclusive results [62].  
The literature highlights that communication in the aircraft maintenance environment 
provides several considerations: first, it is an element that underlies every phase of the aircraft 
maintenance process; next, it is a primary element of the maintenance process, as it is the 
framework upon which information transmission takes place; finally, the research community 
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and the industry need to proceed with further investigation on documentation structure and 
shift turnover procedures.  
2.3. Communication in Aviation Training 
The training framework in aviation is designed to enhance communication skills and 
techniques, promote teamwork, accommodate human performance tools and develop 
situational awareness (SA) among maintenance personnel. This indicates of the way that the 
aviation industry values communication, acknowledges it as an important contributing factor 
of human performance and takes actions towards its successful application within the aviation 
various activities. This training is either called Crew Resource Management (CRM), 
Maintenance Resource Management (MRM), or Team Resource Management (TRM) [63–65].  
As the literature indicates: a) training is essential in enhancing elements such as 
successful communication and indeed has good results, and b) the design of training, the 
delivery and its implementation is of great importance in achieving the required results in 
areas such as communication [50,66,67]. To define the success of training in promoting factors 
such as communication, more ‘on the job’ observation of the participants is needed, given that 
most of the research has been conducted in simulation [64,68,69]. 
In the European Union, there is a 30 mil. Euro program (Future Sky Safety 2015–2019) 
that explores all new tools and approaches to aviation safety. This research, among other 
issues, indicates that a significant gap has been recognized between the quality of the students’ 
oral and written communication skills gained during their studies (especially in the 
aeronautical area) and the skills required by the aeronautical industry to perform the tasks 
safely [70]. Industry and academia do not work together as the communication between them 
is ineffective and discontinued [71,72]. This indicates that since there is no wide human factors 
training within the tertiary education curricula, there is a great need for it in newly recruited 
personnel. 
3. Trust 
First, trust is the belief of somebody else’s benignant intentions. Second, none can impose 
these beliefs to come true, in other words trust means to be prepared for the possibility that 
the anticipated benignant outcome will not happen. Third, the meaning of trust includes a 
degree of interdependency as somebody’s situation is linked to somebody else’s actions [13]. 
Based on these three elements, trust is the attitude someone or a party adopts (trustor) towards 
somebody else or another party (trustee) [73]. This attitude, or even both parties’ relationship, 
is influenced by the trustee’s behaviour and it will form the trustor’s understanding and 
receptiveness towards the trustee [13]. It is noted in the literature that the competence, 
benevolence and integrity of the trustee are the characteristics that trustor takes into 
consideration for the formation of his/her trust [74,75]. 
Trust, while it has been extensively researched by organizational researchers and more 
specifically by certain industries (e.g., web commerce) is understudied in high-reliability 
organisations, such as the aviation industry [76]. Trust usually stands in combination with 
other human characteristics and is difficult to be isolated and quantified. However, there is 
growing research indicating that trust and professionalism are fundamental factors in 
maintaining safety in the aviation industry. On the one hand, professionalism is the basis to 
exercise all the necessary steps towards safety, but on the other hand, personal trust is essential 
in the communication that is required [19,20,22,77,78].  
Additionally, personal trust is associated with performance and cooperation [79–82], 
citizenship behavior [83], problem solving [84], and confidence in the skills and capabilities of 
aviation experts (trust in competence), to achieve the desired level of safety [85]. Maintenance 
personnel need to trust that their colleagues will act as safely as themselves. This is a process 
that needs to be inspired and enhanced rather than taken for granted [86].  
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Trust towards people, and especially towards individuals in the case of a risky situation, 
where an individual will do anything within his/her power to overcome the risk, aspires to be 
a solid factor in ensuring safety management [85]. However, Harvey and Stanton [85] and 
Reason [87] argue that this statement contradicts the modern systems approach to risk and 
human error, according to the human factors principles, as human error has been considered 
so far to be a systemic rather than an individual consequence [88,89]. Adaptation is inevitable 
where models include the social system and human error while organizations put pressure on 
their systems on the benefit of their cost effectiveness-productivity balance [90] 
Apart from the trust between colleagues, there is the trust between maintenance 
personnel and management that has been rather low and makes staff feel sceptic and 
pessimistic whether positive results in safety can be achievable [65]. Management is 
responsible for building (establishing/taking the initiative towards the employees) and 
maintaining trust [13]. Apart from the interpersonal trust, there is the confidence towards 
technology and procedures. Additionally, another characteristic of trust is that it is bipolar: 
lingering between the two edges of trust and distrust [91,92].  
Procedures are clusters of partial steps that, to be successful, need to meet different 
criteria and conditions (e.g., environment). Due to different reasons (e.g., lack of knowledge, 
norms) maintenance employees might not take these conditions under consideration in the 
case of failure. Situations like these might lead these professionals to lose trust in procedures, 
in the case of a failure, or show overreliance in the instance that the procedures were effective 
even if the right conditions were not met [92]. 
The benefits of trust have been well understood for some decades now since Zand proved 
in 1972 [84] that employees with higher levels of trust compared to the ones with lower levels: 
a) make information processing more cost-effective to the company; b) seem to have more 
contentment among them; and c) show certainty towards other counterparts [84]. Research 
has also shown that trust towards familiar individuals is far more easily achieved, especially 
when positive feedback indicates this person to be trustworthy. Obviously, the level of trust 
tends to differ amongst various organizations, depending on their size. In small organizations, 
the interpersonal trust seems to be at a higher level than in larger organizations and the army 
[93].  
Technology, on the other hand, is a human construction and, as a product, it lacks human 
characteristics [94]. To focus on the technology, one should isolate it from the human element 
(users, developers) and examine the technology artifact itself. This approach enables the 
investigation of trust towards technology without being influenced by other surrounding 
human structures [95].  
People depend on technological artifacts and rely on their anticipated abilities and 
capabilities to perform successfully. In this concept trust means to depend or rely on another 
[96]. Therefore, if someone believes he/she can depend on technology’s performance in a time 
of need, then trust towards technology is the describing term for it [95].  
Trust in technology is divided into initial trust and knowledge-based trust [95]. Initial 
trust refers to the expectations and beliefs of the anticipated operations of the technological 
application chosen by the user. Knowledge-based trust is the result after interaction and 
familiarization with a technological system. Trust in technology needs further investigation 
as limited research has been conducted in this area [95].  
Furthermore, in modern times, more organisations have evolved into big impersonal 
enterprises where trust between groups is difficult to achieve [15]. To overcome this issue, 
organisations have to agree, adopt and utilise similar social rules to gain familiarity and work 
together efficiently [97]. Even though these sets of rules seem to prevent distrust among 
enterprises, some researchers insist that interpersonal relations are the ones that guarantee the 
formation of trust. This means that specific people need to represent organisations to form the 
needed familiarity [98].  
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Within business relations, trust is a fundamental factor that takes part in the orchestration 
of their expectations and mode of collaboration [99]. It appears to have an assistive role in 
establishing business relationships and it is crucial to re-establish the theory behind the 
organisational influences on the business behaviour. This will be of major help in attempts at 
building trust in interorganisational interactions [15]; “The more complex and dynamic social 
and economic relations and exchange arrangements are today, the more trust is needed as a 
lubricant to keep the motor running” [100].  
Overreliance or excessive trust may have negative effects on interpersonal and 
organizational relations and there is no current research to describe it adequately [101]. To 
unfold the role that trust plays in organizations, one must explore the macrolevel and 
microlevel of theory and analysis. In the macro level, trust is studied regarding its interaction 
with the industry structure while in micro level trust is examined among people as seen in 
Figure 5 [102].  
 
Figure 5. Schematic representation of the concept of trust [102]. 
3.1. Trust Dynamics within the Organization 
When systems in organizations promote open and free communication (knowledge 
sharing, uninhibited information disclosure) their employees are more likely to develop trust 
towards the organization and each other [13,74,101]. From the very beginning, trust has been 
linked to safety in the aviation industry and there has been a significant effort through MRM 
training (5th generation) to implement and enhance safety culture and engage all personnel in 
that direction.  
In the case that an organization proceeds with implementing all necessary actions to 
reduce human errors then learning from their mistakes would be one of them. In this case, it 
is crucial to the people involved to have sufficient trust that they will not be blamed if they 
report mistakes and that they can speak openly about them (commonly called a just culture 
[103,104]). Although there are mechanisms available to maintenance personnel to avoid or 
reduce human errors, they must trust their managers mutually to achieve that.  
Studies have revealed that a big proportion of engineers do not trust that their managers’ 
actions will be solely aimed at enhancing safety [105]. The lack of trust, or distrust, acts as an 
obstacle to the formation and implementation of programs, such as the FAA’s Aviation Safety 
Action Program (ASAP), that provides maintenance personnel with a system to report failures 
and thereby contribute to the continuous effort to improve aviation safety.  
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3.2. Characteristics of Trust 
Other extended research on trust indicates that trust is at high levels at the beginning of 
a professional relationship “high initial trust levels” [106]. New employees begin their 
employment with an intrinsic level of trust towards their colleagues and their organizations. 
Thereafter, it is the culture of each organization that will be responsible for maintaining or 
altering this level. Trust is also a multidimensional area that is highly influenced by other 
social features. As proposed in the Model of Trust by Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (as cited 
by Mayer et.al. [75]) trustworthiness is perceived by factors like ability, benevolence and 
integrity. In a society that is trained to believe and rely on others, it is most probable that 
people will trust their organization initially at a high level [106,107].  
Depending on the circumstances, trust levels can appear to develop as fragile or robust. 
Fragile is when it is subject to sudden changes during a given period either to a higher level, 
when the initial level is low or vice versa. Robust, on the other hand, is the opposite of fragile. 
It is used when the level of trust remains stable over a specified period [106]. Since the 
existence of the “high initial trust levels” is observed, it is of primary importance in the aviation 
industry to maintain it at those levels. It will only be successful by keeping in mind that the 
elements that make trust robust are: a) adequate precedent support, that is former good 
experience which forms a present behaviour in a similar manner; b) belief-confirming 
cognitive mechanisms, in which people’s remarks that oppose their beliefs are overlooked; 
and c) social mechanisms, the personal contact among people enhances the positive attitude 
between them [106]. Moreover, research has identified legislative procedures, conflicts of 
power, stress, and liability to be factors that reduce trust within organisations [108,109].  
Furthermore, research has confirmed the relationship between ASAPs and trust since 
organizations with ASAPs in place have demonstrated higher scores in trust than other 
companies in which ASAPs were not in their structure [110]. To evaluate the personal 
perception of maintenance personnel regarding human factors and safety in the workplace, 
specific tools had to be introduced. One tool that has been extensively used by FAA is the 
Maintenance Resource Management Technical Operations Questionnaire (MRM/TOQ). 
Among other questions that were used to measure different human factors, the following 
questions were used to measure the level of trust:  
• “My supervisor can be trusted” 
• “My safety ideas would be acted on if reported to supervisor” 
• “My supervisor protects confidential information.” 
• “I know proper channels to report safety issues” [86,110]. 
These types of questionnaires evolve and adapt over time, and new data is accumulating 
through continuous research. The optimum result would be to obtain a large amount of data 
from the full range of aviation activities, which would enable researchers to analyse results 
comparatively, inferentially, and longitudinally [86]. 
4. The Relation between Trust and Communication 
Literature has indicated that personal trust is an essential element that is associated with 
successful communication (see, for example, [15,16,18–20,22,77,78]). Experimental research 
has proven that face-to-face communication has been highly successful due to, among other 
reasons, the lifting of anonymity and the trust that the communicators show to each other. 
Face-to-face communication enhances verbal communication where trust elements, such as 
commitment and promises, are used along with body language, facial expressions, and visual 
cues to ensure a successful outcome [82]. Experimental evidence, regarding the relation 
between trust and communication, is scarce and more research in that field is needed [82].  
When it comes to group communication, the group should establish common ground for 
the members to agree upon some basic ideas/concepts. This process depends on trust 
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development among the members, towards their incentives and attitudes, for the group to 
create a functioning communication ([30] as adapted by [111,112]).  
At the organizational level, when organizational culture supports open and free 
communication among all levels of employees, it is expected from them to enhance their trust 
levels towards each other and their organization [13,74,101]. Recent research in the aviation 
maintenance field indicated that communication and trust are two major factors that both can 
be used as tools for maintenance failure detection [113]. Additionally, according to the FAA, 
trust is an essential element for a successful safety program in the aviation industry. The 
different safety programs base their effectiveness on the successful communication among the 
different business partners and mutual trust or distrust can affect this communication. 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
This review aimed to include mainly aviation maintenance literature relevant to 
communication and trust and this literature was found to be scarce. This suggests that, the 
factors of communication and trust, either individually or in combination, are understudied 
in aviation maintenance. To unfold this critical issue, communication and trust were explored 
in multidisciplinary literature and they were considered within the aviation maintenance 
framework. Some of the most important findings of the review are presented in Figure 6. 
Most researchers have concluded that aviation has recognised miscommunication as a 
paramount human factor contributing to errors [36,114], but there is still much work to be 
done to eliminate this risk and provide the industry with error free communication. A gap has 
been identified in the issues that arise from the communication among different areas within 
aviation, and there is research underway mitigating these issues [46,47]. Every aspect of 
human nature and personality characteristics should be considered, to eliminate the factors 
that might lead the message to not be adequately delivered and understood in the 
communication process. To succeed in this, it is of high importance to place the mechanisms 
and models of miscommunication in the specific frame of aviation industry [30] as there is a 
great deal of potential in their implementation and development, especially in aviation 
maintenance [115]. 
Several decades ago, it became quite apparent that standard terminology and 
methodology would help reduce human errors related to aircraft procedures, especially in the 
written forms of communication, e.g., documentation, manuals, workcards, etc. [55,59]. Due 
to such endeavours, new technology and improved software are being used in the place of 
internal communication forms and workcards with encouraging results [56,57]. Extended 
research has still to be conducted in this direction to make novel technology more appealing 
and subsequently resolve both managers’ and employees’ negative attitude to similar 
platforms [58]. On the other hand, there is a lack of systemic study of maintenance debriefings 
that does not help in the comprehension and improvement of this crucial step in the 
maintenance procedure [62]. 
Training is the only vehicle that will introduce and facilitate all the required 
communication skills [63–65,116]. There has been considerable research during the past few 
decades in developing systems and the generation of effective programs. There is, however, 
potential for further research in the long-term effectiveness of these programs as trainees do 
not seem to acquire the desired level of knowledge and skill [50]. 
The framework within interorganisational trust has a lot of potential to be restructured, 
to enhance business interactions, and to achieve further development [15]. The literature 
found that deals with trust in the aviation industry is scarce. This alone indicates that there is 
a great deal of work that could be done in identifying and associating trust with other traits 
in the actual working environment in aviation maintenance [19]. The interesting element in 
trust is that the initial levels of trust (the levels of trust an individual or a company indicates 
at the beginning of a collaboration) are high, so human factors researchers could focus their 
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research towards the direction of the mechanisms which will contribute to maintaining these 
levels high over time [106]. 
More extensive research is needed to standardize trust measuring methodologies, 
analyse results, and enable smaller-scale research to be compared safely, which, in turn, will 
lead to reliable results and interventions [86]. Only over recent years have researchers started 
trying to unveil the causal factors for maintenance errors [117]. 
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Figure 6. Tabular representation of the recognised future research potentials. 
Following the example of ‘Future Sky Safety’ and trying to fill in the gap of the human 
factors research in aviation maintenance, the investigation of the interaction between two 
factors, such as communication and trust, is pioneering within the aviation maintenance 
context and of great importance. The research that has been conducted in aviation human 
factors so far is mainly a single factor research. Therefore, the study of two and more factors 
and their impact on human performance is a direction more researchers should follow in the 
future, given that human reaction is the result of different factors and conditions that interact 
with each other. 
Under the scope of the investigation of factors in combinations, it would be interesting to 
see further combined research in communication and trust in aviation maintenance. More 
specifically the relationship between trust and communication (how they interact with each 
other) among colleagues, between subordinates and managers/supervisors, and between 
maintenance staff and technology. Furthermore, trust among aviation businesses and how 
they interact with each other would be a domain for further research, as new data could be 
exposed. Moreover, trust in technology has been under-researched in the aviation 
maintenance domain, which appears to be bereft of any significant research in this field. 
Additionally, the negative effects of excessive interpersonal or organizational trust can be 
researched further as, again, this is an understudied field, especially in aviation maintenance. 
Author Contributions:  Conceptualization, Anna V. Chatzi.; Data Curation, Anna V. Chatzi.; 
Writing – Original Draft Preparation, Anna V. Chatzi.; Writing – Review & Editing, Anna V. 
Chatzi, Wayne Martin, Paul Bates, Patrick Murray 
Funding: This research received no external funding 
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest. 
References 
1. Dhillon, B.S.; Liu, Y. Human Error in Maintenance: A Review. J. Qual. Maint. Eng. 2006, 
12, 21–36. 
2. Reason, J.T. Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents; Ashgate: Farnham, UK, 1997. 
3. European Aviation Safety Agency. Annual Safety Review 2014; European Aviation Safety 
Agency: Cologne, Germany, 2015. 
4. Blaise, J.-C.; Levrat, E.; Iung, B. Process Approach-Based Methodology for Safe 
Maintenance Operation: From Concepts to SPRIMI Software Prototype. Saf. Sci. 2014, 70, 
99–113. 
5. Chang, Y.-H.; Wang, Y.-C. Significant Human Risk Factors in Aircraft Maintenance 
Technicians. Saf. Sci. 2010, 48, 54–62. 
6. Dupont, G. The Dirty Dozen Errors in Maintenance. In 11th Symposium on Human 
Factors in Maintenance and Inspection: Human Error in Aviation Maintenance. 
Washington, DC, USA, 12–13 March 1997. 
7. Flin, R.; O’Connor, P.; Mearns, K. Crew Resource Management: Improving Team Work 
in High Reliability Industries. Team Perform. Manag. Int. J. 2002, 8, 68–78. 
8. Marquardt, N.; Gades, R.; Robelski, S. Implicit Social Cognition and Safety Culture. Hum. 
Factors Ergon. Manuf. Serv. Ind. 2012, 22, 213–234. 
9. Wise, J.A.; Hopkin, V.D.; Garland, D.J. Handbook of Aviation Human Factors; CRC Press: 
Boca Raton, FL, USA, 2010. 
10. Reiman, T. Understanding Maintenance Work in Safety-Critical Organisations-Managing 
the Performance Variability. Theor. Issues Ergon. Sci. 2011, 12, 339–366. 
  190 
11. Federal Aviation Administration. Addendum—Chapter 14: Human Factors. In Aviation 
Maintenance Technical Handbook FAA-H-8083-30; US Department of Transportation: 
Oklahoma City, OK, USA, 2011. 
12. Silvagni, S.; Napoletano, L.; Graziani, I.; Blaye, P.L.; Rognin, L. Concept for Human 
Performance Envelope; EU Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme: Brussels, 
Belgium, 2015. 
13. Whitener, E.M.; Brodt, S.E.; Korsgaard, M.A.; Werner, J.M. Managers as Initiators of 
Trust: An Exchange Relationship Framework for Understanding Managerial 
Trustworthy Behavior. Acad. Manag. Rev. 1998, 23, 513–530. 
14. Hernandez, J.M.d.C.; Santos, C.C.d. Development-Based Trust: Proposing and Validating 
a New Trust Measurement Model for Buyer-Seller Relationships. BAR Braz. Adm. Rev. 
2010, 7, 172–197. 
15. Bachmann, R. The Coordination of Relations Across Organizational Boundaries. Int. Stud. 
Manag. Org. 2003, 33, 7–21. 
16. Carrière, J.; Bourque, C. The Effects of Organizational Communication on Job Satisfaction 
and Organizational Commitment in a Land Ambulance Service and the Mediating Role 
of Communication Satisfaction. Career Dev. Int. 2009, 14, 29–49. 
17. Cascio, W.F. Managing a Virtual Workplace. Acad. Manag. Exec. 2000, 14, 81–90. 
18. Cho, Y.J.; Park, H. Exploring the Relationships Among Trust, Employee Satisfaction, and 
Organizational Commitment. Public Manag. Rev. 2011, 13, 551–573. 
19. Flin, R. Measuring Safety Culture in Healthcare: A Case for Accurate Diagnosis. Saf. Sci. 
2007, 45, 653–667. 
20. Muchinsky, P.M. An Intraorganizational Analysis of the Roberts and O’Reilly 
Organizational Communication Questionnaire. J. Appl. Psychol. 1977, 62, 184–188. 
21. Shapiro, D.B.; Sheppard, H.; Cheraskin, L. Business on a Handshake. Negot. J. 1992, 8, 
365–377. 
22. Yeager, S.J. Measurement of Independent Variables Which Affect Communication: A 
Replication of Roberts and O’Reilly. Psychol. Rep. 1978, 43, 1319–1324. 
23. Shannon, C.; Weaver, W. The Mathematical Theory of Communication; University of Illinois 
Press: Champaign, IL, USA, 1949. 
24. Fiske, J. Introduction to Communication Studies (Studies in Culture and Communication); 
Taylor & Francis Group/Books: London, UK, 1990. 
25. Berelson, B.; Steiner, G. Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings; Harcourt, 
Brace, and World: Oxford, UK, 1964; p. 527. 
26. Ayer, A.J. What is Communication? J. Commun. 1955, 9, 13. 
27. Schramm, W. How Communication Works. In the Process and Effects of Mass 
Communication; University of Illinois Press: Champaign, IL, USA, 1954; pp. 3–26. 
28. Duncan, T.; Moriarty, S.E. A Communication-Based Marketing Model for Managing 
Relationships. J. Mark. 1998, 62, 1–13. 
29. Kanki, B.G.; Helmreich, R.L.; Anca, J. Communication and Crew Resource Management. 
In Crew Resource Management, 2nd ed.; Academic Press: London, UK, 2010; pp. 111–146. 
30. Anolli, L.; Ciceri, R.; Riva, G. Say not to Say: New Perspectives on Miscommunication; IOS 
Press: Washington, DC, USA, 2002; Volume 3. 
31. Parret, H. Indirection, Manipulation and Seduction in Discourse. In Pretending to 
Communicate; Walter De Gruyter GmbH: Berlin, Germany, 1994. 
32. Mortensen, C.D. Miscommunication, 1st ed.; Oaks, T., Ed.; Sage Publications: London, UK, 
1997. 
33. Shukri, S.A.; Millar, R.M.; Gratton, G.; Garner, M. The Potential Risk of Communication 
Media in Conveying Critical Information in the Aircraft Maintenance Organisation: A 
Case Study. IOP Conf. Ser. Mater. Sci. Eng. 2016, 152, 012044. 
  191 
34. Cushing, S. Fatal Words: Communication Clashes and Aircraft Crashes; University of Chicago 
Press: Chicago, IL, USA, 1994. 
35. Dismukes, R. K. Human Error in Aviation; Routledge, Ed.; Taylor & Francis: London, UK, 
2009. 
36. Balk, A.D.; Bossenbroek, J.W. Aircraft Ground Handling and Human Factors. A Comparative 
Study of the Perceptions by Ramp Staff and Management; NLR Air Transport Safety Institute: 
Amsterdam, Niederlande, 2010. 
37. Drury, C.G. Human Factors in Aircraft Maintenance; RTO AVT lecture series: Sofia, 
Boulgaria, 2000; pp. 15-1–15-9. 
38. McFadden, K.L.; Towell, E.R. Aviation Human Factors: A Framework for the New 
Millennium. J. Air Transp. Manag. 1999, 5, 177–184. 
39. Graham, S.; Bonacum, D.; Leonard, M. The Human Factor: The Critical Importance of 
Effective Teamwork and Communication in Providing Safe Care. Qual. Saf. Health Care 
2004, 13, 85–90. 
40. Lautman, L.; Gallimore, P. Control Caused Accident: Results of a 12-Operator Survey; Boeing 
Commercial Airplane Co: Seattle, WA, USA, 1987. 
41. Wiegmann, D.A.; Shappell, S.A. Human Error and Crew Resource Management Failures 
in Naval Aviation Mishaps: A Review of US Naval Safety Cetre Data, 1990–1996. Aviat. 
Space Environ. Med. 1999, 70, 1147–1151. 
42. Yacavone, D.W. Mishap Trends and Cause Factors in Naval Aviation: A Review of Naval 
Safety Center data. Aviat. Space Environ. Med. 1993, 64, 392–395. 
43. Wiegmann, D.A.; Shappell, S.A. A Human Error Approach to Aviation Accident Analysis: The 
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System; Burlington, V.T., Ed.; Ashgate: 
Aldershot, UK, 2003. 
44. Murphy, P. The Role of Communications in Accidents and Incidents during Rail 
Possessions. In Harris D (ed) Engineering Psychology and Cognitive Ergonomics Volume Five 
Aerospace and Transportation Systems; Ashgate: Aldershot, UK, 2001. 
45. Rail Safety Standards Board. Railway Group Safety Plan; Rail Safety Standards Board: 
London, UK, 2003. 
46. Caldwell, J.A. Fatigue in Aviation. Trav. Med. Infect. Dis. 2005, 3, 85–96. 
47. Mattson, M.; Petrin, D.A.; Young, J.P. Integrating Safety in the Aviation System: 
Interdepartmental Training for Pilots and Maintenance Technicians. J. Air Transp. World 
Wide 2001, 6, 37–64. 
48. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). Aircraft Accident Report—In-Flight Loss 
of Propeller Blade Forced Landing and Collision with Terrain, Atlantic Southeast 
Airlines, Inc., Flight 529, Embraer EMB-120RT, N256AS; NTSB: Washington, DC, USA, 
1996. 
49. Bonnefon, J.F.; Feeney, A.; De Neys, W. The Risk of Polite Misunderstandings. Curr. Dir. 
Psychol. Sci. 2011, 20, 321–324. 
50. Taylor, J.C.; Thomas, R.L., III. Written Communication Practices as Impacted by a 
Maintenance Resource Management Training Intervention. J. Air Transp. 2003, 8, 69–90. 
51. Von Thaden, T.L.; Wiegmann, D.A.; Shappell, S.A. Organizational Factors in Commercial 
Aviation Accidents. Int. J. Aviat. Psychol. 2006, 16, 239–261. 
52. Ward, M.E.; McDonald, N.; Morrison, R.; Gaynor, D.; Nugent, T. A Performance 
Improvement Case Study in Aircraft Maintenance and Its Implications for Hazard 
Identification. Ergonomics 2010, 53, 247–267. 
53. Sogg, S. An Integrated Systems Approach to Human Factors in Commercial Aviation 
Maintenance Systems; Aviation Maintenance Symposium: San Francisco, CA, USA, 2002. 
54. Drury, C.G.; Guy, K.P.; Wenner, C.A. Outsourcing Aviation Maintenance: Human 
Factors Implications, Specifically for Communications. Int. J. Aviat. Psychol. 2010, 20, 124–
143. 
  192 
55. Drury, C.G.; Johnson, W.B. Writing Aviation Maintenance Procedures That People 
Can/Will Follow. In Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Soiety 57th 
Annual Meeting, San Diego, CA, USA, 3 October 2013. 
56. Kraus, D.C.; Gramopadhye, A.K. Effect of Team Training on Aircraft Maintenance 
Technicians: Computer-Based Training Versus Instructor-Based Training. Int. J. Ind. 
Ergon. 2001, 27, 141–157. 
57. Liang, G.-F.; Lin, J.-T.; Hwang, S.-L.; Wang, E.M.-Y.; Patterson, P. Preventing Human 
Errors in Aviation Maintenance Using an On-Line Maintenance Assistance Platform. Int. 
J. Ind. Ergon. 2010, 40, 356–367. 
58. Chaparro, A.; Groff, L.S. Human Factors Survey of Aviation Maintenance Technical 
Manuals. In 16th Human Factors in Aviation Maintenance Symposium; Embry-Riddle 
Aeronautical University Scholarly Commons: San Francisco, CA, USA, 2002. 
59. Chervak, S.; Drury, C.G.; Ouellette, J.P. Simplified English for Aircraft Workcards. Hum. 
Factors Ergon. Soc. Annu. Meet. Proc. 1996, 40, 303–307. 
60. Karanikas, N.; Soltani, P.; Boer, R.J.; Roelen, A.L.C. Safety Culture Development: The Gap 
Between Industry Guidelines and Literature, and the Differences Amongst Industry 
Sectors. In Advances in Safety Management and Human Factors: Proceedings of the AHFE 2016 
International Conference on Safety Management and Human Factors; Springer International 
Publishing: Orlando, FL, USA, 2016. 
61. Parke, B.; Kanki, B.G. Best Practices in Shift Turnovers: Implications for Reducing 
Aviation Maintenance Turnover Errors as Revealed in ASRS Reports. Int. J. Aviat. Psychol. 
2008, 18, 72–85. 
62. Tannenbaum, S.I.; Cerasoli, C.P. Do Team and Individual Debriefs Enhance 
Performance? A Meta-Analysis. Hum. Factors 2013, 55, 231–245. 
63. Patankar, M.S.; Taylor, J.C. MRM Training, Evaluation, and Safety Management. Int. J. 
Aviat. Psychol. 2008, 18, 61–71. 
64. Salas, E.; Burke, C.S.; Bowers, C.A.; Wilson, K.A. Team Training in the Skies: Does Crew 
Resource Management (CRM) Training Work? Hum. Factors 2001, 43, 641–674. 
65. Taylor, J.C.; Patankar, M.S. Four Generations of MRM: Evolution of Human Error 
Management Programs in the United States. J. Air Transp. World Wide 2001, 6, 3–32. 
66. Lappas, I.; Kourousis, K.I. Anticipating the Need for New Skills for the Future Aerospace 
and Aviation Professionals. J. Aerosp. Technol. Manag. 2016, 8, 232–241. 
67. Salas, E.; Tannenbaum, S.I.; Kraiger, K.; Smith-Jentsch, A.K. The Science of Training and 
Development in Organizations: What Matters in Practice. Psychol. Sci. Public Interest 
Suppl. 2012, 13, 74–101. 
68. Karanikas, N. Using Reliability Indicators to Explore Human Factors Issues in 
Maintenance Databases. Int. J. Qual. Reliab. Manag. 2013, 30, 116–128. 
69. Kirkpatrick, D. Evaluating Training Programs: The Four Levels; Berrett-Koehler: San 
Francisco, CA, USA, 1998. 
70. Ribeiro, B.; Filipe, P. Dissemination, Exploitation and Communication; EU’s Horizon 2020 
Research and Innovation Programme: Brussels, Belgium, 2016. 
71. Karanikas, N. Human Error Views: A Framework for Benchmarking Organizations and 
Measuring the Distance between Academia and Industry. In Proceedings of the 49th 
ESReDA Seminar, Brussels, Belgium, 29–30 October 2015. 
72. Malagas, K.; Fragoudaki, A.; Kourousis, K.I.; Nikitakos, N. The Prospects of the Higher 
Education Aviation Programs in Greece: A Missed Opportunity or a Challenge to Meet? 
J. Aerosp. Technol. Manag. 2017, 9, 510–518. 
73. Robinson, S.L. Trust and Breach of the Psychological Contract. Adm. Sci. Q. 1996, 41, 574–
599. 
74. Butler, J.K.J. Towards Understanding and Measuring Conditions of Trust: Evolution of a 
Conditions of Trust Inventory. J. Manag. 1991, 17, 643–663. 
  193 
75. Mayer, R.C.; Davis, J.H.; Schoorman, F.D. An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust. 
Acad. Manag. Rev. 1995, 20, 709–734. 
76. Cox, S.; Jones, B.; Collinson, D. Trust Relations in High-Reliability Organizations. Risk 
Anal. 2006, 26, 1123–1138. 
77. O’Reilly, C.A. Supervisors and Peers as Information Sources, Group Supportiveness, and 
Individual Decision-Making Performance. J. Appl. Psychol. 1977, 62, 632–635. 
78. O’Reilly, C.A.; Roberts, K.H. Task Group Structure, Communication, and Effectiveness 
in Three Organizations. J. Appl. Psychol. 1977, 62, 674–681. 
79. Axelrod, R. The Evolution of Cooperation; Basic Books: New York, NY, USA, 1984. 
80. Deutsch, M. Cooperation and Trust: Some Theoretical Notes. In Nebraska Symposium on 
Motivation; University of Nebraska Press: Lincoln, NE, USA, 1962. 
81. Earley, P.C. Trust, Perceived Importance of Praise and Criticism, and Work Performance: 
An Examination of Feedback in the United States and England. J. Manag. 1986, 12, 457–
473. 
82. Ben-Ner, A.; Putterman, L. Trust, Communication and Contracts: An Experiment. J. Econ. 
Behav. Organ. 2009, 70, 106–121. 
83. McAllister, D.J. Affect-And Cognition-Based Trust as Foundations for Interpersonal 
Cooperation in Organizations. Acad. Manag. J. 1995, 38, 24–59. 
84. Zand, D.E. Trust and Managerial Problem Solving. Adm. Sci. Q. 1972, 17, 229–239. 
85. Harvey, C.; Stanton, N.A. Safety in System-Of-Systems: Ten Key Challenges. Saf. Sci. 
2014, 70, 358–366. 
86. Taylor, J.C.; Thomas, R.L., III. Toward Measuring Safety Culture in Aviation 
Maintenance: The Structure of Trust and Professionalism. Int. J. Aviat. Psychol. 2003, 13, 
321–343. 
87. Reason, J.T. Organizational Accidents Revisited; CRC Press: Boca Raton, FL, USA; London, 
UK, 2016. 
88. Dekker, S. Drift into Failure: From Hunting Broken Components to Understanding Complex 
Systems; Ashgate: Farnham, UK; Burlington, Vt, USA, 2011. 
89. Rasmussen, J. Risk Management in a Dynamic Society: A Modelling Problem. Saf. Sci. 
1997, 27, 183–213. 
90. Leveson, N. A New Accident Model for Engineering Safer Systems. Saf. Sci. 2004, 42, 237–
270. 
91. Jian, J.-Y.; Bisantz, A.M.; Drury, C.G. Towards an Empirically Determined Scale of Trust 
in Computerized Systems: Distinguishing Concepts and Types of Trust. Proc. Hum. 
Factors Ergon. Soc. 1998, 1, 501–505. 
92. Ockerman, J.; Pritchett, A. A Review and Reappraisal of Task Guidance: Aiding Workers 
in Procedure Following. Int. J. Cogn. Ergon. 2000, 4, 191–212. 
93. Patankar, M.S.; Gomez, M. Maintenance ASAP Programs: Barriers and Opportunities; 
Federal Aviation Agency (FAA): Washington, DC, USA, 2004. 
94. McKnight, D.H.; Thatcher, J.B. Trust in Technology: Development of a Set of Constructs 
and Measures. In Handbook of Trust Research; Zaheer, A., Bachmann, R., Eds.; American 
Psychological Association: Washington, DC, USA, 2004. 
95. McKnight, D.H.; Carter, M.; Thatcher, J.B.; Clay, P. Trust in a Specific Technology: An 
Investigation of Its Components and Measures. ACM Trans. Manag. Inf. Syst. 2011, 2, 1–
25. 
96. McKnight, D.H.; Chervany, N.L. The Meanings of Trust. In MIS Research Center Working 
Paper Series; University of Minnesota: Minneapolis, MN, USA, 1996. 
97. Powell, W.W.; DiMaggio, P.J. The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis; 
University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL, USA, 1991. 
98. Giddens, A. The Consequences of Modernity; John Wiley & Sons: New Jersey, NJ, USA, 1990. 
  194 
99. Salam, M.A. The Mediating Role of Supply Chain Collaboration on the Relationship 
between Technology, Trust and Operational Performance. Benchmarking Int. J. 2017, 24, 
298–317. 
100. Arrow, K. The Limits of Organization; Norton: New York, NY, USA, 1974. 
101. Zaheer, A.; Bachmann, R. Handbook of Trust Research. Elgar Original Reference; Edward 
Elgar Publishing: Cheltenham, UK, 2006. 
102. Kramer, R.M.; Tyler, T.R. Whither Trust? In Trust in Organizations; Kramer, R.M., Tyler, 
T.R., Eds.; Sage: Thousand Oaks, CA, USA, 1996. 
103. Catino, M. A Review of Literature: Individual Blame vs. Organizational Function Logics 
in Accident Analysis. J. Conting. Crisis Manag. 2008, 16, 53–62. 
104. Dekker, S.W.A. Just Culture:Who Gets to Draw the Line? Cogn. Technol. Work 2009, 11, 
177–185. 
105. Goglia, J.; Patankar, M.S.; Taylor, J.C. Lack of Error Mitigation Tools: The Weakest Link 
in Maintaining Airworthiness? In 55th Annual International Air Safety Seminar, Dublin, 
Ireland, 4–7 November 2002. 
106. McKnight, D.H.; Cummings, L.L.; Chervany, N.L. Initial Trust Formation in New 
Organizational Relationships. Acad. Manag. 1998, 23, 473. 
107. Rotter, J.B. A New Scale for the Measurement of Interpersonal Trust. J. Pers. 1967, 35, 651–
665. 
108. Hovden, J.; Størseth, F.; Tinmannsvik, R.K. Multilevel Learning from Accidents–Case 
Studies in Transport. Saf. Sci. 2011, 49, 98–105. 
109. Naevestad, T.O. Safety Cultural Preconditions for Organizational Learning in High-Risk 
Organizations. J. Conting. Crisis Manag. 2008, 16, 154–163. 
110. Patankar, M.; Driscoll, D. Factors Affecting the Success or Failure of Aviation Safety Action 
Programs in Aviation Maintenance Organizations; Federal Aviation Administration: 
Washington, DC, USA, 2005. 
111. Donath, J.S. Identity and Deception in the Virtual Community. In Communities in Cyberspace; 
Smith, M.A., Kollock, P., Eds.; Routledge: London, UK, 1999. 
112. Bachmann, R. Trust, Power and Control in Trans-Organizational Relations. Organ. Stud. 
2001, 22, 337–365. 
113. Langer, M.; Braithwaite, G.R. The Development and Deployment of a Maintenance 
Operations Safety Survey. Hum. Factors 2016, 58, 986–1006. 
114. B..A.S.I.. Human Factors in Airline Maintenance: A Study of Incident Reports; Department of 
Transport and Regional Development Bureau of Air Safety Investigation Australia: 
Canberra, Australia, 1997. 
115. McRoy, S. Preface: Detecting, Repairing and Preventing Human—Machine 
Miscommunication. Int. J. Hum.-Comput. Stud. 1998, 48, 547–552. 
116. Robertson, M. Maintenance Resource Management. In Human Factors Guide for Aviation 
Maintenance; Authority, F.A., Ed.; Federal Aviation Administration: Washington, DC, 
USA, 2005. 
117. Hobbs, A.; Williamson, A. Associations Between Errors and Contributing Factors in 
Aircraft Maintenance. Hum. Factors 2003, 45, 186–201. 
 
© 2019 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is 
an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the 




  195 
Appendix B: Published Journal Paper 2 
Chatzi, A., V., (2019). Safety management systems: an opportunity and a challenge for military aviation 
organisations. Aircraft Engineering and Aerospace Technology, 91(1),190-196, 
https://doi.org/10.1108/AEAT-05-2018-0146  
Author Accepted Manuscript 
 
Safety Management Systems: An Opportunity and a Challenge for Military 
Aviation Organisations 
Anna V Chatzi 
 
School of Commerce, University of Southern Queensland, USQ Toowoomba 
Campus, QLD, Australia. 
 
Abstract 
Purpose - Most military aviation organisations today have not evolved their safety 
management approach towards harmonising with civil aviation. Safety culture is the 
base for any civil aviation organisation, enabling employees to communicate 
effectively and be fully aware and extrovert on safety. Just culture and reporting 
culture both are related to safety culture. Both are parts of the awareness process, 
enhancing safety promotion. These distinct elements and the safety management 
systems (SMS) can serve well the military aviation. This viewpoint paper presents and 
discusses the SMS philosophy, structure and elements as a solution for military 
aviation organisations. 
Design/methodology/approach – The feature of civil aviation SMSs are presented 
and discussed, with reference to the applicable frameworks and regulations governing 
the SMS operation. A discussion on the challenges faced within the military aviation 
organisations, with a brief examination of a European Union (EU) military aviation 
organisation, is presented. 
Findings – The European Military Airworthiness Requirements (EMARs), which are 
based on the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) set of rules, can act the basis 
for establishing military aviation SMSs. A civil-based approach, blended, as 
necessary, with military culture is workable, as this is the case for many defence forces 
that have adopted such aviation safety systems. 
Originality/value – This viewpoint paper discusses the opportunities and challenges 
associated with the adoption of SMS by military aviation organisations. This is the 
first time that this issue is openly discussed and presented to the wider aviation 
community, outside military aviation. 
 
Keywords: Safety Management Systems, Safety Culture, Reporting Culture, Just 
Culture, Aviation. 
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Introduction 
Aviation is one of the most complex and regulated industries around the world. From 
its early years, while its operations were growing rapidly, and tragic accidents with 
great loss of life and cost had started to occur, safety arose as a major factor in its 
operations. International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) is the United Nation’s 
specialised agency which works with 191-member States and industry groups to set 
common Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) and policies to implement 
safe, efficient, financially and ecologically sustainable activity in civil aviation. Since 
1944, when the Chicago Convention took place, the first 52 attending Nations signed 
the International Convention for Civil Aviation, setting the regulations and principles 
for all National Aviation Authorities (NAAs) (Purton, Clothier, & Kourousis, 2014b). 
These policies and guidelines are used by Member States to ensure that their civil 
aviation authorities include them in their legislations content to the State’s 
harmonisation with the global standards and safety procedures set by ICAO (Gerede, 
2015; Purton & Kourousis, 2014). Recognising the effectiveness of these standards 
and regulations by mitigating the accident rate in civil aircraft, especially after the 
1970s, efforts are driven at the moment in designing a relevant framework that 
concerns the state aircraft. The state aircraft (military, customs, police services) due to 
its diversity in technical and flight operations are in great need for SARPS, similar to 
the European Military Airworthiness Requirements (EMARs) (Purton, Clothier, & 
Kourousis, 2014a; Purton et al., 2014b; Purton & Kourousis, 2014; Purton, Kourousis, 
Clothier, & Massey, 2014c). However, transition to a modern civil-based aviation 
safety system has yet to be realised for most of the defence forces around the world, 
including the defence forces within the European Union (EU). Many EU defence 
forces share similar characteristics (size, homogenous population, diversity of the 
fleet) sharing similar goals. For that reason, the Hellenic Army’s example is used in 
this paper as their representative. The Hellenic Army aviation is an operator utilising 
a very diverse fleet of approximately 160 helicopters (AH-64 Apache, CH-47 
Chinook, NHI NH-90, Bell UH-1H/AB 205, Bell 206B, Bell AB212). Historically, the 
operation of military aviation helicopters in the Hellenic defence forces have been 
experiencing a relatively constant fatality rate, significantly higher than their Air Force 
counterparts (Fig. 1).  
 
Figure 1. Hellenic Army – Hellenic Air Force helicopter fatal accidents (courtesy of 
K. I. Kourousis). 
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Without examining the operational and other organisation differences existing 
between the Hellenic Army aviation and the Hellenic Air Force, a key factor that could 
possibly contribute in improving safety performance in the Hellenic Army aviation is 
the establishment of a safety management system on the basis of the civil aviation 
safety management systems (SMS). This viewpoint article aims to analyse the 
elements of an SMS system that can be applicable to the Hellenic military aviation 
organisation and other defence forces that share similar characteristics. Moreover, it 
discusses the SMS main philosophy, structure and elements as a solution for military 
aviation organisations’ safety management. 
 Safety Management Systems 
From the 1960s the quality management system term (QMS) appeared on the aviation 
field to pave the way to occupational health and SMS (Stolzer, Goglia, & Stolzer, 
2015). Safety management systems have evolved gradually with the influence of other 
management systems and disciplines until they finally took their most current form 
(Stolzer et al., 2015). SMS and QMS are closely related to each other as they both 
promote safety. They are the most basic and complementary systems in managing 
safety in aviation (ICAO, 2013). 
General Framework 
The globalisation of operations dictated the standardisation of SMSs as well, to the 
harmonisation and efficient collaboration of different aviation organisations, as their 
international character grew bigger and more complicated. More than 20 years ago, 
the first standardisation of quality assurance was a reality (Stolzer et al., 2015). Today, 
aviation regulatory bodies around the world have institutionalised safety management 
systems, that follow the standardisation requirements, and aviation companies are 
obliged to have them in place.  
According to the 3rd edition of the ICAO’s Safety Management Manual (SMM) (2013) 
“SMS is a systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary 
organisational structures, accountabilities, policies and procedures” (ICAO, 2013, 
pxii). In the same document ICAO states the significance of the implementation of 
SMSs by the NAAs internationally in order to: a) locate the potential threats to safety, 
b) make certain to enforce all corrective actions necessary to keep the agreed safety 
performance, c) contribute to continuous monitoring and orderly assessment of safety 
performance, and d) to target a higher quality of performance of the safety 
management system.    
To meet these criteria, a set of four components are proposed to form the SMS’s 
framework. It is understandable that the size of each organisation and the complexity 
of the services provided, defines the form of the frame in which the SMS is 
implemented. These four components include twelve elements and they are the 
minimum requirement for an aviation company to implement an SMS. The four 
components of SMS, as shown in Fig. 2, according to ICAO’s Safety Management 
Manual (SMM) (2013) are: safety policy and objectives, safety risk management, 
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Figure 2. Schematic representation of the four SMS components. 
 
Each one of these components consists of different individual elements that categorise 
its activities as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. SMS individual elements and corresponding activities. 
Safety policy and objectives • Management commitment and 
responsibility; 
• Safety accountabilities; 
• Appointment of key safety personnel; 
• Coordination of emergency response 
planning; 
• SMS documentation. 
Safety risk management • Hazard identification; 
• Safety risk assessment. 
Safety assurance 
 
• Safety performance monitoring and 
measurement; 
• The management of change; 
• Continuous improvement of the 
SMS. 
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 • Safety communication. 
 
These components and their elements are set by ICAO’s Safety Management Manual 
(SMM) (2013) as the minimum requirements each aviation organisation should have, 
after each National Aviation Authority’s (NAA) approval. This approval reflects on 
each of the NAA guidance materials and requirements available to the aviation 
companies within their jurisdiction. Aviation regulatory bodies such as the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) and European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) have 
developed themselves SMS structures under the direction of ICAO’s guidelines. As a 
result, NAAs around the globe are designing their SMSs following either FAA’s or 
EASA’s policies or directly ICAO’s guidelines to ensure their compliance with 
ICAO’s directions (Fig. 3). 
Figure 3. Schematic representation of the policy making process. 
SMS Components 
In the FAA’s Advisory Circular AC 120-92B (2015), the four components of SMS, as 
they are introduced by ICAO, are presented and explained. Aviation companies are 
obliged to follow this structure in order to ensure their successful implementation of 
an SMS programme within their operational activities. These four components, as they 
are retrieved from the FAA’s AC 120-92B, are explained in more detail in the 
subsequent sections. 
First Component - Safety Policy and Objectives 
The core of every organisational structure is its policies and procedures. For safety to 
be established as a fundamental part of this core, it needs to be dominated by relevant 
guidelines and to be included in the policies and the organisational structure. Under 
this framework, safety is organisationally in the company’s goals to set objectives, 
assign responsibilities and set standards. The implementation of this stage depends 
highly on the commitment of the upper management to safety.  
The management’s role is critical, in regard to the safety policy and objectives, as it is 
the management’s active support and anticipation that keeps all employees focused 
and motivated to this direction. It is clearly the management’s responsibility to oversee 
the accurate implementation of all policies and procedures as well as to ensure that 
safety is one of the primary goals of the company. This means that safety is included 
in the strategic plans of the company and is being assessed regularly along with the 
company’s SMS. This assessment is a very critical phase for every aviation 
organisation. It includes feedback from the implementation of the safety risk 
management component and the risk assurance component of the SMS. This 
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procedures are realised in the way they were designed to be, and all standards are 
accurately held. 
In military aviation policy is described in Orders, of different hierarchy, and it is often 
very prescriptive, especially when compared to civil aviation policy documents. The 
level of inflexibility involved in military policy documents often presents challenges 
in the implementation of safety rules. 
Second Component - Safety Risk Management 
The safety risk management component consists of decision making processes, such 
as identifying hazards and mitigating risks, by carefully evaluating the organisation’s 
systems and their operating environment. Evidently the most important element in this 
component is the risk management system that is in place and its effectiveness. It is of 
high importance in each aviation organisation to successfully measure risk and to 
develop efficient strategies to manage it. This particularly important for military 
aviation, due to the nature of operations, both in peace and war time. 
Acceptable risk is a value that each aviation organisation must set for itself, following 
specific procedures, and then making decisions on ways to reduce that risk. This 
process requires a thorough understanding of the operational systems which includes 
the structures, the procedures and the policies of the company along with the staff, 
equipment and the artefacts of the company. This means risk experts are called to use 
all available tools to process risk management by identifying the hazard in the 
company’s activities and calculate the associated risk accordingly. Once the risk is 
analysed, its assessment comes next and eventually follows the reducing of the risk to 
conclude the process. In military aviation, the commanding officer’s role in deciding 
to accept or reject risk is of paramount importance. In practice, for most military 
aviation organisations, the safety system operates strictly under a single-point failure 
mechanism. This is considered a major drawback for the effective implementation of 
risk-management system. Reducing the risk is a realistic term as elimination is rarely 
accomplished, either in civil or military aviation. In reality, reduction of risk to an 
acceptable level of risk is doable, with risk experts evaluating this acceptable level 
after thorough investigations and analyses. Again, military aviation practice generally 
suffers from the chain-of-command effect and the lack of sufficient independence 
between the organisation’s units comprising their safety system – e.g. the commander 
is the operator and the regulator in some cases, which presents a clear conflict of 
interest in civil aviation terms. 
Third Component - Safety Assurance 
Safety assurance is the stage in which the safety risk management process is evaluated. 
It means that this is the reassuring component which gives an aviation organisation the 
reassurance that their SMS is meeting their strategically set safety objectives and that 
all risk controls and mitigations, that took place during the safety risk management 
component, had positive impact and were effective. Thus, in safety assurance 
procedure, detailed monitoring is of primary importance in measuring safety 
performance in the company’s operations and in improving their level of safety 
constantly. Safety performance is military aviation requires a far more dynamic 
monitoring approach, as opposed to civil aviation. The simple reason is that the 
inherent system safety of the aircraft, as well as the operational environment, have a 
profound effect on the evolution of safety performance. Effectively, trend analyses are 
a constant tool used to predict a degrading performance or assist in faster recovery of 
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operations following incidents or accidents. In the military helicopter operations 
world, the situation is far more dramatic than in the fixed wing world (mainly due to 
the high-risk profile of the operations and the overall lower reliability of the technical 
systems).  
A robust safety assurance process uses as many resources as possible to preserve the 
integrity of risk controls. These resources may stem from information gained through 
staff reporting system, audits (external or internal), experts’ investigations and 
analyses. The key element at this stage is again the management’s commitment to 
safety. Management staff in military aviation are governed not only by a chain of 
superior (commanding) officers but from a set of military rules. One odd situation that 
can be identified in the defence forces, is the regular disconnect existing between rules 
governing purely military discipline and those rules who dictate safe practice of the 
staff duties. This disconnect may lead to contradictory situations, which can have a 
negative impact on the military organisations aviation safety performance, especially 
in the Army (as opposed to the Air Force, which is a more technical service body). 
Management is the organisational factor that is responsible for the realisation of all 
necessary changes in order to proceed to the desired level of safety. Therefore, safety 
assurance is the framework that enhances the safety performance of the organisation, 
makes corrections whenever it is necessary and pointing out existing processes that 
need to be under consideration. 
 
Fourth Component - Safety Promotion 
Safety promotion is the last component of SMS and is designed to promote safety 
among the organisation’s employees. All staff from the upper management to the 
newly hired have to acknowledge their responsibility in safety by familiarising 
themselves with the safety policies and procedures, the reporting procedures that are 
in place and the risk controls. For a safety promotion to be effective the creation and 
application of a robust safety culture in of high importance.  
A safety culture within the organisation enables all staff to comprehend and maintain 
their part in safety operations of the company by following all the relevant policies and 
procedures while empowering the company’s reporting culture and the just culture 
(Stolzer et al., 2015). An efficient reporting culture comprises of a system that enables 
safety related issues to be reported freely among employees having as a goal their 
correction. A healthy just culture is the culture’’in which individuals are both held 
accountable for their actions and treated fairly by the organization’’ (Stolzer et al., 
2015, pp. 33). Promoting safety culture is another area of problematic implementation 
within military aviation, especially where a military aviation/airworthiness system is 
not established and operated. Moreover, a key characteristic of army aviation is the 
less robust education channel for their staff. In general, aviation staff (either pilots, 
technicians or engineers) may come from a common education system where the focus 
is on developing a culture geared around effective ground-battle practice. This staff is 
then moving to aviation roles and a new culture/behavioural attitude must be 
developed from scratch, that of having a focus on aviation safety. This transition is 
neither straightforward nor easy and has a negative impact on creating a safety culture 
within an army aviation organisation. 
In these regards training and communication are essential elements of safety 
promotion. Continuous staff training ensures that all individuals involved are updated 
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with all the requirements for their roles in the company and the proper certified 
qualifications have been provided to them. Training can be helpful, however 
fundamental education is also very important for military aviation staff. Thus, several 
defence forces are putting emphasis on the combination of training with education. 
Moreover, every organisation should have an efficient communications system in 
place for staff to have untrammelled access to all safety regulations and policies and 
at the same time unrestricted access to qualified safety personnel for help and 
guidance. 
 
Safety Culture and its relation to Just and Reporting Culture 
As mentioned, safety culture is a fundamental part of the fourth component of an SMS, 
the safety promotion. “Safety culture is defined as the shared values, beliefs, 
assumptions, and norms that may govern organizational decision making, as well as 
individual and group attitudes about safety” (Wiegmann, Zhang, Von Thaden, Sharma, 
& Gibbons, 2004, pp.122). Safety culture is a term that has been examined extensively 
through the different industries around the world. Researchers have proposed that 
safety culture includes different organisational indicators in these different industries 
(Wiegmann et al. 2004). There are at least five of them that are applicable globally to 
all industries and they include organizational commitment, management involvement, 
employee empowerment, reward systems, and reporting systems (Wiegmann et al. 
2004), as shown in Fig. 4. 
Figure 4. The five different organisational indicators that form safety culture 
 
 In any industry that its complexity and responsibility to their products or services 
dictates an efficient safety system in place, like aviation, reporting systems are their 
corner stones. Through these reporting systems any failure of safety management is 
detectible, by recognising the faults and omissions of the system. Therefore, their 
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accident, depend on the free reporting of all employees regarding any safety issue that 
arises while on duty (Wiegmann et al. 2004).  
By the term free reporting, the aviation organisation has to take measures towards the 
protection of the status of their staff and assets while using the reporting system. This 
is the only warranty towards staff to persuade them to use the system effectively and 
to prevent accidents and incidents while they get feedback on how the issue has been 
resolved (Wiegmann et al. 2004). 
An ongoing debate is in place for years in civil aviation regarding free reporting and 
more specifically how a blame-free reporting attitude can lead people away from their 
responsibilities, by blaming the system, even though every provision, to prevent 
mistakes, was in place (Sharpe, 2003). This means that staff should be accountable for 
their actions, thus being more responsible. On the other hand, it is of great importance 
to encourage staff into reporting their mistakes freely and contributing in their 
correction (Catino & Patriotta, 2013; Dekker & Breakey, 2016).   
Just culture has been offered as a possible solution to this dilemma by researchers 
(Catino, 2008; Dekker, 2009; Dekker & Breakey, 2016). A just culture approach aims 
to keep all staff’s obligations and expectations open and transparent. It also 
acknowledges that even experienced personnel are anticipated, at some point of their 
career, to err and to develop shortcuts or routine violations (Dekker & Breakey, 2016). 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that management tolerates deliberate or reckless 
mistakes. By this approach, just culture aims at perspicuous reporting and more 
efficient communication among staff (Dekker & Breakey, 2016). This system benefits 
itself from a transparent punitive matrix, in which every staff is aware of, to promote 
free reporting. This is a reassuring measure that staff won’t be unfairly blamed in case 
of an incident and they are encouraged to honestly report any error or malfunction of 
the system and to mitigate any negative consequences (Dekker & Breakey, 2016). To 
be able to eliminate the risk it is of great importance that the right questions are asked. 
To address the problem properly at an incident, and find the right solution, it is 
important to investigate the conditions and examine the way the provocative systems 
worked and not only who was involved in it (Zehr & Gohar, 2002).  
Again, the key role in just culture is played by upper management who is responsible 
in establishing a fair and just environment for all staff and empowering them in 
reporting all critical issues in safety. In a military aviation organisation, the role of the 
commanding officer, at the various levels of the chain-of-command, is instrumental in 
creating such a working environment. Upper management’s role is critical in 
communicating all relevant to safety information and human factors initial and 
concurrent training to the whole of their staff. However, human factors’ training (or 
even basic awareness) is very limited in most military aviation organisations. 
Moreover, there is often the misconception (especially among higher/mid-level 
management military staff) that generic health and safety rules can be adopted in lieu 
of aviation-specific human factors’ considerations and rules. Literature has shown that 
there is a tendency that staff who are aware of the safety regulations and requirements, 
choose safety over productivity (Karanikas, Melis, & Kourousis, 2017). This is also a 
typical situation among less experienced army aviation staff operating or maintaining 
aircraft and who are frequently subject to transfers between different 
units/roles/aircraft types. To reach this desired state in which employees consciously 
prefer safety, effective safety communication is a prerequisite among all organisational 
and managerial levels reflecting the thorough safety training that has been provided to 
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the staff (Geldart, Lohfeld, Shannon, & Smith, 2010; Hall, Oudyk, King, Naqvi, & 
Lewchuk, 2016). The role of a structured and well-defined education and training 
system in military aviation is of paramount importance, especially if the military 
organisation is experiencing regularly staff internal mobility or attrition. 
 
Discussion  
All sectors in aviation regardless if they are maintenance, operators, air traffic 
management, airport operations etc. operate under the same regulatory framework. 
SMSs are applied across the different sectors ensuring their safe operation. However, 
these different sectors have different operational circumstances and requirements that 
might affect the way the SMSs are applied and even affect their activities. The same 
situation, and in even greater extent, applies to military aviation, where (for example) 
the operations and maintenance units within the organisation have different needs and 
requirements, which also vary between training and wartime operations. 
ICAO has already established the framework, which the Member States around the 
world, one by one, include into their regulatory repertoire and take part in the attempt 
for global standardisation and safety operations in aviation. Each national aviation 
authority is responsible for the implementation, alongside with the industry’s active 
role. This model has proven to be successful in civil aviation, as the positive outcomes 
in safety have resulted in the mitigation of the rate of accidents which has led to: a) the 
expansion of these regulations globally to include the military aircraft (Purton, 
Clothier, & Kourousis, 2014a; Purton et al., 2014b; Purton & Kourousis, 2014; Purton, 
Kourousis, Clothier, & Massey, 2014c); b) other industries like healthcare to 
acknowledge the successful example of aviation and take steps in following its 
example (Pronovost et al., 2003; Ross, 2014;Sexton, Thomas, & Helmreich, 2000). 
However, for most military operators around the world, this harmonisation/adaptation 
has yet to be realised. The Hellenic Army aviation is one of these operators. It is 
highlighted that none of the Hellenic defence forces services, as well as several other 
European Union (EU) defence forces, have yet adopted the EU military airworthiness 
framework (EMARs). This is considered as a missed opportunity in moving towards 
a more effective and efficient aviation safety system. 
In the development of the components of SMS, safety culture emerged as a critical 
element being the goal for every management in aviation. Within the frame of a well-
established safety culture staff are fully aware of safety requirements and willing to 
promote safety. The structures that assist staff in gaining the desired level of awareness 
and collaboration towards safety are reporting culture and just culture (Stolzer et al., 
2015). Research not only in aviation but in other highly complex and regulated 
industries dictate that a functional reporting system promotes safety as it enables free 
and accurate communication in safety issues and their successful resolution 
(Wiegmann et al. 2004). Communication in military organisations is an activity which 
is prescribed by a mixed set of generic military communication norms/rules and 
aviation-specific rules (the latter are not necessarily best adapted to the needs of an 
aviation organisation). Moreover, fragmentation of information and rules (especially 
legacy rules or standing orders established over a series of iterations throughout the 
years) present additional difficulties in establishing a robust reporting system. These 
are considered distinct challenges that a military aviation organisation, such as the 
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Hellenic Army aviation among other similar EU military aviation organisations, must 
manage in the process of setting up an SMS. 
Just culture, on the other hand, warranties the transparency and the feeling of justice, 
the employees should experience in their workplace. This helps them to work 
undistracted and proceed in reporting any safety related issue without prejudice and 
fear (Dekker & Breakey, 2016). Evidently, it is obvious that reporting culture and just 
culture are two desirable qualities in aviation organisations that affect positively safety 
culture and safety promotion and contribute to a successful SMS. However, 
maintaining military discipline, which is part of the chain-of-command function of any 
military organisation, will surely obstruct the full deployment of a reporting and just 
culture. Responsibility is considered not only one of the virtues that all military staff 
should have and in most military organisations its promotion is linked with punishment 
of individuals (or even groups, to offer examples to others). This is perhaps one of the 
primary challenges (mental shift) that the commanding officers are going to face in 
any such change management process. 
Research has shown that in aircraft maintenance, even though there are differences in 
the SMSs and the safety climate among different organisations, it does not affect the 
safety attitude of the staff or their dedication to their work, which is found to be high 
(McDonald, Corrigan, Daly, & Cromie, 2000). This led the research to acknowledge 
the similarities of the technical personnel sub-culture, while a difference in the climate 
between the different occupational groups of the organisation revealed the different 
understanding of safety by these groups (McDonald et al. 2000). This is an important 
consideration for military aviation staff, since the groups are generally not only more 
diverse (in terms of staff experience/expertise) but also more in number (as military 
aircraft require more technical specialties/trades and licences, when compared to the 
typical EASA or FAA licencing/type rating system). 
The aviation example dominates the relevant healthcare research regarding safety 
(Pronovost et al., 2003; Ross, 2014; Sexton, Thomas, & Helmreich, 2000). In the 
literature it is stated that a good safety culture is associated with decreased error within 
pilots. Furthermore, the contribution of efficient communication, successful teamwork 
and decision making is highly appreciated in the reinforcement of safety culture in 
aviation (Pronovost et al., 2003). Especially among pilots, the values that are highly 
anticipated by their employers, are their ability in learning by errors, among other 
qualities and capabilities (Pronovost et al., 2003). For this ability i.e. learning by errors, 
a healthy reporting system is required to provide all pilots with all the near misses and 
incidences to inform and train them in avoiding a similar situation in the future. The 
highly procedural nature of the pilot’s activities exists in same, or even greater, extent 
in military aviation. The pilot of a military helicopter (or aircraft) must fly, navigate 
and operate the aircraft as means of transportation and a war vehicle. Therefore, the 
workload of a military pilot, especially in tactical missions (either in training or 
wartime operations), is a risk-multiplier factor that must be taken into consideration 
when developing and operating a SMS. 
Moreover, recent research has unveiled that pilots have more contact with different 
types of management within the aircraft operators (e.g. airlines). As a result, they have 
noted that there is no consistency on behalf of the different layers of management 
towards safety resulting in giving contradicting messages to pilots (Gibbons, von 
Thaden, & Wiegmann, 2006). Therefore, the management’s important role is obvious 
in maintaining the same amount of awareness among the pilots of an airline. The same 
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applies for pilots of military helicopters and aircraft, especially when the organisation 
operates a diverse fleet (such as the case of some of the EU military aviations). 
Conclusion 
As a result, it is obvious that just culture and reporting culture are influencing safety 
culture, and both are important when developing a military-specific SMS. Military 
aviation organisations, in all sectors/activities involved, should take cautious steps in 
maintaining and strengthening these elements (just-reporting culture) as they have 
been proven to be significant part of safety promotion and by extension they can 
influence the performance of an SMS. Military pilots, technical staff and other 
occupational groups (support staff working in logistics support, etc) have been proven 
to show inconsistences in their perception of safety in their organisation. Therefore, it 
is the military organisation management’s responsibility to make sure that safety is an 
equal priority for every different occupational aviation group by maintaining a 
consequent attitude towards them all. The Hellenic Army aviation and other similar 
organisations can benefit largely by examining the structure of SMS and how elements 
of that could be gradually implemented within the organisation. A civil-based 
approach, blended, as necessary, with the military culture is workable, as this is the 
case for many defence forces that have adopted the EMARs and other (relevant) 
airworthiness/aviation safety systems. However, establishing the applicability of civil 
norms to military aviation is currently work-in-progress, as part of an ongoing research 
project. It is noted that this communication paper offers the research and military 
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Abstract 
Purpose – The Airbus A320 family engine fan cowl doors safety issue is known to the 
industry for almost 18 years, however it has not been addressed adequately by the 
aircraft manufacturer and the various operators and regulating authorities. This brief 
case study paper examines in a systematic way the possible operational and safety 
implications of a new modification on the engine fan cowl doors. 
Design/methodology/approach – An array of error-prone scenarios are presented and 
analysed under the prism of human factors in a non-exhaustive qualitative scenario 
analysis.  
Findings – All examined scenarios are considered more or less probable. A number 
of accident prevention solutions are proposed for each of the scenario examined, in 
view of the acceptance and implementation of this modification by operators.  
Research limitations/implications – Since these scenarios are neither exhaustive, nor 
have been tested/validated in actual aircraft maintenance practice further analysis is 
necessary. A substantial follow up survey should take place, which should include a 
wider array of scenarios. This would allow obtaining the necessary data for a 
quantitative (statistical) analysis. 
Practical implications – This case study identifies issues in relation to this 
modification, introduced by Airbus and the European Aviation Safety Agency 
(EASA), which may prove problematic from the point of view of safety effectiveness 
and disruption of operations. 
Originality/value – This case study examines a long-standing aviation safety issue 
and the implications of a solution proposed by the aircraft manufacturer and adopted 
by EASA. This can be useful in increasing the awareness around these issues and 
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highlight the importance of a human-centric and scenario-based design of engineering 
modifications towards minimising error in aircraft technical operations. 
 
Keywords 
Human factors, aviation maintenance, safety, airworthiness, accident prevention 
 
Introduction 
Several Airbus A320 family engine fan cowl door (FCD) (Figure 1) losses have 
occurred in the past due to uninspected unlocked situations that have occurred in 
service (AAIB, 2015). This issue is known to the industry for almost 18 years, however 
it has not been addressed adequately by the aircraft manufacturer (Airbus) and the 
various operators and regulating authorities. Similar issues have been faced in the past 
with other aircraft types, such as the ATR-42 (AEAT, 2002). 
 
Figure. 1 A British Airways Airbus A319-100, where the (blue-painted) fan cowl 




A historical overview offers an interesting insight on the FCD safety issue, by looking 
at the preceding modifications (manufacturers’ SBs), issued EASA and Federal 
Aviation Authority (FAA) ADs and FAA proposed rulemaking documents (Notice for 
Proposed Rule Making, NPRM) (Figure 2). What stems from this brief examination is 
that following an activity in the early 2000’s, the issue was practically silenced (from 
the standpoint of redesign and safety regulation) for 12 years, despite the ongoing 
incidents. Airbus, as the aircraft design approval holder, has re-opened the 
investigation and mitigation of this safety issue in reaction to an accident investigation 
report released in 2015 by the United Kingdom (UK) Air Accidents Investigation 
Branch (AAIB). 
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Figure 2. A historical overview of the manufacturers’ and regulating authorities’ 
(EASA, FAA) actions on the Airbus A320 family engine FCD safety issue. Note: 
DGAC refers to the French aviation regulator (‘Direction Générale de l'Aviation 
Civile’). 
 
In particular, it was a double FCD loss from a British Airways Airbus A319 in 2013 
(Figure 3) that has led to the escalation of this issue, following the release of the 2015 
AIB accident investigation report (AAIB, 2015). Airbus, in an attempt to address the 
issue permanently, proceeded in redesigning the FCD locking arrangement and control 
philosophy (Airbus, 2015a; Airbus, 2015b), which were subsequently adopted by the 
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), in 2015 and 2016, as Airworthiness 
Directives (ADs) (EASA, 2016c; EASA, 2016d). Both EASA ADs are currently under 
consideration by FAA (FAA, 2016a; FAA, 2016b). 
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Figure 3. Remaining parts of the right-hand engine inboard FCD of the British 
Airways Airbus A319-131 G-EUOE following the 24 May 2013 accident 
(photograph reproduced from the AAIB Aircraft Accident Report 1/2015 (AAIB, 
2015)). 
 
The 2016 EASA ADs and the relevant Airbus Service Bulletins (SBs) describe the 
modification that the aircraft operators has to implement on all affected models of the 
Airbus A320 family (A318/319/320/321) fitted with the IAE V2500 and CFM56 
engines. The main features introduced by this modification are (EASA, 2016c; EASA, 
2016d):  
• A new FCD front latch which locks/unlocks with a use of a specific key (the 
two other latches remain unchanged) (Figure 4). This key cannot be removed 
once the latch is unlocked. 
• A new locking/unlocking key for the FCD front latch with a (‘remove before 
flight’) flag fitted on it (Figure 4). The flag increases the visibility-detectability 
of an unlatched condition, since the key-flag assembly is attached to the latch 
as long as it remains in the open position.   
• A key keeper assembly at a designated storage area in the cockpit, where the 
key and the (‘remove before flight’) flag assembly are kept when once the FCD 
is closed. 
• Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) adaptation, to include provisions for a 
logbook entry requirement when opening/closing the FCDs is performed, as a 
way to assist communication and raise awareness over the matter. 
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Figure. 4 Modified A320 family engine FCD with new latch and key - ‘remove 
before flight’ flag assembly. 
However, as part of the EASA ADs’ consultation process (conducted prior to their 
issue), a number of major operators (United Airlines, American Airlines, All Nippon 
Airways, Air Canada) have expressed reservations on the effectiveness of the Airbus 
redesign, on the basis of human factors issues, potential financial impact on operations 
and implementation cost (EASA, 2016a; EASA, 2016b). For example, United 
Airlines, in their comments to EASA (EASA, 2016a) argued that the implementation 
of another visual cue does not guarantee that the people involved will not miss it, 
unless they are careful and attentive. In the same response, United Airlines highlighted 
that dual sign-off for the FCD closure and other steps they have introduced in their 
operational procedures (towards increasing the awareness of the technical staff) have 
proved to be successful in addressing human factor related issues. In particular, United 
Airlines has not had any incidents occurring since the introduction of these, human 
factor focused, measures in 2006. Similarly, Air Canada supported the suitability and 
effectiveness of the dual sign procedure, expressing a strong negative view on the 
usefulness of the modification (EASA, 2016b). As Air Canada highlighted in their 
comments, a uniform solution approach is not likely to be effective, since each 
organisation should work towards changing the technical staff culture to address the 
safety issues around FCDs (EASA, 2016b). As also recorded in the (EASA, 2016a; 
EASA, 2016b), one may note that, in response to these comments, EASA did not make 
any changes in the final ADs, while they suggested that operators may apply for an 
Alternative Means of Compliance (AMC) to the AD, by providing data supporting 
their requests (for exemption from the AD). 
The EASA’s reasoning behind the adoption of the Airbus FCD SB is not described in 
the ADs. Moreover, the design principles employed by Airbus, in the development of 
the SB, is not known (as the SB is not publicly available). The adopted solution is 
considered peculiar for aviation maintenance, from the point of view of human factors, 
since it is not usual practice to restrict access to aircraft compartments via specific 
keys, rather than standard or special tools. Extensive review has failed to identify 
similar solutions utilised in civil aviation.  
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This brief paper intends to examine and discuss in a systematic way the possible 
operational and safety implications that the FCD modification can have in aircraft 
maintenance practice.  
Qualitative scenario analysis, results and discussion 
Taking into account the aircraft modifications and the changes in the maintenance 
processes which occur from the EASA ADs, we have examined and identified steps in 
the new procedures that may prove problematic from the point of view of safety 
effectiveness (increase errors or lead to deviations from safe practice) and disruption 
of operations (create delays/obstructions in aircraft dispatch/maintenance). In 
particular, an array of error-prone scenarios are presented and analysed under the prism 
of the human element.  
The scenarios were developed conceptually by utilising the authors’ 10+ years’ 
experience in aircraft maintenance practice (as certifying staff), design/certification of 
modifications and accident/incident investigation. The realism of the scenarios (steps, 
sequence, etc.) was also validated by consulting aircraft maintainers having prior 
experience on the A320 family aircraft. Thus, both the development and validation of 
the scenarios did not require any physical work on aircraft (or any interaction with an 
aircraft maintenance organisation). 
Moreover, accident prevention solutions are proposed for each of the scenario 
examined. It is noted that within the EASA framework these recommendations are part 
of the existing Maintenance Resource Management (MRM) training and the EASA 
Part-66 and Part-145 human factors training requirements (EU, 2014). Errors related 
to handovers generally have more severe and dangerous consequences, as 
approximately half of the aircraft maintenance failures due to ineffective 
communication are related to the shift handover (Parke and Kanki, 2008). Debriefs 
which are based upon human factors considerations have the potential to enhance 
productivity by 20%–25% (Tannenbaum and Cerasoli, 2013). Effective teamwork is 
known to be essential in safer aviation maintenance practice (Leonard et al, 2004; 
Robertson, 2005; Sexton et al, 2000), mainly due to the nature of the profession 
(organisational structure of work, rather than individuals working in isolation). Time 
pressure, such as that experienced in the flight line environment, is a primer for errors 
(Goglia et al, 2002; Reason 2000) and, in this case, it is considered important to 
examine. Overall, teamwork, dual sign-offs, effective time management and request 
for assistance from colleagues and supervisors (whenever required) constitutes good 
practice in aviation MRM. 
According to the FAA, MRM can also act as a training programme, as it aims to alter 
the technicians’ attitude and perspectives in order to establish safety as their primary 
goal (Robertson 2005). As regularly reported in the literature, training in aviation is 
important and it acts beneficiary, while its design, delivery and implementation needs 
to be tailored to the needs of the organisation (Lappas and Kourousis, 2016; Salas et 
al, 2012; Taylor and Thomas, 2003). Consequently, aircraft maintenance managers 
should consider the training process as a proactive safety measure and actively support 
MRM training. It is of note that employees working within the highly regulated 
aviation industry, are inclined to practice more safely than in a more productive fashion 
(Karanikas et al, 2017). This is a strong indicator of how the ‘safety over productivity’ 
equilibrium can be positively influenced (towards safety) by regulation. 
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It is interesting to look at the definition of (Wiegmann,et al, 2004) on safety culture 
“as the shared values, beliefs, assumptions, and norms that may govern organisational 
decision making, as well as individual and group attitudes about safety”. Focusing on 
the norms of an organisation, these set the framework within the employees are 
expected to think and operate (Wreathall, 1995). Therefore, if the norms contradict the 
organisation’s safety policy, they should be revised or abolished. Any organisation, in 
order to action changes in culture, they have to establish effective safety 
communication between the various organisational and managerial levels. In aircraft 
maintenance training, this can include the establishment of a thorough safety training 
programme (Geldart et al, 2010; Hall et al, 2016). 
The scenarios are not intended to be exhaustive, in terms presenting the full spectrum 
of combinations of actions. However, they represent a number of cases which are 
deemed likely to occur in service and that can have a considerable impact on safety 
and operations. All scenarios start from the case of a maintenance task requiring access 
to the area enclosed by the FCD (in the cases examined ‘engine failure 
troubleshooting’), which is secured by the specific key (introduced with the Airbus 
modification/EASA ADs).  
FCD key in designated area 
The technician retrieves the FCD key from the designated storage area in the cockpit 
and inserts a logbook entry for the opening/closing of the FCD. 
Scenario 1 The technician leaves the maintenance task (in the area enclosed by the 
FCD) for the end of the failure troubleshooting. He/she performs the maintenance task 
at the end of his/her shift. However, he/she does not dedicate adequate time for the 
maintenance task, as he/she inadvertently prioritised the FCD task [return of the key, 
closure of the logbook entry (‘FCD closed’)], in an effort to avoid the FCD is not left 
open. This poor practice may result in reduced maintenance quality, under stressful or 
very time constrained situations, since FCD-related tasks are added to the existing 
workload. Prevention measures may include: putting more focus on time management 
techniques and requesting assistance from peer-workers/team leader in stressful/time-
pressing situations. 
Scenario 2 The technician performs the maintenance task straight away but leaves the 
key return and logbook entry closure for later. Since these steps were left for a later 
time, the technician either forgets completely to return the key/close the logbook entry 
or gets distracted near that time, having the same result. As a consequence, the aircraft 
release to service can be delayed, since the involved personnel (flight crew, technical 
staff) will have to locate the missing key and complete the FCD sign-off in the 
logbook. 
A dual sign off practice would offer the opportunity for a confirmation check and 
reduce the possibility of misses and errors. 
Scenario 3 The technician does not perform the maintenance task and has to pass it 
over to the next shift. Since these steps were left for the next shift, he/she either forgets 
to return the key/close the logbook entry or gets distracted to do that. In case that the 
shift handover is not performed properly, the FCD tasks are not completed. As a 
consequence, similarly to Scenario 2, the aircraft release to service can be delayed, 
since the missing key has to be located and the logbook signed off. 
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As with Scenario 2, the dual sign off practice can mitigate this issue. Moreover, a 
thorough (verbal and written) shift handover would be helpful in avoiding 
communication gaps in relation to the FCD tasks (reducing the possibility for misses 
and errors).  
Key missing from designated area 
The technician does not find the FCD key in the designated storage area in the cockpit. 
Scenario 4 The technician attempts to find the FCD key. He/she prioritises this task 
over the maintenance task itself. In the case that he/she finds the key, the amount of 
time spent on the search does not allow him/her to focus on the maintenance task, thus 
this is not performed adequately. 
Similarly, to Scenario 1, it would be beneficial if better time management techniques 
were practiced, as well as if the technician requested assistance. 
Scenario 5 The technician attempts to find the FCD key, prioritising the search over 
the maintenance task (same as in Scenario 4). He/she does not manage to find the key, 
leaving the maintenance task unaccomplished. In the case that the technician is 
forgetful or distracted, he/she will not report the missing key, causing more delay, as 
other personnel in later time will repeat the search process. 
Similarly to other scenarios, the dual sign off in conjunction with a robust handover 
process could mitigate this miss. 
Scenario 6 The technician attempts to find the FCD key, prioritising the search over 
the maintenance task (same as in Scenario 4 and 5). He/she does not manage to find 
the key, therefore deciding to use his/her own key or the spare key as per the 
organisation’s ‘norm’, and fills in the logbook entry (‘open FCD’). After completing 
the maintenance task the technician is forgetful/omits or gets distracted and does not 
report the missing key. As with Scenario 5, this may cause a delay in the future. 
Moreover, using his/her own key means that this may not have the ‘remove before 
flight’ flag attached, increasing the probability of leaving the cowl door open (since 
this modified visual cue will be missing). 
Similarly to previous scenarios, the dual sign off in conjunction with a robust handover 
process could mitigate this miss. In addition, a change in the organisational culture 
would be necessary to abolish unsafe practices in relation to established ‘norms’ 
outside the standard policies and procedures. 
Scenario 7 The technician does not have the required time or attitude to attempt to 
find the missing key, thus he/she decides not to perform the assigned maintenance task 
and, for example, to move onto a different task. He/she forgets about the missing FCD 
key or gets distracted and does not report that. This shall cause delay in the work of 
the personnel who are then assigned to the maintenance task in the FCD-accessed area 
(as they will have to search for the missing key). 
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Graphical Representation of the Scenarios 
The sequence of the events and causes described in each of the Scenarios (1 to 7) is 
graphically represented in Figure 5, where all interconnections are shown. The graph 
illustrates characteristically the complexity of the various problematic situations that 
may arise out of the subject matter FCD safety modification. 
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Since all scenarios are realistic they are considered more or less probable. Typically, 
these may be encountered by technicians working both in the line and base level 
aircraft maintenance environment. However, since these scenarios are neither 
exhaustive, nor have been tested/validated in actual aircraft maintenance practice 
further analysis is necessary. For that purpose, a substantial survey, which should 
include a wider array of scenarios, would be necessary to obtain the necessary data for 
a quantitative (statistical) analysis.  
Conclusion 
The A320 family FCD safety issue cannot be considered as a trivial issue, since it has 
been concerning the aviation industry over the past 18 years. It is anticipated that the 
Airbus modification - EASA ADs shall be able to contribute positively to the error 
management regarding FCD losses. However, it is important to consider the associated 
human attitude elements brought in with this modification, as illustrated by this 
qualitative scenario analysis. To this end, a list of human factors centred procedures 
and actions are recommended. These stem from the various scenarios, described and 
discussed in the previous section, and consist of all possible attitudes and responses of 
the technicians towards the new modifications. In summary, the recommended actions 
are: provision of better time management training, enhancement of communication 
skills, focused training, encouraging a collaborative attitude, implementation of a dual 
sign off procedure for the opening/closing of the FCDs, thorough verbal/written shift 
handover and facilitation of changes in the airline/maintenance organisation culture 
(where necessary). These measures are able to achieve efficiencies in procedures 
associated with troubleshooting in the area enclosed by the key-accessed FCD, reduce 
the likelihood of errors, and, most importantly, identify and suppress any safety-
infringing ‘norms’ within operators and maintenance organisations. 
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Abstract: In this research paper a new conceptual model is introduced, the Diagnosis of 
Communication and Trust in Aviation Maintenance (DiCTAM) model. The purpose of this 
model is to recognise, measure and predict the relationship between communication and 
trust in the aviation maintenance field. This model was formed by combining a conceptual 
cyclical process and two established survey tools adapted and incorporated in a single 
question set. The implementation of each phase of the DiCTAM model is performed with the 
use of qualitative and quantitative research methods. This includes the use of content 
analyses of accident/incident investigation reports and training material, a survey, and a 
hypothetical case study. The predictive functionality of the DiCTAM model has been 
investigated through the hypothetical case study. The obtained results indicate a positive 
relationship between communication and trust according to the aviation maintenance 
employees’ perception and accidents/incidents reports, even though basic training includes 
communication without direct mention to trust.  




Communication can be defined as the transmission of information from one person to 
another while trust is the openness to another party, based on the concept of its reliability and 
competence [1]. Trust is associated with and can contribute to successful communication [2,3]. 
Thus, a minimum level of trust should be present along with effective communication 
between two or more counterparts. Past research has shown that effective communication 
techniques are part of the employees’ initial and recurrent training and are linked to their on-
job safety-related practices [4]. Furthermore, organisational commitment and employees’ level 
of organisational satisfaction is associated with employees’ safety-related practices [5-9].  
Both communication and trust are fundamental concepts that can influence safe practice 
in aviation maintenance, especially in the regions exhibiting fast growth [10]. It is well 
recognised that poor communication is a paramount human factor contributing to errors 
[11,12]. More specifically, researchers have identified the gap in effective communication 
between maintenance staff, cabin crew and flight crew, proposing some ways to mitigate this 
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issue [13-16]. Some researchers have acknowledged the need for error-free communication 
within aviation [14,16], while others have identified poor communication to be an accident 
causal factor [17-19]. Tools have been developed to proactively detect maintenance failures, 
such as the Maintenance Operations Safety Survey (MOSS), in which communication and trust 
are major factors [20]. The relationship between trust and communication, including initial 
trust levels, among technical staff, have not been adequately investigated and further research 
could play an important role in aviation maintenance and the advancement of aviation safety 
[21]. 
The recognition and measurement of perceptions around communication and trust has 
been studied extensively in various industries. Various survey-based research tools has been 
used for that purpose, including the Communication Satisfaction Questionnaire (CSQ) and 
the Trust Constructs and Measures Questionnaire (TCMQ). These are briefly discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
The CSQ is a tool that was incepted in 1977 [22] and widely used since then in research 
projects dealing with communication satisfaction in various industries [22-34]. The CSQ has 
been an efficient tool to extract employees’ perceptions of the communication within their 
organisation [33,35,36]. This is a 40-questions questionnaire, with items categorized in eight 
communicative themes (dimensions). These dimensions vary from interpersonal 
communication (e.g. an employee’s evaluation of the communication with his/her supervisor), 
to the organization-wide communication climate [32]. This construct has been found to have 
a test-retest reliability of 0.94 [22]. It has been characterised as “arguably the best measure of 
communication satisfaction in the organizational arena” [27, p. 6] while Rubin et al. [34, p. 
116] agree that “The thoroughness of the construction of this satisfaction measure is apparent. 
The strategies employed in this study are exemplary”.  
The TCMQ has been developed by Li, Rong, & Thatcher, [37] and it is in practice a 
synthesis of various questionnaires developed and used in past research studies [38-44]. The 
studies performed with the constituent questionnaires have yielded valid and reliable 
research data and findings, which informed their adoption and adaption from Li et al. [37]. 
Moreover, the measurement model (reliability scores, construct validity, convergent and 
discriminant validity) was found to produce statistically significant results [37]. The 
measurement model results verified that the measurement scales adapted by Li et al., [37] 
were valid and reliable in their study. Specifically, web capability and reliability were found 
to be powerfully belief constituent in assessing trust in website. This outcome confirmed that 
the Information Technology-specific scales, which were adopted by Li et al., [37] were valid 
in technology trust measurement [37].  
This paper introduces a conceptual model, built upon the CSQ and TCMQ tools, which 
aims to explore and understand the relationship between trust and communication in aviation 
maintenance. In particular, the objectives of the proposed model are summarised as following: 
1. Detect the existence of communication and trust in aviation maintenance practice; 
2. Recognise if communication and trust are covered in the aviation maintenance basic 
training curriculum; 
3. Detect and measure the perception of aviation maintenance employees on 
communication and trust within their working environment; 
4. Predict deviations in maintenance practice that can be attributed to communication 
and trust preconditions. 
2. Model Formulation 
2.1. Model Foundation: Cyclical Process 
The foundation of the proposed conceptual model is a four-phase cyclical process used 
for the diagnosis of communication and trust issues in various facets of aviation maintenance. 
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Each phase has been chosen to align with the objectives of the model, as outlined in the 
Introduction section of this paper. The cyclic process transforms the individual objectives of 
the model to a structured-interconnected process, following a systems approach. Each phase’s 
tasks are provided below, with the cyclical process illustrated schematically in Fig. 1: 
1. Phase 1: The two traits, communication and trust, are examined whether they exist or 
not in  aviation maintenance; 
2. Phase 2: Aviation maintenance training material is examined to recognise if the 
aviation maintenance employees are trained for communication and trust, and 
consequently if they have developed awareness and relevant good practices in their 
work; 
3. Phase 3: The aviation maintenance sector is investigated for the detection and 
measurement of the relation between the communication and trust; 
4. Phase 4: Having completed phase 1, 2 and 3, with all information and data available, 
one can predict any communication and trust precondition (positive associations), as 
a possible cause of error in any already established or new maintenance 
procedure/process/task in the workplace.  
 
 
Figure 1. The foundation cyclic process of the proposed conceptual model used. 
 
2.2. Model Tool: Communication and Trust Question Set  
In order to accompish the tasks involved in each of the four phases, and by extention the 
objectives of the model, it is necessary to introduce a new tool. For this reason, a dual-use 
question set is introduced, consisting primarily of the :  
• Communication Satisfaction Questionnaire (CSQ) [22]; 
• Trust Constructs and Measures Questionnaire (TCMQ) [37]. 
Both the original CSQ and TCMQ [27, 38] have been adapted to research communication and 
trust in an aviation maintenance context. Details on the adaptation of the CSQ and TCMQ are 
provided in a separate paper currently under review [69]. These two questionnaires are 
complemented with demographics and general questions’ sections. The complete set is 
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denoted as the Communication and Trust Question Set (CTQS) (Appendix A) and it is 
comprised of the following sections: 
• Section A: ‘Demographic information of the participants ‘; 
• Section B: ‘General Questions’; 
• Sections C, D and E: ‘Communication Satisfaction Questionnaire’ (section E is limited 
to managers); 
• Sections F and G: ‘Trust Constructs and Measures Questionnaire’ (section G is limited 
to managers). 
The CTQS is common across all phases of the conceptual process (Fig. 1) and it is used 
both as a qualitative tool (having a recognition function) and a quantitative tool (having a 
diagnosis function). In both cases, the CTQS questions serve either as survey questions for 
human participants or desk research on primary/secondary data (i.e. when employing content 
analysis/case study methodologies). For example, as a quantitative tool, the CTQS diagnosis 
function can be used to explore the perceptions of aviation maintenance professionals about 
their work (phase 3 shown in Figure 1). As a qualitative tool, its recognition function can be 
used to conduct content analysis of accident and incident investigation reports, audit reports, 
etc (phase 1 and 2 shown in Fig. 1). Depending on the nature and amount of the body of 
material available, a quantitative analysis of these data through this function is possible. The 
same approach can be followed for actual or hypothetical scenarios for prediction purposes 
(phase 4 shown in Figure 1).  
The overall construct and functionalities of the CTQS are illustrated in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. Multifunctional uses of the CTQS. 
2.3. Complete Model: Diagnosis of Communication and Trust in Aviation Maintenance (DiCTAM) 
The merging of the foundation cyclical process with the CTQS (described in sections 2.1 and 
2.2 correspondingly) constitutes the complete model, denoted as the Diagnosis of 
Communication and Trust in Aviation Maintenance (DiCTAM) model. This is represented 
schematically in Fig. 3, where the different functionalities for each phase are also shown. The 
implementation of the model and the results obtained is presented in the next section of this 
paper. 
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Figure 3. The complete Diagnosis of Communication and Trust in Aviation 
Maintenance (DiCTAM) model. 
3. Results and Discussion 
The implementation of the DiCTAM model is performed via a selection of different 
types of data and cases, in order to present its features, operation and the results that can be 
obtained when used for communication and trust analyses within an aviation maintenance 
context. Each section corresponds to the phases of the model, discussing in detail in the 
findings. 
3.1. Phase 1 
The content analysis technique was used in phase 1 of DiCTAM, chosen for its capability 
for a thorough investigation of the existence of both communication and trust in real 
occurrences within aviation maintenance. A selection of accident and incident investigation 
reports was performed by applying criteria in relation to the language, origin and recency of 
the report. When applying these criteria, accident and incident investigation 
authorities/bodies from Indonesia, Ireland, Australia, Netherlands, UK, USA, India Japan, 
Portugal and Hong Kong were shortlisted. Initial filtering of the databases of these 
authorities/bodies was performed with the term ‘maintenance’, producing an extensive list of 
(100+) accidents/incidents. Thus, further shortlisting was necessary, in this case performed by 
searching in the internet for incidents/accidents considered as ‘high profile’ (based on their 
order of appearance in the google search engine results) and for reports containing substantial 
information (in terms of volume and detail) on the maintenance related causal factors. This 
shortlisting exercise identified the fifteen representative (for the purposes of this study) 
accidents/incidents selected for the content analysis. It is noted that further investigation 
(involving a higher volume of reports) would not add more to the scope of this analysis, as 
the reports selected were able to reveal the existence of these two traits (communication and 
trust), reaching their saturation point [45].  
Each report was manually scanned for the keywords: ‘communication’ and ‘trust’ by the 
author as a Subject Matter Expert (SME) (approved EASA Part 147 maintenance training 
instructor in Human Factors). In the case that a keyword was found in the report this was 
mentioned accordingly. From the previous keywords, the only found was ‘communication’ 
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(‘trust’ was not found in any report). In this case, the items of the CTQS were used to identify 
any underlying communication or trust factor. The CSQ items were used to identify 
underlying communication issues while the TCMQ items to locate trust issues. The 
preconditions for errors identified were mapped against the questionnaire items, with a 
detailed justification provided.  
 
The summarised results from the analysis of all (fifteen) accident and incident 
investigation reports are presented in Appendix B. This table offers a quick view of the items 
of the CTQS identified in these reports. Considering all data obtained from the content 
analysis (as summarised in Appendix B), it is indicated that both trust and communication are 
detectable in the aviation maintenance sector. In particular, trust and communication, as they 
are reported in the accident and incident investigation reports, are identified as distinct 
preconditions in the vast majority (78%) of the distinct maintenance errors. In six of the 
examined distinct maintenance errors (accounting to 14% of the total 42) trust only can be 
identified as a precondition to maintenance error, while communication is identified in just 
four distinct maintenance errors (corresponding to 8% of the errors analysed) (Table 1).  
Table 1. Absolute number and percentage (%) of maintenance errors where trust, 
communication and combination of both identified as preconditions within the 






Number of Distinct Maintenance Errors that were 







6 4 31 
14% 8% 78% 
 
Only 22% (out of the total forty-two errors analysed) included solely one (communication 
or trust) as an error precondition and not both. It is, however, noted that these numerical 
results are not conclusive, as the investigation reports reflect the accident/incident 
investigators’ exposition of evidence. This means that the investigators were not necessarily 
looking for ‘communication’ or ‘trust’ evidence; therefore, both factors may have not been 
exhaustively investigated (and subsequently reported). 
More specifically about trust, the two types that were investigated in this research were 
about interpersonal trust and trust towards the company’s software used for aviation 
maintenance purposes. The TCMQ, which includes all trust items, is devided in smaller 
groups of items, constructs. Each group indicates specific attributes of trust. Therefore, the 
specific characteristics identified here were trust towards colleagues’ competence, integrity 
and benevolence and trust towards the company software’s capability. Regarding the 
communication satisfaction, there is a similar grouping of items, depending on the theme of 
each item. Therefore, the groups of items, in relation to satisfaction, are: with the 
organisation’s communication climate, with their superiors, with the organisation’s 
integration, with the media quality, with the general organisational perspective and with the 
horizontal informal communication. These are the wider groups of the CSQ items, that were 
initially introduced by Downs and Hazen [22] and can describe categorically the specific 
issues with communication satisfaction identified in the analysed reports. Nonetheless, the 
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aim of the content analysis here is to identify qualitatively the co-existence of these two factors 
as maintenance error preconditions. 
 
3.2. Phase 2 
For the implementation of phase 2 of the DiCTAM, the data were obtained directly from 
official/approved aviation maintenance training sources. It is noted that the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) does not include a distinct module of human factors training in its 
curriculum (as presented in Appendix B to Part 147—General Curriculum Subjects). Therefore 
it is the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), Directorate General of Civil 
Aviation, Government of India (DGCA) and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority of Australia 
(CASA) from which approved training material can be obtained for review. All three 
regulatory authorities practically share the same curriculum for their maintenance human 
factors training; thus, the analysis is performed on the EASA Part-66 Category A and B 
Module 9 ‘Human Factors’ curriculum (Table 2).  
Aircraft maintenance training under the EASA framework is highly regulated with 
provisions of consistency and high quality in the delivered course material by all approved 
maintenance training organisations (commonly referred as EASA Part-147 organisations, 
reflecting the applicable regulatory set). Two coursebooks were selected for the content 
analysis, as very few published and publicly available EASA Part-66 Module 9 ‘Human 
Factors’ course material exists. These coursebooks were:  
• Coursebook 1: ‘Module 9-Human Factors’ (by C. Strike), published in 2018 by Cardiff 
and Vale College in the UK [61]; 
• Coursebook 2: ‘Human factors for A level Certification, module 9’ by N. Gold, 
published in 2015 by Aircraft Technical Book Company in the USA [62]. 
Table 2. Curriculum of the EASA [62] Part-66 Category A and B Module 9 ‘Human Factors’. 
Chapter Title Content 
9.1 General 
The need to take human factors into account; Incidents attributable 





Vision; Hearing; Information processing; Attention and perception; 
Memory; Claustrophobia and physical access. 
9.3 
Social Psychology  
 
Responsibility: individual and group; Motivation and de-
motivation; Peer pressure; ‘Culture’ issues; Team working; 




Fitness/health; Stress: domestic and work related; Time pressure 
and deadlines; Workload: overload and underload; Sleep and 





Noise and fumes; Illumination; Climate and temperature; Motion 
and vibration; Working environment. 
9.6 Tasks 
Physical work; Repetitive tasks; Visual inspection; Complex 
systems. 
9.7 Communication 
Within and between teams; Work logging and recording; Keeping 
up to date, currency; Dissemination of information. 
9.8 Human Error 
Error models and theories; Types of error in maintenance tasks; 
Implications of errors (i.e. accidents); Avoiding and managing 
errors. 
9.9 
Hazards in the 
Workplace 
Recognising and avoiding hazards; Dealing with emergencies. 
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The first examination of these coursebooks determined that both followed the EASA 
curriculum, as expected. Furthermore, the content of both books was found to cover the 
curriculum in a similar way, having a comparable structure and content. Therefore, these two 
coursebooks were the adequate required body of material for using the content analysis 
technique in phase 2 of DiCTAM. 
The EASA curriculum and the two coursebooks were examined manually by the author 
as a SME, to locate the words ‘communication’ and ‘trust’. The EASA Part-66 Module 9 
‘Human Factors’ curriculum covers only the chapters and subchapters of the material 
approved to be taught. In the curriculum, the word ‘trust’ is not used while the word 
‘communication’ is solely used in chapter seven (Communication) one time in the title of the 
chapter. The next step was to scan the two EASA Part-66 Module 9 coursebooks for the same 
words. The results were as follows: 
• In Coursebook 1 [61], the word count in Chapter Seven-Communication, for the word 
‘communication’ is 52, while for the word ‘trust’ is 0. It is noted that in the whole 
Chapter Seven-Communication, there is no reference to trust, even though 
communication is analysed and different communication techniques are presented 
there. 
• In Coursebook 2 [62], the word count in Sub-module 07, Communication, for the word 
‘communication’ is 63 while for the word ‘trust’ is 1. Trust towards a message sender 
is referred one time, in the communication chapter, as a precondition in the effective 
receipt of a message. 
The summary of findings in the curriculum and the coursebooks are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3. Word count of ‘communication’ and ‘trust’ in the EASA Part-66 Module 9 
curriculum and the two coursebooks. 
EASA Part 66 Module 9 ‘Human 




Curriculum 1 0 
Coursebook 1 52 0 
Coursebook 2 63 1 
 
The second stage of this examination continued into the in-depth analysis to identify any 
concealed elements of communication and trust into the twelve elements of the Dirty Dozen 
tool. A better understanding of human factors has become imperative within aviation, and 
several models and systems have been introduced and implemented in the continuous 
attempt to predict and reduce human error. In aviation maintenance, there are twelve factors 
identified as the principal preconditions or conditions, that contribute to human error, widely 
known as the Dupont’s Dirty Dozen [17,18,64-67]. These elements are dissimilar in nature and 
appear either on personal, group or organizational performance levels [68]. Communication 
is among these 12 most frequent causes of human error. These twelve factors are: 
13. Lack of communication; 
14. Complacency; 
15. Lack of knowledge; 
16. Distractions;  
17. Lack of teamwork; 
18. Fatigue; 
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19. Lack of resources; 
20. Pressure; 
21. Lack of assertiveness; 
22. Stress; 
23. Lack of awareness; 
24. Norms.  
The Dirty Dozen is one of the most used human factors typologies in aviation 
maintenance, as it is still used in training and accident and human error analysis in aviation 
worldwide [18,64-66,69]. These 12 factors are of different nature and quantifiability; 
nevertheless, each one of them represents a causal failure in the user’s judgement, and as such, 
they are treated either individually or in homogeneous groups [66]. In particular, the results 
of this analysis were obtained by the mapping of the twelve elements of the Dirty Dozen with 
the use of the CTQS. All Dirty Dozen elements refer to the total population of the aviation 
maintenance professionals; therefore, all levels of management are included (sections E and 
G of the CTQS which are only for supervisors/managers). Ten factors appear to have either 
the communication or trust elements concealed into their meaning. Two of them, the lack of 
communication and lack of teamwork, appear to have both communication and trust 
concealed. For illustrative purposes, the overall mapping of the CTQS items against the Dirty 
Dozen elements are provided in appendix C. 
 
The third stage included the manual tabulation of the elements of the Dirty Dozen against 
the EASA Part-66 Module 9 ‘Human Factors’ course material. This tabulation (using the 
mapping of the CTQS items against the Dirty Dozen elements) revealed the concealed 
elements of communication and trust in Coursebook 1 and 2. The summary of the findings is 
presented in Table 4. From this analysis, it stems that both coursebooks include all factors of 
the Dirty Dozen and consequently include indirectly and concealed both communication and 
trust elements in their content.  
 
Table 4. Dirty Dozen elements found in the examined EASA Part-66 Module 9 ‘Human 
Factors’ coursebooks in relation to communication and trust elements. 
Coursebook 
Dirty Dozen Element 
included in the Coursebook 
Preconditions identified based on 




1. Lack of Communication X X 
2. Complacency X  
3. Lack of knowledge  X 
4. Distraction  X 
5. Lack of teamwork X X 
6. Fatigue X  
7. Lack of resources X  
8. Pressure X  
9. Lack of assertiveness X  
10. Stress X  
11. Lack of awareness X  
12. Norms  X 
1. Lack of Communication X X 
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Coursebook 2 
(Gold, 2015) 
2. Complacency X  
3. Lack of knowledge  X 
4. Distraction  X 
5. Lack of teamwork X X 
6. Fatigue X  
7. Lack of resources X  
8. Pressure X  
9. Lack of assertiveness X  
10. Stress X  
11. Lack of awareness X  
12. Norms  X 
 
Considering all data from the content analysis (presented in Table 3) it stems that trust is 
not considered to be covered sufficiently in the aviation maintenance human factors basic 
training. In particular, the EASA curriculum has no mention of trust, neither as a separate 
chapter nor in any other chapters (and most importantly in the communication chapter). In 
the two examined coursebooks’ chapters covering communication, there was only one 
mention to trust. Therefore, there is neither direct mention nor further explanation/discussion 
on trust. However, with the assistance of the mapping of the Dirty Dozen factors with the 
items of CTQS, concealed communication and trust elements were identified into the material 
of the two coursebooks. The direct absence of the trust factor in the training material may be 
partially covered by these concealed elements, although this has limited pedagogic value and 
effectiveness. 
3.3. Phase 3 
In phase 3 of the DiCTAM model the association among three factors was explored: 
communication satisfaction, interpersonal trust and trust towards maintenance software used 
by aviation maintenance companies. To serve this purpose, the CTQS was distributed to 
diverse set of aviation maintenance professionals working in civil and military organisations. 
The participants were sent an invitation to participate online (on the web-based tool 
Limesurvey) through emails. Over the two phases for the recruitment of participants, 501 
aviation maintenance professionals were contacted and 259 answered fully to the 
questionnaire. A quantitative analysis was performed on the data collected, to identify 
possible interrelations between the three factors examined. For this analysis, a correlational 
research design was used to prevent any suggestion in any causal relationship among them. 
For the purposed of this research design, the specific statistical methods used were: 
Cronbach’s alpha, descriptive statistics, correlations between variables, t-tests and analyses of 
variance (ANOVA), Harman’s one factor with the help of SPSS Statistics 25.0.0. Further details 
are provided in a separate paper currently under review [70] 
The survey results indicated, for managers and subordinates as well as for all employees, 
that a substantial proportion of their communication satisfaction was explained by their levels 
of interpersonal trust, giving statistically significant results. Differences in the communication 
satisfaction and software trust between military and civil aviation maintenance company 
employees were also observed. The results of civil aviation employees exhibit higher mean 
scores than that of military for all three factors. Overall, communication satisfaction was found 
to have a stronger association with interpersonal trust than with software trust. The mean 
scores of communication satisfaction and interpersonal trust increased across various levels 
of experience, with the differences between less and more experienced employees being 
statistically significant. An interesting finding of this research is that aviation maintenance 
professionals have relatively high levels of trust and communication satisfaction at the start 
of their current employment. This finding is also consistent with the initial trust levels theory, 
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examined in the past for other industries.  The descriptive statistics indicated that the 
participants of this survey came from many different geographical areas in small numbers. 
This can limit the results of this survey to be generalised to the global aviation maintenance 
professionals’ population [70]. 
3.4. Phase 4 
Following the confirmation of the positive association among those three aspects of the 
two traits (communication satisfaction, interpersonal trust and software trust), in phase 4 of 
the DiCTAM model prediction is attempted. Prediction can form different hypothetical 
occurrences (possible events and scenarios) by using the survey's results as a guide and can, 
therefore, contribute to the process of the examination of the two traits. More specifically, 
phase 4 includes hypothetical scenarios about possible aviation maintenance deviations that 
can take place in real life with the use of the case study method. For this purpose, the case 
study presented next is selected to present the operation of the DiCTAM model, as well as 
exemplifying its use. A well-known case has been selected, that of the engine fan cowl door 
losses experienced in the Airbus A320 family fleet in worldwide level [71]. The method of the 
case study is considered to be suitable method to examine hypothetical scenarios. A suitable 
application for the prediction exercise is deemed the use of the Fan Cowl Doors (FCDs) 
maintenance occurrences (after the implementation of the new procedures, provisioned by the 
latest EASA Airworthiness Directives (ADs)) [71]. The case study methodology assists in the 
holistic examination of these hypothetical occurrences to unveil concealed elements and 
identify or even predict future trends or patterns [72].  
At this stage the aim is to examine these hypothetical scenarios for the identification of 
communication and trust elements and then, based on these findings, to predict the possibility 
of occurrence of each scenario. Seven scenarios, as they were introduced and discussed by 
Kourousis et al. [71], are examined below for the identification of trust and communication 
elements. Each scenario is scrutinised against the items of the CTQS by the author as SME, for 
the identification of question set's items within the scenario. The seven scenarios are divided 
in two broader groups, those which are occurring from two different situations: 
• The technician retrieves the FCD key from the designated storage area in the cockpit 
and inserts a logbook entry for the opening/closing of the FCD (Scenarios 1, 2 and 3), 
presented in subsection 3.4.1; 
• The technician does not find the FCD key in the designated storage area in the cockpit 
(Scenarios 4, 5, 6 and 7), presented subsection 3.4.2. 
 
3.4.1 FCD Key in Designated Area 
Scenario 1 
‘The technician leaves the maintenance task (in the area enclosed by the FCD) for the end of the failure 
troubleshooting. He/she performs the maintenance task at the end of his/her shift. However, he/she 
does not dedicate adequate time for the maintenance task, as he/she inadvertently prioritised the 
FCD task [return of the key, closure of the logbook entry (‘FCD closed’)], in an effort to avoid the FCD 
is not left open. This poor practice may result in reduced maintenance quality, under stressful or very 
time constrained situations, since FCD-related tasks are added to the existing workload.’ 
Trust factor 
identified 
Maintenance personnel failed to dedicate the time required for this task, risking the 
quality of this work. This indicates that the maintenance personnel deviated from an 
expected good practice in their duties. Specifically, by using the CTQS, the following 
three items are identified in this failure: F2 ‘My colleagues perform their duties very 
well’, F3 ‘Overall, my colleagues are capable and proficient technical staff’ and F5 ‘My 
colleagues act in the best interest of the project’. 
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Items F2 and F3 correspond to the ‘construct of trust in colleagues’ competence’ 




Putting more focus on time management techniques and requesting assistance from 







‘The technician performs the maintenance task straight away but leaves the key return and logbook 
entry closure for later. Since these steps were left for a later time, the technician either forgets 
completely to return the key/close the logbook entry or gets distracted near that time, having the 
same result. As a consequence, the aircraft release to service can be delayed, since the involved 
personnel (flight crew, technical staff) will have to locate the missing key and complete the FCD sign-
off in the logbook.’ 
Communication 
factor identified 
Not performing a proper handover, makes the ideal preconditions for errors. 
This deviation from accurate reporting can result in lack of effective 
communication between colleagues and can prevent from the proper actions 
taken to mitigate the errors. Therefore, the communication problems identified 
here are in relation to items: D19 ‘The amount of communication was not about 
right’, D2 ‘The organisation’s communication motivates and stimulates an 
enthusiasm for meeting its goals’, C3 ‘Information about organisational 
policies and goals’, D8 ‘Personnel receive in time the information needed to do 
their job’, D6 ‘The organisation’s communications are interesting and helpful, 
item’, D17 ‘Issues whether the attitudes towards communication in the 
organisation are healthy’, C7 ‘Information about departmental policies and 
goals, item C7’, D15 ‘Meetings are well organised’, D12 ‘Communication with 
colleagues within the organisation is accurate and free flowing’, D3‘ Supervisor 
listens and pays attention to personnel’ and D6 ‘The organisation’s 




A dual sign off practice would offer the opportunity for a confirmation check 
and reduce the possibility of misses and errors. 
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3.4.2 FCD Missing from Designated Area 
Scenario 4 
‘The technician attempts to find the FCD key. He/she prioritises this task over the maintenance task 
itself. In the case that he/she finds the key, the amount of time spent on the search does not allow 
him/her to focus on the maintenance task, thus this is not performed adequately.’ 
Trust factor 
identified 
Similarly to Scenario 1, maintenance personnel, failed to dedicate the time required 
for this task, risking the quality of this work. This indicates that the maintenance 
personnel deviated from an expected good practice in their duties. Specifically, 




Similarly, to Scenario 1, it would be beneficial if better time management techniques 
were practiced, as well as if the technician requested assistance. 
 
Scenario 5 
‘The technician attempts to find the FCD key, prioritising the search over the maintenance task (same 
as in Scenario 4). He/she does not manage to find the key, leaving the maintenance task 
unaccomplished. In the case that the technician is forgetful or distracted, he/she will not report the 
missing key, causing more delay, as other personnel in later time will repeat the search process.’ 
Communication 
factor identified 
As with Scenario 2 and 3, not performing a proper handover, makes the ideal 
precondition for errors. This deviation from accurate reporting can result in 
lack of effective communication between colleagues and can prevent from the 
proper actions taken to mitigate the errors. Therefore, the communication 
problems identified here are in relation to items: D19, D2, C3, D8, D6, D17, C7, 




Similarly to other scenarios, the dual sign off in conjunction with a robust 




‘The technician does not perform the maintenance task and has to pass it over to the next shift. Since 
these steps were left for the next shift, he/she either forgets to return the key/close the logbook entry 
or gets distracted to do that. In case that the shift handover is not performed properly, the FCD tasks 
are not completed. As a consequence, similarly to Scenario 2, the aircraft release to service can be 
delayed, since the missing key has to be located and the logbook signed off.’ 
Communication 
factor identified 
As with Scenario 2, not performing a proper handover, makes the ideal 
precondition for errors. This deviation from accurate reporting can result in 
lack of effective communication between colleagues and can prevent from the 
proper actions taken to mitigate the errors. Therefore, the communication 
problems identified here are in relation to items: D19, D2, C3, D8, D6, D17, C7, 




As with Scenario 2, the dual sign off practice can mitigate this issue. Moreover, 
a thorough (verbal and written) shift handover would be helpful in avoiding 
communication gaps in relation to the FCD tasks (reducing the possibility for 
misses and errors). 





3.4.3 Analysis of Scenarios 
The seven scenarios presented (Scenario 1 to 7) refer to seven different causal situations 
in which safety issues, related to the fan cowl doors of modified aircraft of the Airbus 320 
Scenario 6 
‘The technician attempts to find the FCD key, prioritising the search over the maintenance task (same 
as in Scenario 4 and 5). He/she does not manage to find the key, therefore deciding to use his/her own 
key or the spare key as per the organisation’s ‘norm and fills in the logbook entry (‘open FCD’). After 
completing the maintenance task, the technician is forgetful/omits or gets distracted and does not 
report the missing key. As with Scenario 5, this may cause a delay in the future. Moreover, using 
his/her own key means that this may not have the ‘remove before flight’ flag attached, increasing the 
probability of leaving the cowl door open (since this modified visual cue will be missing).’ 
Trust factor 
identified 
Maintenance personnel deliberately chooses to use own key, opposite to the 
company’s policies, which might not include the dedicated visual cue. This 
indicates that the maintenance personnel deviated from an expected good 
practice in their duties. Specifically, by using the CTQS, the following four 
items are identified in this failure: F2 ‘My colleagues perform their duties very 
well’, F3 ‘Overall, my colleagues are capable and proficient technical staff’, F4 
‘In general, my colleagues are knowledgeable about our organisation’ and F5 
‘My colleagues act in the best interest of the project’.  
Items F2, F3 and F4 fall in the construct of trust in colleagues’ competence while 
item F5 falls in the construct of trust in colleagues’ benevolence. 
Communication 
factor identified 
As with Scenario 2, 3 and 5, not performing a proper handover, makes the ideal 
precondition for errors. This deviation from accurate reporting can result in 
lack of effective communication between colleagues and can prevent from the 
proper actions taken to mitigate the errors. Therefore, the communication 
problems identified here are in relation to items: D19, D2, C3, D8, D6, D17, C7, 




Similarly to previous scenarios, the dual sign off in conjunction with a robust 
handover process could mitigate this miss. In addition, a change in the 
organisational culture would be necessary to abolish unsafe practices in 
relation to established ‘norms’ outside the standard policies and procedures. 
Scenario 7 
‘The technician does not have the required time or attitude to attempt to find the missing key, thus 
he/she decides not to perform the assigned maintenance task and, for example, to move onto a 
different task. He/she forgets about the missing FCD key or gets distracted and does not report that. 
This shall cause delay in the work of the personnel who are then assigned to the maintenance task in 
the FCD-accessed area (as they will have to search for the missing key).’ 
Communication 
factor identified 
As with Scenario 2, 3, 5 and 6, not performing a proper handover, makes the 
ideal precondition for errors. This deviation from accurate reporting can result 
in lack of effective communication between colleagues and can prevent from 
the proper actions taken to mitigate the errors. Therefore, the communication 
problems identified here are in relation to items: D19, D2, C3, D8, D6, D17, C7, 




Dual sign off and in-shift/inter-shift handover would be an effective solution 
to avoid such situations. 
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family, may arise. These scenarios were investigated against the items of the CTQS. As shown 
in Table 5, many different trust and/or communication issues corresponded to each one of the 
scenarios, therefore all scenarios showed communication and trust preconditions. Trust was 
found present in five scenarios while communication was found present in three. One scenario 
had communication and trust preconditions present at the same time, while the rest six had 
solely one precondition present (either trust or communication). 




Communication Factor Items 
Scenario 1 F2, F3, F5  
Scenario 2  D19, D2, C3, D8, D6, D17, C7, D15, D12, D3, D6 
Scenario 3  D19, D2, C3, D8, D6, D17, C7, D15, D12, D3, D6 
Scenario 4 F2, F3, F5  
Scenario 5  D19, D2, C3, D8, D6, D17, C7, D15, D12, D3, D6 
Scenario 6 F2, F3, F4, F5 D19, D2, C3, D8, D6, D17, C7, D15, D12, D3, D6 
Scenario 7  D19, D2, C3, D8, D6, D17, C7, D15, D12, D3, D6 
More specifically, the issues identified in relation to trust were about interpersonal trust. 
The CTQS items are grouped in different constructs, each one indicating specific attributes of 
trust. Therefore, the specific characteristics identified here were trust towards colleagues’ 
competence and benevolence. In relation to the communication satisfaction, issues were 
identified in relation to the satisfaction with the organisation’s communication climate, with 
the superiors, with the organisation’s integration, with the media quality, the general 
organisational perspective and with the horizontal informal communication. These are the 
wider groups of the CSQ items, that were initially introduced by Downs and Hazen [22] and 
can describe categorically the specific issues with communication satisfaction identified in 
these scenarios. 
The communication and trust items identified (listed in Table 5) are not factors that have 
to exist in combination to contribute to the hypothetical scenario. At least one of these factors 
(namely, one of the possible items) could suffice in the occurrence of the relevant scenario. 
The mean value of each item corresponds to the level of communication satisfaction and trust 
exhibited by the surveyed population. Namely, a high mean score is a positive indicator of 
high levels of communication satisfaction or trust. For this reason, an item’s lower mean score 
of each scenario was selected as the criterion for the hierarchical categorisation of the scenarios 
relative to the possibility of occurrence. For example, a scenario with an item having a higher 
mean is less probable than that of a scenario with an item of a lower mean. Lower mean scores 
reveal lower communication satisfaction and trust, which subsequently include issues with 
communication and trust (yielding higher probability of occurrence).  
The identification of more probable and less probable scenarios involves the comparison 
of the means for all scenarios, listed in Table 6. The lower mean score is accounted as to have 
the higher occurrence probability of the scenario tabulated to this mean score. The least mean 
score in each scenario, that determined the ranking of the relevant scenario, is shown in Table 
6 in bold font and highlighted in grey shade. This process identified two items; whose mean 
scores categorised the seven scenarios. Therefore, the two mean scores categorised the seven 
scenarios into two groups: Group A, corresponding to more possible to occur, and Group B, 
to less possible to occur scenarios. 
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Table 6. Means of the trust and communication factors as identified in Scenarios 1 to 7. 
 
Scenario 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Trust Factor 
identified 
F2 5.66 - - 5.66 - 5.66 - 
F3 5.89 - - 5.89 - 5.89 - 
F4 - - - - - 5.56 - 
F5 5.54 - - 5.54 - 5.54 - 
Communication 
Factor identified 
D19 - 4.45 4.45 - 4.45 4.45 4.45 
D2 - 4.15 4.15 - 4.15 4.15 4.15 
C3 - 4.73 4.73 - 4.73 4.73 4.73 
D8 - 4.83 4.83 - 4.83 4.83 4.83 
D6 - 4.51 4.51 - 4.51 4.51 4.51 
D17 - 4.65 4.65 - 4.65 4.65 4.65 
C7 - 4.71 4.71 - 4.71 4.71 4.71 
D15 - 4.55 4.55 - 4.55 4.55 4.55 
D12 - 5.27 5.27 - 5.27 5.27 5.27 
D3 - 5.09 5.09 - 5.09 5.09 5.09 
D6 - 4.51 4.51 - 4.51 4.51 4.51 
 







A. More Possible  
Scenario 2 4.15 D2 
Scenario 3 4.15 D2 
Scenario 5 4.15 D2 
Scenario 6 4.15 D2 
Scenario 7 4.15 D2 
B. Less Possible 
Scenario 1 5.54 F5 
Scenario 4 5.54 F5 
 
The output of this exercise summarised the results presented in Table 7, with a two-tier 
ranking obtained (Group A and B). Based on this ranking, Scenarios 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 are more 
possible to occur that Scenarios 1 and 4.  
4. Conclusions 
The novelty of this model lies in the development and utilisation of a dedicated (CTQS) 
survey/question tool for aviation maintenance, which addresses methodically, for the first 
time, the association between communication and trust in aviation maintenance. The model 
can predict hypothetical deviations during maintenance practice attributed to communication 
and trust preconditions. These preconditions are identified (and can be quantified) based on 
the target group's perceptions on communication and trust. This model is expected to 
contribute to the advancement of research in this area, having, in turn, a positive contribution 
to the promotion of aviation maintenance safety. 
In summary, the DiCTAM model is capable to:  
1. Detect the traits of communication and trust; 
2. Identify, investigating and associating the perceptions of the people involved; 
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3. Examine in depth the extent of the aviation maintenance employees’ exposure to 
them, through their training; 
4. Predict their actions regarding communication and trust preconditions in aviation 
maintenance. 
This process can be expanded to include more preconditions and offer a structured 
approach applicable to other similar research projects. Thus, the construct of the DiCTAM 
model would be transferable to other human factors preconditions, which, similarly to 
communication and trust, are present in aviation maintenance and affect safety.  
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 The items of the distributed questionnaire in this research study 
 
Section A: Demographic information of the participants (Based on Downs & Hazen 1977)  
A1. My current post and duties require me to exercise my aircraft maintenance license 
privileges. 
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A2. My company is approved by .......................... to perform and certify maintenance. 
A3. My experience with my current company is 
A4. I have a total of ............ years of experience in aviation maintenance. 
 
Section B: General Questions (Based on Downs & Hazen 1977)  
B1. How satisfied are you with your job? 
B2. In the past 6 months, what has happened to your level of satisfaction? 
 
Section C: Communication - My job (Based on Downs & Hazen 1977)  
C1. Information about my progress in my job. 
C2. Personnel news. 
C3. Information about organisational policies and goals. 
C4. Information about how my job compares with others. 
C5. Information about how I am being judged. 
C6. Recognition of my efforts. 
C7. Information about departmental policies and goals. 
C8. Information about the requirements of my job. 
C9. Information about government action affecting my organisation. 
C10. Information about changes in our organisation. 
C11. Reports on how problems in my job are being handled. 
C12. Information about benefits and pay. 
C13. Information about our organisation’s financial standing. 
C14. Information about accomplishments and/or failures of the organisation. 
 
Section D: Communication - My job and the people I work with (Based on Downs & Hazen 
1977)  
D1. My superiors know and understand the problems faced by subordinates. 
D2. The organisation’s communication motivates and stimulates an enthusiasm for meeting 
its goals. 
D3. My supervisor listens and pays attention to me. 
D4. My supervisor offers guidance for solving job related problems. 
D5. The organisation’s communication makes me identify with it or feel a vital part of it. 
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D6. The organisation’s communications are interesting and helpful. 
D7. My supervisor trusts me. 
D8. I receive in time the information needed to do my job. 
D9. Conflicts are handled appropriately through proper communication channels. 
D10. The grapevine (person to person informal communication / gossip) is active in our 
organisation. 
D11. My supervisor is open to new ideas. 
D12. Communication with my colleagues within the organisation is accurate and free 
flowing. 
D13. Communication practices are adaptable to emergencies. 
D14. My work group is compatible. 
D15. Our meetings are well organised. 
D16. The amount of supervision given me is about right. 
D17. The attitudes towards communication in the organisation are basically healthy. 
D18. Informal communication is active and accurate. 
D19. The amount of communication in the organisation is about right. 
D20. Are you a supervisor / manager? 
 
Section E: Communication - Only for managers / supervisors (Based on Downs & Hazen 
1977)  
E1. My subordinates are responsive to downward directive communication. 
E2. My subordinates anticipate my needs for information. 
E3. I do not have a communication overload. 
E4. My subordinates are receptive to evaluation, suggestions, and criticism. 
E5. My subordinates feel responsible for initiating accurate upward communication. 
 
Section F: Trust (Adapted from Li et al. 2012)  
F1. My colleagues fulfil my expectations in our collaboration. 
F2. My colleagues perform their duties very well. 
F3. Overall, my colleagues are capable and proficient technical staff. 
F4. In general, my colleagues are knowledgeable about our organisation. 
F5. My colleagues act in the best interest of the project. 
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F6. If I required assistance, my colleagues would do their best to help me. 
F7. My colleagues are interested in my professional well-being, not just their own. 
F8. My colleagues are truthful in their contact with me by actively exposing the whole truth 
on any work-related matter. 
F9. I would characterize my colleagues as honest by not telling lies. 
F10. My colleagues would keep their verbal commitments. 
F11. My colleagues are sincere and genuine. 
F12. My company's software has the functionality I need. 
F13. My company's software has the ability to do what I want it to do. 
F14. Overall, my company's software has the capabilities I need. 
F15. My company's software is very reliable. 
F16. I can depend on the software when I perform/certify maintenance tasks. 
F17. This software performs in a predictable way. 
F18. Are you a supervisor / manager? 
 
Section G: Trust - Only for managers / supervisors (Adapted from Li et al. 2012)  
G1. My subordinates are effective in assisting and fulfilling my expectations in our 
collaboration. 
G2. My subordinates perform their duties very well. 
G3. Overall, my subordinates are capable and proficient technical staff. 
G4. In general, my subordinates are knowledgeable about our organisation. 
G5. My subordinates act in the best interest of the project. 
G6. If I required assistance, my subordinates would do their best to help me. 
G7. My subordinates are interested in my professional well-being, not just their own. 
G8. My subordinates are truthful in their contact with me by actively exposing the whole 
truth on a matter. 
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APPENDIX B Tabulation of the accident and incident investigation reports analysed. 
No 
Aircraft, Registration, Date, Accident 










Communication Factor: Survey items 
indicating communication issues existence 
R1 
Airbus A320-214, EI-GAL, 07/05/2019, Air 
Accident Investigation, Ireland (Serious 
Incident) [46] 
R1.1 F2, F3, F5  
R1.2  C3 
R1.3 F2, F3, F5  
R2 
Airbus A320-216, PK-AXC, 30/11/2015, 
Komite National Keselamatan 
Transportasi, Republic of Indonesia 
(Accident) [47] 
R2.1 F2, F3, F5  
R2.2  D19, D8, C7 
R3 
de Havilland Canada DHC 6-300, C-GSGF, 
18/02/2016, Air Accident Investigation Unit, 
Ireland (Serious Incident) [48] 
R3.1  C3 
R3.2 F2, F3, F5  
R3.3 F2, F3, F5 D19, D12, D17 
R3.4  D19, D12 
R3.5 F2, F3, F5   
R3.6 F2, F3, F5  
R4 
Airbus A320, VH-VGZ, 22/03/2019, 
Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 
Australia (Incident) [49] 
R4.1 F2, F3, F5 D19, D12, D17 
R4.2 F2, F3, F5 D17 
R4.3 F2, F3, F5 D19, D17, D8, C7 
R4.4 F2, F3, F5 D19, D17, D8, C7 
R5 
Bombardier DHC-8-Q402, G-JECP, 
23/02/2017, Dutch Safety Board, 
Netherlands (Accident) [50] 
R5.1 F2, F3, F5  
R5.2 F2, F3, F5  
R5.3  D19, D17, D8, C7 
R6 
Boeing 747-443, G-VROM, 01/10/2015, Air 
Accidents Investigation Board, UK (Serious 
Incident) [51] 
R6.1 F4 C8 
R6.2 F2, F3, F5  
R6.3  C8, D19 
 
R7 
Airbus A330-243, A6-EYJ, 06/05/2016, 
Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 
Australia (Serious Incident) [52] 
R7.1 F2, F3, F5 C7, C8, D19 
R7.2 F1, F2, F3, F5  
R7.3  C7, C8, D19 
R8 
Boeing 767, N360AA, 07/12/2012, NTSB, 
USA (incident) [53] 
R8.1 F2, F3, F5  
R8.2  C8, D19 
R9 
Boeing 767, N669US, 28/09/2016, NTSB, 
USA (Incident) [54] 
R9.1 F2, F3, F5  
R9.2  C8, D19, D8 
R10 
Airbus A319, VT-SCQ, 16/09/2016, 
Directorate General of Civil Aviation, India 
(Accident) [55] 
R10.1 F2, F3, F5  
R10.2  C8, D19, D8 
R11 
Boeing 737-800, B 18616, 21/08/2009, Japan 
Transport Safety Board, Japan (Accident) 
[56] 
R11.1 
F2, F3, F5, F8, F9, 
F11 
D19, D17, D8, D12 
R11.2  D19, C10, D8, C8 
R12 
Airbus A319-131, G-EUOE, 14/07/2015, Air 
Accident Investigation Branch, UK 
(Accident) [57] 
R12.1 F2, F3, F5  
R12.2  D19, D17, D8, C7 
R12.3 F2, F3, F5 D19, D17, D8, D6 
R12.4 F2, F3, F5  
R12.5   D19, D17, D6, D8 
R12.6  D19, D15, D17, D12, D3, D6  
R12.7  D19, D6, D17, D12, D3, D6 
R12.8 F1, F2, F4, F5, F7   
R12.9 
F1, F2, F4, F5, F7, 
F8, F11 
D19, D2, C3, D8, D6, D17, C7, D15, D12, D3, D6 
R12.10 F12, F13, F14  
R13 
Embraer 190-100LR, P4-KCJ, 02/05/2019, 
Gabinete de Precenção e Investigação de 
Acidentes com Aeronaves e de Acidentes 
Ferroviarios, Portugal (Accident) [58] 
R13.1 F2, F3, F5   
R13.2   D19, C8, D17, C3, D6, D8 
R13.3 F1, F2, F3, F5 D19, D17, D16, D12, D13, D15, D6 
R13.4 F1, F2, F3, F4, F5 D19, D17, C3, D6, D8, D12, D15, D2, D6, C7, D3 
R14 
Airbus A330-342, B-HLL, 03/07/2013, 
Accident Investigation Division, Hong 
Kong (Accident) [59] 
R14.1 F1, F2, F3, F4, F5 D19, D2, C3, D8, D6, D17, C7, D15, D12, D3, D6 
R14.2 F1, F2, F3, F4, F5 D19, D2, C3, D8, D6, D17, C7, D15, D12, D3, D6 
R14.3 F1, F2, F3, F4 D19, D2, C3, D8, D6, D17, C7, D15, D12, D3, D6 
R15 
Lockheed WC-130H, 65-0968, 09/10/2018, 
United States Air Force Accident 
Investigation Board, USA (Accident) [60] 
R15.1 F1, F2, F3, F4, F5 
D19, D2, C3, D8, D6, D17, C7, D15, D12, D16, C1, 
C8, D3, D4, D6 
R15.2 
F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, 
F8, F9, F11 
D19, D2, C3, D8, D6, D17, C7, D15, D12, D16, C1, 
C8, D3, D4, D6 
R15.3 F1 D19, D17, D16, D12, D13, D15, D6 
R15.4 F1, F2, F3, F4 
D19, D2, C3, D8, D6, D17, C7, D16, D15, D12, D3, 
D6 
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DIRTY DOZEN ELEMENT 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
C1 X X   X X X X X X X  
C2 X X   X X X X X X X  
C3 X X   X X X X X X X  
C4 X X   X X X X X X X  
C5 X X   X X X X X X X  
C6 X X   X X X X X X X  
C7 X X   X X X X X X X  
C8 X X   X X X X X X X  
C9 X X   X X X X X X X  
C10 X X   X X X X X X X  
C11 X X   X X X X X X X  
C12 X X   X X X X X X X  
C13 X X   X X X X X X X  
C14 X X   X X X X X X X  
D1 X X   X X X X X X X  
D2 X X   X X X X X X X  
D3 X X   X X X X X X X  
D4 X X   X X X X X X X  
D5 X X   X X X X X X X  
D6 X X   X X X X X X X  
D7 X X   X X X X X X X  
D8 X X   X X X X X X X  
D9 X X   X X X X X X X  
D11 X X   X X X X X X X  
D12 X X   X X X X X X X  
D13 X X   X X X X X X X  
D14 X X   X X X X X X X  
D15 X X   X X X X X X X  
D16 X X   X X X X X X X  
D17 X X   X X X X X X X  
D18 X X   X X X X X X X  
D19 X X   X X X X X X X  
E1 X X   X X X X X X X  
E2 X X   X X X X X X X  
E3 X X   X X X X X X X  
E4 X X   X X X X X X X  
E5 X X   X X X X X X X  
F1 X  X X X       X 
F2 X  X X X       X 
F3 X  X X X       X 
F4 X  X X X       X 
F5 X  X X X       X 
F6 X  X X X       X 
F7 X  X X X       X 
F8 X  X X X       X 
F9 X  X X X       X 
F10 X  X X X       X 
F11 X  X X X       X 
F14 X  X X X       X 
F15 X  X X X       X 
F16 X  X X X       X 
F17 X  X X X       X 
G1 X  X X X       X 
G2 X  X X X       X 
G3 X  X X X       X 
G4 X  X X X       X 
G5 X  X X X       X 
G6 X  X X X       X 
G7 X  X X X       X 
G8 X  X X X       X 
G9 X  X X X       X 
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G10 X  X X X       X 
G11 X  X X X       X 
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Appendix E: Under Review Journal Paper 5 
Chatzi, A., V., Bates, P., & Martin, W. Exploring the Association Between Communication Satisfaction 
and Trust in the Aviation Maintenance Environment: An International Study. Manuscript submitted 
for publication and is currently under review at the Journal of Air Transport management. 
Submitted Version under Review 
 
Exploring the Association Between Communication Satisfaction and Trust in 
the Aviation Maintenance Environment: An International Study 
Anna V Chatzi, Paul R. Bates, Wayne Martin 
 
School of Commerce, University of Southern Queensland, USQ Toowoomba 
Campus, QLD, Australia. 
 
Abstract 
This study explores the association among communication satisfaction, interpersonal 
trust and trust towards maintenance software used by aviation maintenance companies.  
A survey was conducted to a diverse set of civil and military aviation maintenance 
professionals. 259 fully answered questionnaires were quantitatively analysed. Results 
showed managers and subordinates' communication satisfaction to be substantially 
explained by their levels of interpersonal trust. Differences in the communication 
satisfaction and software trust between military and civil employees were also 
observed. The results of civil employees exhibit higher mean scores for all three 
factors. Overall, communication satisfaction was found to have a stronger association 
with interpersonal trust than with software trust. The mean scores of communication 
satisfaction and interpersonal trust increased across various levels of experience being 
statistically significant.  Recommendations are made for management to take into 
consideration trust along with communication, when improving communication 
processes in the wider attempt of aviation maintenance productivity enhancement. 
Keywords: Communication Satisfaction; Interpersonal Trust; Technology Trust; 
Organizational Research; Aviation Maintenance. 
Introduction 
In the aviation industry it is well recognised that poor communication is a paramount 
human factor contributing to errors (Balk & Bossenbroek, 2010; Investigation, 1997). 
Researchers have acknowledged the need for error free communication within aviation 
(Caldwell, 2005; Mattson, Petrin, & Young, 2001) while others have identified poor 
communication to be an accident causal factor (Dupont, 1997; Flin, O’Connor, & 
Mearns, 2002; Weick, 1990). Recently, researchers have developed tools to 
proactively detect maintenance failures, such as the maintenance operations safety 
survey (MOSS), in which communication and trust are major factors (Langer & 
Braithwaite, 2016). 
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Communication is an important aspect of business as information gathering on 
different professional matters takes up a large proportion of employees’ time (Mount 
& Back, 1999). Communication satisfaction (CS) is the perception of employees 
regarding the communication practices followed by their organisation (Carrière & 
Bourque, 2009). CS is very important in identifying a healthy and functioning 
organisation (Downs & Adrian, 2004; Downs & Hazen, 1977). Many researchers 
believe that satisfactory and effective communication is a sign of an organisation’s 
successful operation, in regard of its productivity, efficiency and its sales and 
customers approach (Zwijze-Koning & De Menno, 2007).  
CS has been associated positively with job satisfaction (Appelbaum et al., 2012; 
Carrière & Bourque, 2009; Downs & Hazen, 1977; Muchinsky, 1977; Pincus, 1986), 
employment situation satisfaction (Goris, 2007), organisational commitment (Ng, 
Butts, Vandenberg, DeJoy, & Wilson, 2006; Varona, 1996), productivity (Hargie, 
Tourish, & Wilson, 2002) work value, and job performance (Jalalkamali, Ali, Hyun, 
& Nikbin, 2016). CS research has been conducted so far in business areas such as: 
hospitality (Mount & Back, 1999), manufacturing (Downs & Hazen, 1977), private 
and public sector (Brunetto & Farr-Wharton, 2004), Information Technology  
(Appelbaum et al., 2012), nursing (Pincus, 1986), automotive (Jalalkamali et al., 
2016), financial services (Clampitt & Downs, 1993), and the ambulance service 
(Carrière & Bourque, 2009).  
In the aviation sector, research so far has shown that effective communication 
techniques are part of the employees’ initial and recurrent training and are linked to 
their on job safety-related practices (Karanikas, Melis, & Kourousis, 2017). Also, 
organisational commitment and employees’ level of organisational satisfaction is 
associated with employees’ safety-related practices (Dode, Greig, Zolfaghari, & 
Neumann, 2016; Evans, Glendon, & Creed, 2007; Glendon & Litherland, 2001; Luria 
& Yagil, 2010; O'Connor, 2011) (figure 1). In figure 1 is shown a schematic 
representation of the summary of the interrelationship between communication and 
trust, and the effect of communication in organisational commitment and safety. 
However, in the literature there is no link between the other four organisational traits 
and safety, even though these four are affected by communication as well. However, 
no research in aviation maintenance has been conducted to identify the association 
between employees’ CS and trust.  
Figure 1: Interrelationships between communication, trust, safety and other 
organisational traits.  
  252 
 
Whitener et al. (1998) found that there are three factors in communication that have 
been found to have a strong association with trust: precise information, explanations 
and justifications of decisions and openness. Trust, as a fundamental trait in human 
social life, has been  the focus of many different disciplines of science, and each one 
has dealt with it and defined it according to each discipline’s scope and interest 
(Hernandez & Santos, 2010). Trust has not been investigated as a trait in the aviation 
sector (Flin, 2007).  However, it is a very important element of the interrelationships 
of co-workers in all industries and warrants further research, as it is linked to the 
quality of communication (Bachmann, 2003; Carrière & Bourque, 2009; Cascio, 2000; 
Cho & Park, 2011; Flin, 2007; Muchinsky, 1977; Shapiro, Sheppard, & Cheraskin, 
1992; Yeager, 1978). 
Interpersonal trust is among other organisational variables that have an 
interrelationship with communication.  While these other variables are not the focus 
of this study, they include: performance, citizenship behaviour, problem solving, 
cooperation and cooperative relationships.  These variables can be defined through 
three distinct dimensions (Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, & Werner, 1998). The first 
dimension is the confidence of the element of benevolence in the other party’s acts. 
The second dimension is that there is no control over the other party’s actions, 
therefore there is no warranty in the deliverable outcome and the third dimension is 
that the individual’s performance has some reliance on the performance of another 
individual (Whitener et al., 1998). Also, research has indicated that the character of 
trust can change, depending on the stage of the relationship between the different 
parties involved (Hernandez & Santos, 2010). Moreover, the interaction between the 
two parties i.e. the knowledge and evaluation of previous successful collaboration 
which can lead to successful prediction of potential future collaboration, enhances 
trust. This is called the knowledge-based trust (Hernandez & Santos, 2010). 
In this study, both interpersonal trust and company software trust is investigated. In 
correspondence with the technology trust (Li, Rong, & Thatcher, 2012), software trust 
is the aviation maintenance employees’ beliefs of the trustworthiness towards their 
company software’s performance.  
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The purpose of this study is to investigate the association between CS and trust of the 
aviation maintenance employees. This population is chosen for this study for its critical 
characteristics. These characteristics are mainly influenced by its global nature, yet it 
is governed by different laws in different geographical areas. The aviation maintenance 
profession is a highly complex, highly skilled and highly regulated around the world. 
Aviation maintenance employees, after multiyear training to get their qualifications, 
can work autonomously in a busy, constantly physically challenging working 
environment. Their work requires high pace, long hours, overtime due to shortages in 
staffing, shift work, and ongoing training as new technology and legislation are 
constantly introduced. Additionally, full attention and situational awareness can be 
limited due to the physical restrictions of their immediate working environment. 
Considering that managers’ posts do not require the same hours as the rest of the 
employees (morning shifts) and the same locations (offices rather than ramps or 
painting shops etc), it is obvious that communication and trust between them could 
influence safety. Therefore, ongoing research of human factors, and especially the 
investigation of traits such as communication and trust, will continue to contribute to 
aviation maintenance safety and more efficient performance.  
More specifically, the following hypotheses were tested and analysed in the aviation 
maintenance sector.  
1.1 Research hypotheses 
1. (a) Employees’ levels of interpersonal trust towards their colleagues and (b) 
supervisors/managers’ levels of interpersonal trust towards their subordinates 
have a positive association with their CS. 
2. (a) Employees’ trust towards the company’s software and (b) 
supervisors/managers’ trust towards the company’s software have a positive 
association with their CS. 
3. (a) Subordinates’ levels of interpersonal trust and (b) subordinates’ trust 
towards the company’s software have a positive association with their CS. 
4. High initial trust levels are detectible in (a) interpersonal trust and (b) 
company’s software trust to newly recruited maintenance employees.  
 
2. Material and methods 
2.1 Instrument 
A questionnaire, consisted of two parts, was used for this research: One part was based 
on the he Communication Satisfaction Questionnaire (CSQ) and the other one on the 
Trust Constructs and Measures Questionnaire (TCMQ). The CSQ is a tool that was 
incepted in 1977 and widely used since then in research projects dealing with CS in 
various industries (Appelbaum et al., 2012; Brunetto & Farr-Wharton, 2004; Carrière 
& Bourque, 2009; Chan & Lai, 2017; Clampitt & Downs, 1993; Downs & Hazen, 
1977; Gochhayat, Giri, & Suar, 2017; Jalalkamali et al., 2016; Mount & Back, 1999; 
Pincus, 1986; Zwijze-Koning & De Menno, 2007; Zwijze-Koning, 2016). CSQ has 
proven to be an efficient tool to extract employees’ perceptions of the communication 
within their organisation (Gray & Laidlaw, 2004; Zwijze-Koning & De Menno, 2007; 
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Zwijze-Koning, 2016). The CSQ is a 40-item questionnaire, with items categorized in 
eight communicative themes (dimensions). These dimensions vary from interpersonal 
communication (e.g. an employee’s evaluation of the communication with his/her 
supervisor), to the organization-wide communication climate (Zwijze-Koning & De 
Menno, 2007). This construct has a test-retest reliability of 0.94 (Downs & Hazen, 
1977).  
The CSQ can expose employees’ beliefs on important matters affecting 
communication within an organisation. CSQ’s convergent validity has been compared 
in the past with other questionnaires, e.g. the Communication Incident Technique 
(CIT), and was considered to be a very reliable, up to date tool in investigating an 
organisation’s CS (Zwijze-Koning, 2016). Several researchers have evaluated the 
reliability and concurrent and construct validity of the CSQ (DeWine & James, 1988; 
Lee, Strong, Kahn, & Wang, 2002; Rubin, Palmgreen, & Sypher, 1994; Zwijze-
Koning, 2016).  
It is noted that CSQ has been the primary research tool for various research studies 
conducted in many different countries and institutions (Rubin et al., 1994).  It has been 
characterised as “arguably the best measure of communication satisfaction in the 
organizational arena” (Clampitt & Downs, 1993), p. 6) while Rubin et al. (1994, p. 
116) agree “The thoroughness of the construction of this satisfaction measure is 
apparent. The strategies employed in this study are exemplary”.  
The items of the CSQ part of the questionnaire made its C, D and E sections (Appendix 
A) and all items were used as they were initially developed by Downs and Hazen 
(1977). Sections C and D were addressed to all participants while section E was 
addressed to supervisors/managers only. The question: D10 ‘The grapevine (person to 
person informal communication / gossip) is active in our organisation’ was included 
in the questionnaire that was given to the participants, however it proved to be 
inconsistent with the other items’ (based on reliability measures) and was therefore 
excluded from the analysis. Furthermore, other researchers have excluded the same 
question from their research projects as it was found to be blurry to the participants 
(Chan & Lai, 2017; Mount & Back, 1999).   
TCMQ was again adapted in this research to measure interpersonal trust (among 
colleagues and between employees-managers) and trust towards the software package 
utilised for the purposes of aircraft maintenance certification and management. The 
original  questionnaire, which was adapted by Li et al. (2012), has proven to be valid 
and reliable in  past research (Gefen, 2004; Li et al., 2012; Lowry, Vance, Moody, & 
Beckman, 2008; McKnight, Carter, Thatcher, & Clay, 2011; McKnight, Choudhury, 
& Kacmar, 2002; Nicolaou & McKnight, 2006; Stewart & Malaga, 2009; Vance, Elie-
dit-cosaque, & Straub, 2008). Moreover, the measurement model (reliability scores, 
construct validity, convergent and discriminant validity) was found to produce 
statistically significant results (Li et al., 2012). The measurement model results 
verified that the measurement scales adapted by Li et al., (2012) were valid and reliable 
in their study. Specifically, web capability and reliability were found to be powerfully 
belief constituent in assessing trust in website. This outcome confirmed that the IT-
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specific scales, that were adopted by Li et al., (2012) were valid in technology trust 
measurement (Li et al., 2012).  
In this study, The F and G sections of the questionnaire were formed by the items of 
the TCMQ (Appendix A). Section F was addressed to all participants while section G 
was addressed to supervisors/managers only. This questionnaire was adapted by Li et 
al. (Li et al., 2012) and the items were adjusted again for the purposes of this research. 
Prior to the administration of TCMQ, an experts’ evaluation process was conducted to 
examine the appropriateness of the adaptations (modifications) made. The need for 
this stage was derived from the fact that the items of the questionnaire were adapted 
again to suit the context of this study and therefore they had to be tested for the content 
validity of scores and if any improvement was possible on the questions and the format 
(Creswell, 2014). For this purpose, three aviation maintenance engineers were 
selected. Their background included many years of experience in the field, experience 
in training and in the academic sector. Their recommendations for the improvement of 
the questions were thoroughly assessed and implemented in the questionnaire, as they 
were found to be constructive.   
Two questions: F12 ‘My company's software has the functionality I need’ and F13 
‘My company's software has the ability to do what I want it to do’ were included in 
the questionnaire that was distributed to the participants, however they showed 
problematically high correlations to F14: ‘Overall, my company's software has the 
capabilities I need’. As a result, they were not included in the statistical analysis for 
this reason.  
In the TCMQ, the items were grouped together, forming 8 constructs, as were 
introduced by Li et al. (2012). These constructs are:  trust in colleagues’ competence, 
trust in colleagues’ benevolence, trust in colleagues’ integrity, trust in company's 
software capability, trust in company's software reliability, trust in managers-
subordinates’ competence, trust in managers-subordinates’ benevolence, managers-
subordinates’ integrity. However, since two of the three items forming the construct: 
trust in company's software reliability, were not used in the statistical analysis, a new 
single construct was formed with the four remaining questions about software:  trust 
in company's software capability. All items in sections C, D, E, F, G of the combined 
questionnaire used a 7-point Likert scale. Sections C, D and E used the coding 1 = 
Very Dissatisfied to 7 = Very Satisfied and sections F and G 1 = Strongly Disagree to 
7 = Strongly Agree.  
Demographic and general questions formed section A and B of the questionnaire. 
These questions gathered information on the length of the participants’ longevity of 
employment with current organisation, type of license and regulative authority under 
current employment, position. Sample items are: ‘How satisfied are you with your 
job?’ and ‘I have a total of ............ years of experience in aviation maintenance.’  
The longevity of employment question was expected to separate the sample in two 
groups regarding their experience: 
• The experienced group (6 months of experience and more with current employer); 
• The newly recruited (less than 6 months with current employer). 
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The comparison of the results that stem from items from the TCMQ are essential in 
any observation of the high initial trust levels formation within the newly recruited 
group (Hernandez & Santos, 2010; McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998).  
According to McKnight et al. ‘…initial trust, because the parties have not worked 
together long enough to develop an interaction history’ therefore, for the scope of this 
research the group of employees with experience up to 6 months was selected to 
measure the initial levels of trust. A maximum period of six months’ experience 
enables a sufficient sample size to be used effectively in statistical analysis as well as 
set an amount of time that employees would not be yet familiar with all their 
company’s systems.  
 
2.2 Sample 
The respondents were aircraft maintenance employees working in aircraft maintenance 
organisations operating under the Australian Civil Aviation Safety Agency (CASA), 
the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) system or in military organisations. The questionnaire was distributed in 
English and no respondent required its translation into a different language.  
Respondents were recruited in two different phases: 
• phase 1. contacted through their managers as their company agreed to 
participate in the survey and  
• phase 2. contacted directly by the principal investigator. 
In phase one, 11 aircraft maintenance organisations were contacted initially for 
participation and five accepted the invitation. The questionnaire was sent to 121 
aircraft maintenance employees, with full responses from 62 giving a response rate at 
51%, which is consistent with past research (Chan & Lai, 2017; Leedy & Ormrod, 
2013). In phase two another 380 aircraft maintenance employees were contacted 
directly by the principal investigator, with full responses from 197 giving a response 
rate of 52%. In total 259 fully answered questionnaires were collected.  
The participants received the invitation to participate by email, which included an 
information sheet in which the scope of this research, the survey content, the value of 
each participant’s input, anonymity reassurance, information on ethics approval, 
assurance of confidentiality of the data obtained, and a commitment of feedback were 
included. Participants received two weekly reminders in case they had not responded 
within a week of the initial invitation email. For the questionnaire’s distribution the 
web-based tool Limesurvey (Faul, Erdfeldfer, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) was used. 
Limesurvey helped to augment the response rate to the questionnaire by providing a 
professional appearance, privacy and anonymity to the participants. 
 
2.3 Data analysis  
Quantitative analysis of responses to the questionnaire was conducted using SPSS 
Statistics 25.0.0. In this research study a correlational research design was used to 
investigate the relationship between the two traits (CS and trust) and avoid implying 
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any causational  relationship in any way (Fraenkel & Wallen, 2003). Following data 
screening to address any anomalies, the reliability of each construct, CS and trust, were 
measured using the Cronbach’s alpha. This was followed by descriptive statistics, 
correlations between variables, t-tests and analyses of variance (ANOVA).  
For this study snowball sampling was used, as firstly participants were selected both 
randomly and from an initial circle of colleagues/associates. They were then asked to 
propose more participants from their circle of colleagues and associates. For this 
reason, Harman’s one factor analysis was used to determine the existence or absence 
of the common method bias. This analysis identified that the largest single factor 
explained less than 50% of the variance, i.e. 41%. Therefore, no significant common 
method bias was identified in this research project. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Descriptive statistics 
The respondents were mostly civil aircraft maintenance employees (83%) while their 
military counterparts made up 13% of respondents (4% of the sample did not state 
their civil/military status). The newly hired employees (less than 6 months experience) 
comprised just 7%. Respondents were found to be evenly equally distributed according 
to their total experience: 19% had total experience between 0 to 9.5 years, 26% 10 to 
19.5 years, 31% between 20 to 29.5 years, 24% more than 30 years of experience. Half 
of the respondents were either holding a supervisory or a managerial post. Of the 
respondents 51% held one license and worked for a maintenance company regulated 
by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), 6% held a single license from the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and 9% held a single license from the Civil 
Aviation Safety Authority (CASA). 12 % of the respondents held military license 
while another 12 % held multiple licenses and the remaining held no license. 
The Cronbach’s alpha values were measured for both CSQ and TCMQ whole 
questionnaires and the different group of questions (constructs) that each questionnaire 
was divided in: the managers’ questions group in CSQ and the 7 constructs of the 
TCMQ questionnaire. All of these Cronbach’s alpha values ranged between 0.77 and 
0.97. Particularly, the Cronbach’s alpha for the whole CSQ was 0.97 similar to that 
found by past researchers who used the same questionnaire (Downs & Hazen, 1977; 
Mount & Back, 1999) , the whole TMCQ was 0.91, the CSQ managers’ group was 
0.88 and the TCMQ’s Trust in company's software Capability was 0.92. These were 
high reliability scores and therefore acceptable for this research. 
3.2 Hypotheses testing 
Hypotheses 1(a)(b) are suggesting that interpersonal trust is positively linked to overall 
CS among aircraft maintenance employees and between supervisors/managers 
(referred as managers in the rest of the text) and their subordinates. Hypothesis 1 (a) 
was supported using the bivariate correlation. This correlation indicated a positive 
association between interpersonal trust and overall CS among employees (r = 0.56, p 
< 0.01, N = 261) and is illustrated in figure 2A. In figure 2A it should be noted there 
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are some outliers present that have increased very slightly the strength of the 
association. The overall CS score for all employees and their interpersonal trust score 
are the means of the scores of all items of CSQ (sections C, D excluding D10 and D20) 
and the items F1 to F11 of the TMCQ respectively. The overall scores are measured 
on the same scale as the original scores and this applies to all scores measured in this 
section. 
For Hypothesis 1(b) the strong association between the managers’ CS towards   their 
subordinates and the managers’ interpersonal trust towards their subordinates (r = 0.75, 
p < 0.01, N = 129) is shown in figure 2B. It is noted here that the outliers do not 
significantly alter the correlation. The managers-subordinates CS score and the 
managers-subordinates’ interpersonal trust score are the means of the scores of all 
items of CSQ that were responded to by managers only (section E) and all items of the 
section G of the TMCQ respectively.  
Hypotheses 2(a)(b) were statistically well supported. The correlations indicated the 
positive association between trust towards the company’s software for employees and 
their overall CS, as well as the managers’ trust towards the company’s software and 
their overall CS.  For Hypothesis 2(a) the Pearson correlation r between employees’ 
overall CS and their software trust was r = 0.51, p < 0.01, N = 261. The association 
between employees’ software trust and overall CS is shown in figure 2C indicating 
moderate-large scatter about the line of best fit. The employees’ overall CS score and 
their trust towards the company’s software score are the means of the scores of all 
items of CSQ (sections C, D excluding D10 and D20) and the items F14 to F17 of the 
TMCQ respectively. For Hypothesis 2(b) the correlation between the managers’ levels 
of trust for the company’s software and their CS towards their subordinates indicated 
a weak association (r = 0.33, p < 0.01, N = 132), as illustrated by the large scatter in 
figure 2D.  
It is worth mentioning here that, even though there is a statistically significant 
correlation between these two traits, the association is quite weak.  On the other hand, 
the correlation between the managers’ levels of trust for the company’s software and 
their CS towards their company and peers indicated a stronger association (r = 0.57, p 
< 0.01, N = 132), see figure 2E. It should be noted there are some outliers present that 
have increased very slightly the strength of the association. The managers-
subordinates CS score and the managers’ trust towards the software score are the 
means of the scores of the items in section E of the CSQ and managers’ responses in 
items of the TMCQ (items F14 - F17) respectively. The managers’ CS towards their 
company and peers score is the mean of the score of the items in sections C and D for 
the selected cases of the managers.  
Hypotheses 3(a)(b) were supported as well. For Hypothesis 3(a) the correlation 
between the subordinates’ overall CS and their interpersonal trust, indicated a 
moderate relationship between the two traits (r = 0.60, p < 0.01, N = 129) with figure 
2F supporting the evident association of this form of trust with the subordinates’ 
overall CS. The subordinates’ overall CS score and their interpersonal trust score are 
the means of the scores of the items in sections C and D of the CSQ for the 
subordinates’ as selected cases and items of the TMCQ (items F1 - F11) respectively. 
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For Hypothesis 3(b) the correlation between the subordinates’ overall CS and their 
trust towards the company’s software, showed a medium strength relationship between 
the two traits (r = 0.45, p < 0.01, N = 129) and indicated some association of this form 
of trust with the subordinates’ overall CS, figure 2G with a moderate-large scatter 
about the line of best fit. The subordinates’ overall CS score and their trust towards 
the company’s software score are the means of the scores of the items in sections C 
and D of the CSQ for the subordinates’ as selected cases and items of the TMCQ (items 
F14 - F17) respectively. 
Hypothesis 4(a)(b)(c). For this analysis the sample size of the newly hired personnel 
(N = 17) was anticipated and found to be very small compared to the rest of the 
experienced personnel (N = 244). Due to the large difference in sample sizes of the 
two groups, descriptive statistical analysis was conducted and a comparison between 
the means of each group was used as an indicator of possible support of each part of 
this hypothesis. In particular: For Hypothesis 4(a), while measuring interpersonal trust, 
the newly hired group showed greater levels of trust (M: 5.90, SD = 0.72) in 
comparison to the experienced group (M: 5.57, SD = 0.87). For Hypothesis 4(b) the 
levels of trust towards the company’s software were found to be greater among the 
newly hired group (M: 5.51, SD = 0.87) than the levels of trust in the experienced 
group (M: 4.59, SD = 1.53). Furthermore, the group of newly hired personnel showed 
greater overall CS (M: 5.40, SD = 0.97) than the group of more experienced personnel 
(M: 4.75, SD = 1.09). 
 
Figure 2: A. Scatterplot of interpersonal trust score and overall CS score for all 
employees; B. Scatterplot of mangers’ CS towards subordinates and managers’ 
interpersonal trust towards subordinates; C. Scatterplot of employees’ overall CS and 
their software trust; D. Scatterplot of managers’ levels of trust for the company’s 
software and their overall CS towards their subordinates; E. Scatterplot of managers’ 
levels of trust for the company’s software and their overall CS; F. Scatterplot of 
subordinates’ levels of interpersonal trust and their CS; G. Scatterplot of subordinates’ 












































 3.3 Other observations from the data 
Next, an independent samples t-test was conducted to examine the differences in the 
means of CS and trust scores for civil aviation maintenance employees compared with 
their military counterparts, as shown in figure 3. The independent samples t-test 
showed a statistically significant difference in the means for the overall CS score and 
trust towards software between the civil and military employees. However, the 
difference in the means of the interpersonal trust scores between civil and military 
employees was not statistically significant (table 1). It is noted here that the means of 
all three traits in table 1 are greater for the civil than the military employees. Note that 
Hedge’s g is used here to indicate effect size of the difference in means due to the large 
difference in sample sizes between the military and civil employees The Hedges’ g 
values for the effect size the difference between the two types of employees with 
reference to overall CS and software trust represent a small to medium effect size and 
were found to be statistically significant, while the Hedge’s g for the interpersonal trust 
represents a small effect size and is not statistically significant (table 1). Due to the 
large difference in sample sizes between the two groups of employees, Mann-Whitney 
U tests were conducted and since they led to the same conclusions as those from the t-
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Figure 3: Means of overall CS, interpersonal trust and software trust for civil and 
military aviation maintenance employees 
 
 




N Mean St. 
Devia
tion 




(C and D) 
civil 227 4.88 1.12 2.75 58.98 0.008 * 0.40 




civil 210 5.63 0.88 1.27 246 0.206 0.22 
military 38 5.44 0.70 
Software Trust 
score (F14-F17) 
civil 210 4.75 1.51 2.22 246 0.027 * 0.39 
military 38 4.17 1.33 
*      Statistically significant 
 
Accordingly, independent samples t-tests were conducted to examine the differences 
in the means of CS and trust scores for managers compared with subordinates in 
aviation maintenance, as shown on figure 4. The t-tests indicated no statistically 
significant differences in CS and trust scores for managers compared with subordinates 
(table 2). Thus, it is noted here that the overall CS score, the interpersonal trust score 
and the trust towards the company’s software are statistically no different for the 
groups of managers and subordinates in aviation maintenance as all p values are 
greater than 0.05 (table 2). Even though differences were not statistically significant, 
Cohen’s d values were used to measure effect sizes of differences between managers 
and subordinates on the three traits and all were found to be small.  




Figure 4: A. Means of overall CS for managers and subordinates B. Means of 












  266 
Table 2: T-tests for CS and trust between managers and subordinates in aviation 
maintenance 
Traits Groups N Mean St. 
Devia
tion 




score (C and D) 
managers 136 4.86 1.07 0.93 269 0.353 0.11 




managers 133 5.66 0.78 1.25 259 0.211 0.16 
subordinates 128 5.52 0.94 
Software Trust 
score (F14-F17) 
managers 133 4.52 1.54 -
1.37 
259 0.171 0.17 
subordinates 128 4.77 1.47 
 
 
Figure 5: Means of overall CS, interpersonal trust and software trust for all 
participants in their total years of experience  
 
Differences in traits of CS and trust amongst 4 groups based on years of experience 
were investigated using a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). Differences in CS 
mean scores  across the levels of experience were found to be statistically significant 
(F = 5.96, p < 0.01). Post hoc LSD tests showed significant differences amongst the 
groups as follows: 0 to 0 9.5 years of experience compared with 20 to 29.5 years (p = 
0.001, Cohen’s d= 0.57), indicating a medium effect size; 0 to 9.5 years of experience 
compared with 30 years and more (p = 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.56) also indicating a 
medium effect size; 10 to 19.5 years of experience compared with 20 to 29.5 years (p 
= 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.44) indicating a small to medium effect size; and 10 to 19.5 
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years of experience compared with 30 years and more (p = 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.43) 
indicating a small to medium effect size (table 3).  
There was no significant statistical difference between the 0 to 9.5 years group and the 
10 to 19.5 years group and also between the 20 to 29.5 years group and the 30 years 
and more group. Furthermore, the differences in the means of interpersonal trust and 
software trust were investigated using one-way ANOVA tests, among the different 
groups by level of experience, and none were statistically significant. Another 
observation from table 3 is that the employees with less experience (0 to 9.5 and 10 to 
19.5 years) have lower CS scores than the employees with more years of experience 
(20 to 29.5 and 30 years and more). 
 
Table 3: Means and standard deviations of CS for groups of aviation maintenance 
employees based on years of experience 
Total years of 
experience 
Mean N Std. 
Deviation 
0 to 9.5 4.41 55 1.16 
10 to 19.5 4.60 71 1.00 
20 to 29.5 5.04 87 1.02 
30 years and 
more 
5.06 65 1.12 
Total 4.81 278 1.10 
 
 
Figure 6: Means of overall CS, interpersonal trust and software trust for all 
participants according to the type of license held  
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One-way ANOVA, using the Bonferroni post hoc test, was run to identify the 
differences in the traits CS and trust among six different groups of the employees, 
based on type license held (no license, EASA, FAA, CASA, multiple licenses, 
military) as shown on figure 6. The differences in CS mean scores were investigated, 
across the different licenses under which employees are operating, and was found 
statistically significant (F = 3.71, P < 0.003). The two pairs of groups that showed 
significant differences in the post hoc tests are as follows: FAA-CASA (p = 0.037, 
Hedge’s g = 1.13) indicating a large effect size and FAA-military (p = 0.008, Hedge’s 
g = 1.43) also indicating a large effect size. As a check, due to concerns about 
violations of assumptions and large differences in sample sizes amongst the groups, 
the Kruskal-Wallis test was run for the same traits and gave the same results (see table 
4 for means and standard deviations of CS).  
Statistically significant differences were not indicated between the following pairs: no 
license-EASA, no license-CASA, EASA-CASA, EASA-multiple licenses, FAA-
multiple licenses, military-EASA, military-CASA, military-no license, military-
multiple licenses and FAA- no license. Furthermore, the differences in the means of 
interpersonal trust and software trust among the different license groups were 
investigated with a one-way ANOVA, and none were statistically significant.  
Table 4: Means and standard deviations of CS for the different license groups of 
aviation maintenance employees 
License groups of 
employees 
Mean N Std. 
Deviation 
No license 4.61 27 1.18 
EASA 4.82 142 1.11 
FAA 5.56 16 0.72 
CASA 4.50 24 1.05 
Multiple licenses 5.15 33 1.19 
Military 4.43 36 0.82 
Total 4.81 278 1.10 
 
4. Discussion 
The scatterplots that are presented in Figure 2 show the correlation between the 
variables of trust and CS. From there it is found that 57% of the variation in managers’ 
CS towards their subordinates can be explained by the variation in their interpersonal 
trust towards them, with a supporting very high correlation between these two traits. 
This is the strongest association found in this study and could be due to the high 
interaction and interrelation between the two groups (managers and subordinates). In 
comparison in the subordinates’ group 37% of that group’s variation in CS can be 
explained by variation in interpersonal trust which is lower than that of the managers. 
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Next, the 31% in variation in overall CS for all employees can be explained by 
variation in interpersonal trust, with a supporting high correlation between these two 
traits as well. The association, even though it is not as strong as that of the managers, 
is strong enough to support a statistically significant positive association.  
Conversely, trust towards the company’s software and CS (especially for the managers 
towards their subordinates) indicate a very weak association (r = 0.33) (the weakest 
association found in this study). This could be partly due to other uses of the 
company’s software, apart from the communication between managers and their 
subordinates. The use of the company’s software could explain why the association 
between the subordinates’ CS and their software trust is only slightly greater (r = 0.45), 
while the association of the managers CS towards their company and peers and their 
trust towards the company’s software (r = 0.57), is slightly higher than the previous 
two, but still weak. 
After finding the mean scores of all measures for all aviation maintenance employees 
and the differences between the managers and the subordinates in their CS and the 
different types of trust, t tests were run to identify if any of the differences between 
these groups regarding CS and trust were statistically significant. The results indicated 
that there is not enough evidence to show that differences between the managers and 
the subordinates’ levels of CS, interpersonal trust and software trust were statistically 
significant. However, a t test to identify differences between the military and civil 
aviation personnel on these measures, while indicating no difference between them in 
the levels of interpersonal trust, did identify statistically significant differences in their 
levels of CS and software trust, with the civil employees having larger means for both 
these traits. 
Aviation maintenance employees were separated into six groups according to their 
license status (no license, EASA, FAA, CASA, multiple licenses, military) and were 
investigated to determine the differences in their CS and the different types of trust. A 
one-way ANOVA was run for these groups and it revealed that there were no 
differences for the different groups in their interpersonal and software trust but, there 
were significant differences in the CS for two of the pairs of the groups (FAA-CASA 
and FAA-military). It is noted here that due to the small size of some of the license 
groups, they were not proportionally correspondent to the population sample, so they 
cannot be characterised as representative and further research is recommended. 
However, these results imply the existence of important differences among these 
groups and further investigation would be very beneficial.  
In the exploration of the two traits (CS and trust) in the span of the employees’ 
experience, there were differences in the levels of the CS between the less experienced 
and more experienced employees. More specifically, between the two less experienced 
groups (0 to 9.5 and 10 to 19.5 years) there is no difference in their CS and the same 
happens with the two more experienced groups (20 to 29.5 and 30 years and more). 
The significant differences in the levels of CS appear when any one of the less 
experience groups is compared with any one of the more experienced groups.  So, it 
seems that CS is a trait that changes, as the level of experience increases, and since the 
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mean scores of CS are larger for the more experienced groups, it seems reasonable to 
infer that CS levels get higher as experience grows.   
Furthermore, in an attempt to identify the formation of the initial trust levels theory 
(McKnight et al., 1998) in this study, the aviation maintenance employees formed two 
groups according to the length of employment with their current employer. The newly 
hired employees formed one group and the other more experienced employees formed 
the second group. The newly hired group’s CS, interpersonal and software trust mean 
scores were calculated and compared to the means of the more experienced group, for 
the same traits. All three mean scores for interpersonal trust, software trust and CS 
were found to be larger for the newly hired employees. As the newly hired group is a 
very small group, these results cannot be characterised as representative, however they 




This is the first time that a positive association between communication and trust in 
the aviation maintenance sector has been reported. These findings can be very useful 
to a human factors approach to aviation maintenance safety management, given that 
both communication and trust are fundamental in aviation maintenance failure 
detection and analysis (Langer & Braithwaite, 2016) .  Past research has shown CS 
associated with job satisfaction, organisational commitment and job performance 
(work values in general) which are not only very important to the successful and 
profitable operation of the organisation and productivity (Carrière & Bourque, 2009; 
Jalalkamali et al., 2016), but to the safety-related practices of the employees as well 
(Dode et al., 2016; Evans et al., 2007; Glendon & Litherland, 2001; Luria & Yagil, 
2010; O'Connor, 2011). 
 Furthermore, poor communication itself has been linked to accident causation and 
poor safe work practices (Flin et al., 2002; Karanikas et al., 2017; Weick, 1990). 
Therefore, managers should find a way to enhance the organisation’s communication 
system, in order to keep their employees’ CS at high levels. Since this study has 
showed a positive association between CS and trust, management must take trust into 
consideration while implementing their effective communication systems. Due to the 
nature of aviation maintenance work, trust (especially interpersonal trust) is built 
around co-workers’ relationships and cooperation, which are structured in a way so as 
to reduce the likelihood of error. 
 
6.   Limitations  
This study was conducted using a sample of aviation maintenance employees that is 
not necessarily a representative sample of the total of these employees’ population. 
More specifically, there were small numbers of participants from many different 
geographical areas and this does not mean that they would be representative of the 
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total population of these areas. Therefore, it is suggested that further research is 
necessary before any results are generalised. 
Acknowledgements to Dr Christine MacDonald for her counsel. 
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Appendix A 
The items of the distributed questionnaire in this research study 
 
Section A: Demographic information of the participants (Based on Downs & Hazen 
1977)  
A1. My current post and duties require me to exercise my aircraft maintenance 
license privileges. 
A2. My company is approved by .......................... to perform and certify 
maintenance. 
A3. My experience with my current company is 
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A4. I have a total of ............ years of experience in aviation maintenance. 
 
Section B: General Questions (Based on Downs & Hazen 1977)  
B1. How satisfied are you with your job? 
B2. In the past 6 months, what has happened to your level of satisfaction? 
 
Section C: Communication - My job (Based on Downs & Hazen 1977)  
C1. Information about my progress in my job. 
C2. Personnel news. 
C3. Information about organisational policies and goals. 
C4. Information about how my job compares with others. 
C5. Information about how I am being judged. 
C6. Recognition of my efforts. 
C7. Information about departmental policies and goals. 
C8. Information about the requirements of my job. 
C9. Information about government action affecting my organisation. 
C10. Information about changes in our organisation. 
C11. Reports on how problems in my job are being handled. 
C12. Information about benefits and pay. 
C13. Information about our organisation’s financial standing. 
C14. Information about accomplishments and/or failures of the organisation. 
 
Section D: Communication - My job and the people I work with (Based on Downs & 
Hazen 1977)  
D1. My superiors know and understand the problems faced by subordinates. 
D2. The organisation’s communication motivates and stimulates an enthusiasm for 
meeting its goals. 
D3. My supervisor listens and pays attention to me. 
D4. My supervisor offers guidance for solving job related problems. 
D5. The organisation’s communication makes me identify with it or feel a vital part 
of it. 
D6. The organisation’s communications are interesting and helpful. 
D7. My supervisor trusts me. 
D8. I receive in time the information needed to do my job. 
D9. Conflicts are handled appropriately through proper communication channels. 
D10. The grapevine (person to person informal communication / gossip) is active in 
our organisation. 
D11. My supervisor is open to new ideas. 
D12. Communication with my colleagues within the organisation is accurate and free 
flowing. 
D13. Communication practices are adaptable to emergencies. 
D14. My work group is compatible. 
D15. Our meetings are well organised. 
D16. The amount of supervision given me is about right. 
D17. The attitudes towards communication in the organisation are basically healthy. 
D18. Informal communication is active and accurate. 
D19. The amount of communication in the organisation is about right. 
D20. Are you a supervisor / manager? 
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Section E: Communication - Only for managers / supervisors (Based on Downs & 
Hazen 1977)  
E1. My subordinates are responsive to downward directive communication. 
E2. My subordinates anticipate my needs for information. 
E3. I do not have a communication overload. 
E4. My subordinates are receptive to evaluation, suggestions, and criticism. 
E5. My subordinates feel responsible for initiating accurate upward communication. 
 
Section F: Trust (Adapted from Li et al. 2012)  
F1. My colleagues fulfil my expectations in our collaboration. 
F2. My colleagues perform their duties very well. 
F3. Overall, my colleagues are capable and proficient technical staff. 
F4. In general, my colleagues are knowledgeable about our organisation. 
F5. My colleagues act in the best interest of the project. 
F6. If I required assistance, my colleagues would do their best to help me. 
F7. My colleagues are interested in my professional well-being, not just their own. 
F8. My colleagues are truthful in their contact with me by actively exposing the 
whole truth on any work-related matter. 
F9. I would characterize my colleagues as honest by not telling lies. 
F10. My colleagues would keep their verbal commitments. 
F11. My colleagues are sincere and genuine. 
F12. My company's software has the functionality I need. 
F13. My company's software has the ability to do what I want it to do. 
F14. Overall, my company's software has the capabilities I need. 
F15. My company's software is very reliable. 
F16. I can depend on the software when I perform/certify maintenance tasks. 
F17. This software performs in a predictable way. 
F18. Are you a supervisor / manager? 
 
Section G: Trust - Only for managers / supervisors (Adapted from Li et al. 2012)  
G1. My subordinates are effective in assisting and fulfilling my expectations in our 
collaboration. 
G2. My subordinates perform their duties very well. 
G3. Overall, my subordinates are capable and proficient technical staff. 
G4. In general, my subordinates are knowledgeable about our organisation. 
G5. My subordinates act in the best interest of the project. 
G6. If I required assistance, my subordinates would do their best to help me. 
G7. My subordinates are interested in my professional well-being, not just their own. 
G8. My subordinates are truthful in their contact with me by actively exposing the 
whole truth on a matter. 
G9. I would characterize my subordinates as honest by not telling lies.  
 
 
 
